Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-16-00133-CV
James Clinton COYLE,
Appellant
v.
COYLE FAMILY FARM, INC.,
Appellee
From the County Court at Law, Medina County, Texas
Trial Court No. 3208
Honorable Vivian Torres, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Delivered and Filed: July 26, 2017
REVERSED AND RENDERED
James Clinton Coyle appeals the trial court’s forcible detainer judgment requiring him to
vacate his residence on the Coyle Family Farm and granting a writ of possession to Coyle Family
Farm, Inc. (“CFFI”). We reverse the trial court’s judgment and render judgment dismissing CFFI’s
forcible detainer action with prejudice.
BACKGROUND
In 2003, James Coyle and other Coyle family members conveyed their interests in 764
acres of land in Medina County, Texas, known as the Coyle Family Farm (the “Property”), to CFFI
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in exchange for 100 shares each of CFFI common stock. The deed was recorded in the Medina
County, Texas records. James Coyle was allowed to live on the Property. Disputes subsequently
arose among the owners of CFFI and James Coyle regarding his use of the Property, and CFFI
filed an eviction, or forcible detainer, action against Coyle in 2013. The forcible detainer action
was abated when Coyle filed a trespass to try title action challenging CFFI’s title to the Property.
Coyle also filed a lawsuit against the Coyle Farms Partnership. The parties participated in court-
ordered mediation and reached a settlement resulting in dismissal of all three lawsuits with
prejudice. The Mediated Settlement Agreement signed on May 15, 2015 provided that James
Coyle agreed to sell and convey all his CFFI stock to CFFI’s other shareholders “with the intent
of including in such sale and conveyance all real property in which [he] claims an interest that is
held in the name of CFFI or which is held in his own name including . . . that certain tract of land
consisting of approximately 764 acres of land in Medina County, Texas and known as the Coyle
Farm . . . .” In return, Coyle was to receive a payment of $44,781 from Coyle Farms Partnership
and a payment of $670,000 from the individual shareholders of CFFI. The Settlement Agreement
further provided that Coyle and his wife “only shall have the right to live in the residence
manufactured home [on the Property] until December 31, 2015 at which time they shall vacate.”
Coyle did not vacate the Property by the deadline stated in the Settlement Agreement, and
CFFI promptly filed a new forcible detainer action against him in justice court. See TEX. R. CIV.
P. 510.3. On January 20, 2016, the justice court granted CFFI’s complaint for forcible detainer
and ordered that Coyle vacate the Property and cede immediate possession to CFFI by 5:00 p.m.
that same day. The justice court recited in its judgment that its ruling was based on “the evidence
presented, including that certain Mediated Settlement Agreement dated May 15, 2015 and in
accordance with the Deed . . . executed December 1, 2003 . . . [under which] Coyle Family Farm,
Inc., became the record owner” of the Property. Coyle appealed to county court. See TEX. R. CIV.
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P. 510.9, 510.10. After a trial de novo, the county court rendered judgment on March 11, 2016 in
favor of CFFI, granting it a writ of possession and ordering Coyle to vacate the Property. The
judgment also imposed court costs and attorney’s fees against Coyle in the amount of $9,663.75.
Coyle now appeals.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Coyle argues that CFFI improperly used the expedited eviction process in
justice court to enforce the December 31, 2015 vacancy deadline set forth in the Settlement
Agreement. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.002 (West 2014) (forcible detainer action). He
contends the justice court and county court lacked jurisdiction to “effectively enforce” a
contractual obligation stated in the Settlement Agreement. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(b) (justice
court has jurisdiction over forcible detainer actions); id. R. 510.9 (county court has jurisdiction
over the appeal). Coyle alternatively asserts that any dispute arising under the Settlement
Agreement was required to be resolved by mandatory mediation and/or binding arbitration under
the express terms of the agreement.
CFFI responds that its eviction action is completely unrelated to the Settlement Agreement.
CFFI asserts that it is not seeking to enforce the Settlement Agreement, but merely availing itself
of the expedited statutory procedure for property owners to obtain physical possession from a
holdover tenant or tenant at sufferance. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.002(a)(1), (2) (West
2014); see also Marshall v. Housing Auth. of City of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex.
2006) (action for forcible detainer is “intended to be a speedy, simple, and inexpensive means to
obtain immediate possession of property”). CFFI argues the evidence of its title and superior right
to possession of the Property was undisputed in the justice court and the county court. CFFI cites
the undisputed evidence as: the 2003 deed; the agreed dismissal of Coyle’s trespass to try title
action; and the Settlement Agreement’s deadline for Coyle to vacate the Property. Therefore, CFFI
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argues that under the statutory procedure it was entitled to the writ of possession awarded by both
lower courts.
The ultimate issue in this case is whether CFFI may use a new eviction action against Coyle
as a remedy for his failure to vacate by the deadline set forth in the Settlement Agreement. It is
the Settlement Agreement that created the contractual obligation for Coyle to vacate the Property.
And, CFFI admittedly relies on the Settlement Agreement as part of the evidence warranting
Coyle’s eviction. The justice court’s judgment expressly recited that its ruling was based, in part,
on the Settlement Agreement. Therefore, we first consider the provisions of the Settlement
Agreement.
We construe a written settlement agreement in the same manner as any other type of written
contract. Garza v. Villarreal, 345 S.W.3d 473, 479 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. denied);
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.071(a) (West 2011). Courts interpret an unambiguous
contract according to the plain meaning of the language used within the four corners of the
agreement in an effort to ascertain the true intent of the parties. Garza, 345 S.W.3d at 479-80;
Seagull Energy E & P, Inc. v. Eland Energy, Inc., 207 S.W.3d 342, 345 (Tex. 2006). The court
gives the terms used in the contract their plain, ordinary meaning, unless the contract shows the
parties used them in a technical or different sense, and views the contract as a whole in an effort
to harmonize and give effect to all provisions so that none will be rendered meaningless. Garza,
345 S.W.3d at 479-80. Construction of a contract is a question of law for the court. Tawes v.
Barnes, 340 S.W.3d 419, 425 (Tex. 2011).
In their briefs, both Coyle and CFFI state that the Settlement Agreement resolved all issues
of ownership and right to possession of the Property. Specifically, the Settlement Agreement
addressed and resolved all the claims raised in three lawsuits: Cause No. 13-10-22080-CV, styled
James Coyle v. Coyle Family Farm, Inc., filed in the 38th Judicial District Court of Medina County
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(trