MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2017 ME 168
Docket: Aro-17-55
Submitted
On Briefs: July 19, 2017
Decided: July 27, 2017
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HJELM, JJ.
IN RE BRADYN B.
PER CURIAM
[¶1] The parents of Bradyn B. appeal from a judgment entered by the
District Court (Presque Isle, O’Mara, J.) terminating their parental rights to
Bradyn pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2) (2016). Both
parents challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court’s
findings that they are unfit, and the father also challenges the court’s
discretionary determination that termination is in Bradyn’s best interest.1
Because the evidence supports the court’s findings and discretionary
determination, we affirm the judgment.
1 Additionally, the father argues that he was deprived of either substantive or procedural due
process because the court terminated his parental rights even though—in his view—it was
impossible for him to comply with his reunification plan due to a change in his visitation schedule.
The father did not raise this issue at the termination hearing, however, and in fact he agreed that he
had resolved the visitation issue but was unable to resume visits with the child only because he was
arrested approximately one month before the termination hearing and remained incarcerated at
the time of the hearing. The due process issue is therefore unpreserved and we do not address it
further. See Foster v. Oral Surgery Assocs., P.A., 2008 ME 21, ¶ 22, 940 A.2d 1102; cf. In re Zoe M.,
2004 ME 94, ¶ 6, 853 A.2d 762.
2
[¶2] After a two-day termination hearing, the court found, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the parents were unwilling or unable to protect the
child from jeopardy or take responsibility for the child within a time
reasonably calculated to meet his needs, that they had failed to make a good
faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with the child, and that termination of
their parental rights was in the child’s best interest. See 22 M.R.S.
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii) & (iv); In re Robert S., 2009 ME 18, ¶ 15,
966 A.2d 894. The judgment terminating the parental rights of the mother
and father includes the following findings of fact, all of which are supported by
the evidence. See In re Gabriel W., 2017 ME 133, ¶¶ 2-3, --- A.3d ---.
[¶3] The father assaulted four women—including the child’s mother
and his own mother, i.e., the child’s paternal grandmother—either before this
action was commenced, while it was pending, or both; he only “superficial[ly]”
engaged in a batterers’ intervention program and was unable to complete the
program because he was arrested one month before the termination hearing
and remained in custody at the time of the hearing; because he was
incarcerated, he was also unable to continue participating in other
reunification services, including substance abuse counseling and visits with
the child; several months before his most recent arrest, and nearly one year
3
after the child had been removed from his care, he had pleaded guilty to a
Class C drug furnishing charge and was subject to a deferred disposition, see
17-A M.R.S. §§ 1348 to 1348-C (2015);2 he continued to abuse “multiple
substances” while this matter was pending even though jeopardy was based
in part on his “polysubstance abuse”; he was not “open and honest” with his
providers; he has made statements, which the court discredited, that he does
not understand what the Department and providers expect of him; and he
feels he is “the victim” in this proceeding.
[¶4] The mother “has a lengthy history of substance abuse, both before
and during this proceeding”; “admits using drugs until February 2016 and
alcohol to excess until after an altercation with her sister” in the summer of
2016, which was several months before the termination hearing, even
though—as with the father—jeopardy was based in part on her
“polysubstance abuse”; and she “continues to maintain a relationship with [a
person] . . . who she should well know should not be in [the child’s] life, and
who may well be a threat to her sobriety,” and for whom she had, in fact,
recently provided transportation when he was released from prison.
2 Title 17-A M.R.S. §§ 1348-A and 1348-B have since been amended, but the amendments are
not relevant in the present case. See P.L. 2015, ch. 496, § 10 (effective July 29, 2016) (codified at
17-A M.R.S. § 1348-A (2016)); P.L. 2015, ch. 431, § 43 (effective July 29, 2016) (codified at
17-A M.R.S. § 1348-B (2016)).
4
[¶5] Finally, the child, who was nearly five years old when the
termination hearing was held, had been in foster care for approximately a
quarter of his life, and his need for “permanency, stability, certainty, and
competent parenting . . . in a safe and loving home” was being fulfilled at his
current placement where he was “settled and happy.”
[¶6] These findings are sufficient to support the court’s determinations
that the parents have not ameliorated “the serious issues of substance abuse,
healthy relationships, and violence” that resulted in the removal of the child
from their care; and that “[o]ver the 15 or so months [that] this case [was
pending], neither parent . . . demonstrated the skills, ability, or . . . the desire to
put [the child’s] . . . needs[] and his safety first.” Accordingly, the court did not
err or abuse its discretion in determining that the parents are unfit and that
termination of their parental rights is in the child’s best interest. See In re
Cameron B., 2017 ME 18, ¶¶ 10-11, 154 A.3d 1199; In re Hannah S., 2016 ME
32, ¶ 9, 133 A.3d 590; In re Thomas H., 2005 ME 123, ¶¶ 16-17, 30, 889 A.2d
297.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
5
Matthew A. Hunter, Esq., Caribou, for appellant Father
Amy McNally, Esq., Woodman Edmands Danylik Austin Smith & Jacques, P.A.,
Biddeford, for appellant Mother
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Hunter C. Umphrey, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office
of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and
Human Services
Presque Isle District Court docket number PC-2015-16
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY