Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-17-00080-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF A.F.C., I.C.C., and A.R.H. Jr., Children
From the 225th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2015PA01986
Honorable Charles E. Montemayor, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Marialyn Barnard, Justice
Sitting: Marialyn Barnard, Justice
Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Delivered and Filed: July 26, 2017
AFFIRMED
This is an appeal from the trial court’s order terminating appellant mother’s (“Mother”)
rights to her children, A.F.C., I.C.C., and A.R.H. Jr. On appeal, Mother contends the evidence is
legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination is in the
children’s best interests. We affirm the trial court’s termination order.
BACKGROUND
The record shows the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (“the
Department”) first became involved with Mother based on a referral alleging mental health
concerns, domestic violence, and drug use. After Family Based Services proved unsuccessful, the
Department filed its petition for termination of Mother’s parental rights in the event reunification
proved impossible. The Department removed the children from Mother’s care. Upon removal,
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the Department placed the two girls, A.F.C. and I.C.C., in foster care, and placed A.R.H. Jr., a
half-brother to the girls, with his paternal grandmother. At the time the petition was filed, A.F.C.
and I.C.C. were six and five years old, respectively; A.R.H. Jr. was one. 1
The Department created a service plan for Mother which required, among other things, that
she attend counseling, parenting courses, and an outpatient drug program. The trial court ordered
Mother to comply with each requirement set out in the plan. Mother did not complete the
requirements of her service plan. Despite the service plan requirements, Mother tested positive
for methamphetamines on at least three occasions, and was discharged from a drug treatment
program for noncompliance. Twice during this case, Mother was accused of assaulting her own
mother, with whom she was living. She was twice incarcerated for the assaults and for a violation
of probation.
Throughout the case, the trial court held the statutorily-required status and permanency
hearings. Ultimately, the matter moved to a final hearing, during which the Department sought to
terminate Mother’s parental rights. 2 After considering the evidence, the trial court terminated
Mother’s parental rights, finding she: (1) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to
remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of
the children; (2) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged
in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children; (3) failed to
comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for
her to obtain the return of her children; and (4) used a controlled substance in a manner that
1
We note that in the parties’ briefs, A.R.H. Jr. is listed as having been a week old at the time the Department filed its
petition. However, the order appointing the Department as temporary managing conservator of the children stated
A.R.H. Jr. was one year old at the time.
2
The Department also sought to terminate the parental rights of the children’s respective fathers. The two fathers in
this case each voluntarily relinquished their parental rights. Neither father sought appellate review, and they are not
parties to this appeal.
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endangered the health or safety of the children and either failed to complete a court-ordered
substance abuse treatment program or after completing a court-ordered substance abuse treatment
program, continued to abuse a controlled substance. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (P) (West Supp. 2016). Additionally, the trial court found
termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children. See id.
§ 161.001(b)(2). Thereafter, Mother perfected this appeal.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Mother does not contest the trial court’s findings under sections 161.001(b)(1)
of the Texas Family Code (“the Code”). See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O),
(P). Rather, she contends only that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the
trial court’s finding that termination was in the children’s best interests. See id. § 161.001(b)(2).
Standard of Review
A court may terminate a parent’s rights to her children only if the court finds by clear and
convincing evidence the parent violated a provision of section 161.001(1) and termination is in the
best interests of the children. Id. § 161.001(1), (2). The Code defines “clear and convincing
evidence” as “proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as
to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Id. § 101.007. Courts require this
heightened standard of review because the termination of parental rights results in permanent and
unalterable changes for both parent and child. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex. 2002). Thus,
when reviewing a termination order, we must determine whether the evidence is such that a fact
finder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that termination was in the child’s best
interest. J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 267; In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002).
In addressing a legal sufficiency challenge in parental termination cases, the court views
the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings and judgment, and any disputed
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facts are resolved in favor of the trial court’s findings if a reasonable fact finder could have so
resolved them. J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 267. The court must disregard all evidence that a reasonable
fact finder could have disbelieved and consider undisputed evidence even if such evidence is
contrary to the trial court’s findings. Id. In other words, we consider evidence favorable to
termination if a reasonable fact finder could, and we disregard contrary evidence unless a
reasonable fact finder could not. Id.
In addressing the factual sufficiency challenge, we give due deference to the trier of fact’s
findings, avoiding substituting our own judgment for that of the fact finder. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at
27. “If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable fact finder could not
have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that fact finder could not reasonably have
formed a firm belief or conviction[in the truth of the finding], then the evidence is factually
insufficient.” J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266.
In conducting a sufficiency review, we may not weigh a witness’s credibility because it
depends on appearance and demeanor, and these are within the domain of the trier of fact. In re
J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). Even when such issues are found in the appellate record,
we must defer to the fact finder’s reasonable resolutions. Id.
Applicable Law
In a best interest analysis, we consider the factors set forth by the Texas Supreme Court in
Holley v. Adams: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now
and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the
parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist these
individuals to promote the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by these individuals;
(7) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that
may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for acts
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or omissions of the parent. 544 S.W.3d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). These factors are not exhaustive
and a court may consider other factors. Id. at 372. Also, a court need not find evidence of each
and every factor to terminate the parent-child relationship. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. According to
the Texas Supreme Court, “the absence of evidence about some of these considerations would not
preclude a fact finder from reasonably forming a strong conviction or belief that termination is in
the child’s best interest, particularly if the evidence were undisputed that the parental relationship
endangered the safety of the child.” Id. Furthermore, in conducting our review of the trial court’s
termination, rather than focusing on the parent’s best interest, we will focus on whether termination
of the parent-child relationship is in the best interest of the child. Id.
We recognize courts indulge in the strong presumption that maintaining the parent-child
relationship is in a child’s best interest. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam).
However, promptly placing the child in a safe environment is also presumed to be in his or her
best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(a). Thus, in addition to the Holley factors, a court
should consider the following factors in determining whether the children’s parent is willing and
able to provide the children with a safe environment: (1) the child’s age and physical and mental
vulnerability; (2) the frequency and nature of out-of-home placements; (3) the magnitude,
frequency, and circumstances of the harm to the child; (4) whether the child has been the victim
of repeated harm after the initial report and intervention by the department; (5) whether the child
is fearful of living in or returning to the child’s home; (6) the results of psychiatric, psychological,
or developmental evaluations of the child, the child’s parents, other family members, or others
who have access to the child; (7) whether there is a history of abusive or assaultive conduct by the
child’s family or others who have access to the child’s home; (8) whether there is a history of
substance abuse by the child’s family or others who have access to the child’s home; (9) whether
the perpetrator of the harm to the child is identified; (10) the willingness and ability of the child’s
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family to seek out, accept, and complete counseling services and to cooperate with and facilitate
an appropriate agency’s close supervision; (11) the willingness and ability of the child’s family to
effect positive environmental and personal changes within a reasonable period of time; (12)
whether the child’s family demonstrates adequate parenting skills; and (13) whether an adequate
social support system consisting of an extended family and friends is available to the child. Id.
§ 263.307(b).
Moreover, although proof of acts or omissions under section 161.001(b)(1) of the Texas
Family Code does not relieve the Department from proving the best interest of the child, the same
evidence may be probative of both issues. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28. In conducting a best interest
analysis, a court may consider circumstantial evidence, subjective factors, and the totality of the
evidence, in addition to direct evidence. In re B.R., 456 S.W.3d 612, 616 (citing In re E.D., 419
S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied)). Additionally, a trier of fact may
measure a parent’s future conduct by his or her past conduct in determining whether termination
of the parent-child relationship is in the best interest of the child. Id.
The Evidence
As Mother points out, at the final hearing, the Department presented limited evidence with
regard to several of the Holley factors — the desires of the children, programs available to assist
in promoting the best interests of the children, and Mother’s parental abilities. However, as stated
above, a court need not find evidence of each Holley factor before terminating the parent-child
relationship. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. The absence of evidence as to one or more of the Holley
factors does not preclude a trier of fact from reasonably forming a strong conviction or belief that
termination is in a child’s best interest. Id. Here, despite the lack of evidence as to all of the Holley
factors, we hold the evidence that does exist is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial
court’s finding that it was in the children’s best interests to terminate Mother’s parental rights.
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In our review, we have considered the Holley factors and the statutory factors in section
263.307(b) of the Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.
We have also considered the acts or omissions as found by the trial court under section
161.001(b)(1) of the Code, as well as the circumstantial evidence, subjective factors, and the
totality of the evidence. See In re R.S.D., 446 S.W.3d 816, 820 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014,
no pet.).
At the termination hearing, the Department called three Department caseworkers: (1) Amy
Loper; (2) Orlando Herrera; (3) and Leonor Cisneros-Salazar. The Department also called A.R.H.
Jr.’s paternal grandmother, who provided testimony relating to her willingness to care for and
adopt A.R.H. Jr. Mother testified on her own behalf.
1. Desires of the Children
We recognize, as Mother points out, the Department did not present any evidence directly
addressing the desires of the children. However, at the time of trial, A.R.H. Jr. was two years old
and likely unable to express his desires regarding conservatorship. When a child is too young to
express his desires, a fact finder may consider whether he has bonded with the foster family, is
well-cared for by them, and has spent minimal time with the parent. In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105,
118 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). At the time of trial, Mother had not seen
the children, including A.R.H. Jr., for more than a year. Two of the Department caseworkers
opined that the children had made significant progress since their placements. The paternal
grandmother testified that since A.R.H. Jr. had been in her care, “he [was] bonding to [her and her
husband] really good.” Thus, the trial court was permitted to consider this evidence regarding
A.R.H. Jr.’s desires.
Unlike their half-brother, A.F.C. and I.C.C. may have been able to express their desires.
As Mother contends, the Department did not produce evidence as to the older children’s desires,
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however, its failure to do so is not dispositive in a best interest analysis. See C.H., 89 S.W.3d at
27.
2. Emotional & Physical Needs/Emotional & Physical Danger/Parenting Abilities
Mother’s youngest child, A.R.H. Jr., will require constant emotional and physical support
because of his age. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(1) (child’s age and mental and
physical vulnerabilities); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. His age renders him vulnerable if he
were left in the custody of a parent who uses drugs or exposes him to violence. See TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(1); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. A.R.H. Jr. relies on caretakers for all
his needs and this need will continue for many years. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(1);
Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.
Although the record is unclear as to the specific needs and vulnerabilities of the two older
children, the Department caseworkers stated A.F.C. and I.C.C. suffered as a result of exposure to
violence, drugs, and their Mother’s untreated mental health issues. Additionally, the Department
caseworkers noted the girls have “special needs” requiring medication and therapy, which they
have received since their removal from Mother’s care. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. 263.307(b)(1).
As a result of the children’s specific needs, two independent therapists recommended
suspending all parent-child visitation with Mother. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(6)
(results of psychiatric, psychological, or developmental evaluations of child, the child’s parents,
other family members, or others who have access to the child’s home). Since the suspension of
visits, the children have made significant progress with their therapists. Even after the children’s
improvement, the Department caseworkers stated the therapists did not recommend reinstating
visits with Mother. See id. We recognize Mother visited with the children twice in the beginning
of her case and the suspension of visits was a unilateral decision. However, the evidence shows
the therapists believed Mother’s lifestyle was harmful to the children. In sum, the evidence shows
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the children have heightened emotional and physical needs that were addressed only by foster care
placement and the Department’s intervention. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(1); id.
§ 263.307(b) (6); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.
With regard to the potential emotional and physical danger to the children, there is evidence
of Mother’s drug use and the existence of domestic violence. The Department presented testimony
showing Mother sent a seemingly inadvertent text message to a caseworker asking for “yellow,” a
street name for drugs. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(8) (history of substance abuse by
child’s family or others who have access to child’s home); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. Mother
admitted using methamphetamines and she tested positive for methamphetamines on at least three
occasions. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(8); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.
As part of her service plan, the Department referred Mother to an outpatient drug treatment
program. However, Mother was discharged from the program for noncompliance when she arrived
under the influence and refused to drug test. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(8); id.
§ 263.307(b)(10) (willingness and ability of child’s family to seek out, accept, and complete
counseling services and to cooperate with and facilitate appropriate agency’s close supervision);
id. § 263.307(b)(11) (willingness and ability of child’s family to effect positive environmental and
personal changes within reasonable period of time); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. Furthermore,
one caseworker testified Mother admitted she needed to use drugs to comply with the
Department’s service plan. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(8); id. § 263.307(b)(11);
Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. Although the parties dispute whether Mother completed a drug
treatment program, it is undisputed that Mother returned to using drugs after she allegedly
completed treatment. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(8); id. § 263.307(b)(11); Holley,
544 S.W.2d at 371–72. The evidence shows Mother uses, and may continue to use,
methamphetamines, placing her children in emotional and physical danger. See TEX. FAM. CODE
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ANN. § 263.307(b)(4) (magnitude, frequency, and circumstances of harm to child); id.
§ 263.307(b)(8); id. § 263.307(b)(11); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.
Mother’s issues with domestic violence also placed the children in emotional and physical
danger. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(7) (whether there is history of abusive or
assaultive conduct by child’s family or others who have access to child’s home); Holley, 544
S.W.2d at 371–72. Mother admitted there were instances of domestic violence with her boyfriend.
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(7); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. In addition, as
previously noted, Mother was accused of assaulting her mother, with whom she lived, on two
separate occasions. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(7); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.
Moreover, one of the caseworkers testified the two female children suffered some sort of traumatic
experience involving sexual abuse, although the record is unclear regarding the specifics of the
incident. Thus, the evidence shows Mother subjected the children to emotional and physical
danger when they were in her custody. See In re J.I.T.P., 99 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (noting domestic violence is evidence of physical and
emotional endangerment).
Additionally, Mother did not challenge the trial court’s findings that she placed or engaged
in conduct that placed her children in conditions that endangered their physical or emotional well-
being. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1) (D), (E). She also failed to challenge the finding
that she used a controlled substance in a manner that endangered the children. See id.
§ 161.001(b)(1)(P). Although this does not relieve the Department from proving termination is in
the best interests of the children, it is probative on the best interests issue and shows Mother’s
propensity for placing her children in dangerous situations. See C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28; see also
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(12) (whether child’s family demonstrates adequate parenting
skills); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.
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The evidence set out above is also relevant to Mother’s lack of parenting abilities. See
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(10); id. § 263.307(b)(11); id. § 263.307(b)(12); Holley, 544
S.W.2d at 371–72. Mother chose to use drugs and engage in violent conduct during a time when
undertaking services to regain custody of her children should have been her priority. See TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(8); id. § 263.307(b)(11); id. § 263.307(b)(12); Holley, 544 S.W.2d
at 371–72.
Moreover, there are concerns about Mother’s ability to parent her children given her refusal
to deal with her mental health issues. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(11); id.
§ 263.307(b)(12); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. Although the record is unclear as to the specific
mental health concerns, Mother admitted hearing voices, suffering from depression, and having
suicidal thoughts. Despite these issues, Mother failed to comply with the portion of her service
plan requiring a psychosocial or mental health evaluation. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 263.307(b)(10); id. § 263.307(b)(11); id. § 263.307(b)(12); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. The
trial court could have determined, based on this evidence, that Mother lacks the abilities needed to
properly parent her young children. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.
3. Available Programs to Assist Individual to Promote Best Interest
The Department created a service plan tailored to Mother’s needs and the trial court
adopted the plan as a requirement for reunification. Mother was required, among other things, to
seek a mental health or psychiatric evaluation, to attend counseling, to attend parenting courses,
and to complete outpatient drug treatment. According to the caseworkers’ testimony, Mother
failed to complete any part of her service plan, despite the referrals to several available programs.
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(10); id. § 263.307(b)(11); id. § 263.307(b)(12); Holley,
544 S.W.2d at 371–72. Although Mother contends, and the caseworkers confirm, she completed
a domestic violence class, a parenting class, and an anger management class while she was
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incarcerated at Bexar County Jail, the completed courses did not meet the requirements of her
service plan. Mother and one of the caseworkers testified Mother began counseling; however, the
record shows Mother only attended for a couple of months and failed to complete the program.
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(10); id. § 263.307(b)(11); id. § 263.307(b)(12); Holley,
544 S.W.2d at 371–72. One caseworker testified to Mother’s lack of contact with the Department
during the case and to helping Mother obtain providers after her release from jail despite Mother’s
disappearance for several months. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(10); id.
§ 263.307(b)(11); id. § 263.307(b)(12); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.
The evidence establishes that despite the availability of services and programs provided by
the Department, Mother chose not to engage. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(10); id.
§ 263.307(b)(11); id. § 263.307(b)(12); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. Rather, Mother chose to
continue to engage in conduct that originally resulted in the removal of her children.
As stated above, this choice is also relevant to Mother’s parenting skills. Based on the
evidence showing Mother’s almost complete failure to participate and complete her service plan,
she has demonstrated a lack of motivation to improve her parenting skills, which are questionable
given her lifestyle choices. See In re W.E.C., 110 S.W.3d 231, 245 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003,
no pet.) (holding that trier of fact could have formed firm belief that parent was not motivated to
improve parenting abilities given failure to avail herself of programs provided); see also TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(10); id. § 263.307(b)(11); id. § 263.307(b)(12); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at
371–72.
4. Plans for Children by Those Seeking Custody/Stability of Home or Proposed Placement
At the time of the final hearing, Mother was incarcerated. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 263.307(b)(7); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. Although Mother speculated she might be
released from jail within two months, her plans after her release were vague and uncertain. See
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TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(11); id. § 263.307(b)(12); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.
Moreover, upon release, she would be required to attend a drug treatment program, which due to
her prior inability to comply with treatment, the trial court may have inferred Mother would be
unable to complete. See B.R., 456 S.W.3d at 616 (allowing trier of fact to measure future conduct
by prior conduct). Furthermore, the testimony established Mother failed to obtain stable housing
and was forced to move in with her mother. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(11); Holley,
544 S.W.2d at 371–72.
Although Mother contends she was employed at a temporary agency, she failed to provide
proof of employment to the Department, and when the caseworker called to verify her
employment, the agency stated Mother worked for one day and never returned. See TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(11); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. In sum, Mother’s continued drug
use, lack of housing plans, unemployment, and incarceration portend future instability and “[a]s a
general rule, conduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability endangers the
physical and emotional well-being of a child.” In re D.J.H., 381 S.W.3d 606, 613 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 2012, no pet.) (quoting In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2004, pet. denied)).
Most telling, Mother testified her service plan was “hard” and her current incarceration
would not allow her to provide care for her children. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(11);
Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. Additionally, Mother testified she was happy with A.R.H. Jr.’s
placement with his paternal grandmother. Regarding her two older children, Mother stated her life
has been “lacking in the stability that [her] girls need” and she wants them to be in a placement
where they can continue to develop well. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(11); Holley,
544 S.W.2d at 371–72.
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The Department also provided evidence regarding the current and future placement of the
children. The evidence shows the planned placements are supportive and stable. See Holley, 544
S.W.2d at 371–72. As for A.R.H. Jr., his paternal grandmother, who is also his foster mother,
testified he is doing “really good” and bonding with her family. See id. Furthermore, she testified
she and her husband are willing to adopt A.R.H. Jr. and raise him as if he were their own child.
See id. She is also willing to maintain a relationship between A.R.H. Jr. and his half-sisters. See
id.
A.F.C. and I.C.C. were in foster care at the time of the final hearing. As Mother points out,
their current foster family is not able to adopt the girls; however, the Department testified about
permanency plans for the girls. The Department intends to place them with family friends of their
maternal grandmother. See id. The evidence shows that at the time of the final hearing, these
family friends were going through the process to become licensed and certified foster parents as a
precursor to adoption. See id. The Department caseworkers testified they supported the family’s
efforts and were positive with regard to the family’s ability to care for the girls after completion
of the process. See id. The caseworkers testified the proposed adoptive parents were aware of the
girls’ special needs and were still dedicated to their adoption. See id. The evidence also shows
the potential adoptive parents are aware of the girls’ half-brother, A.R.H. Jr., and are willing to
continue to foster a sibling relationship between the children. See id.
Additionally, the Department caseworkers testified about the improvements the two older
children have made since their placement in foster care. Prior to their foster care placement, the
children did not express emotion or discuss their traumatic experiences. Since their removal from
Mother’s care, the caseworkers testified the older children have begun to open up, laugh, and smile.
Each caseworker expressed support for the proposed placements for all three children and their
disapproval of returning the children to Mother’s care. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.
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Summation
The evidence shows Mother exposed her children to drug use and domestic violence,
endangering their physical and emotional well-being. She engaged in criminal behavior, including
assaulting her mother, which resulted in Mother’s incarceration. Mother failed to comply with her
service plan, despite reasonable time and opportunity. Mother’s conduct prior to the Department’s
removal of the children and subsequent thereto shows she is unable to care for her children — she
is unable to resolve her own mental health and drug issues.
Therefore, based on the foregoing, we hold the evidence, when considered in light of the
relevant Holley factors and statutory considerations, weighs in favor of a finding that termination
was in the best interests of Mother’s children. Given the trial court was permitted to consider
circumstantial evidence, subjective factors, and the totality of the evidence, in addition to the direct
evidence presented, we hold the trial court was within its discretion in finding termination of
Mother’s parental rights would be in her children’s best interests. In other words, we hold the
evidence is such that the trial court could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that
termination was in the children’s best interests.
CONCLUSION
We hold the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to have permitted the trial court, in
its discretion, to find termination was in the best interests of A.F.C., I.C.C., and A.R.H. Jr.
Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not err in terminating Mother’s parental rights, overrule
Mother’s sole issue, and affirm the trial court’s termination order.
Marialyn Barnard, Justice
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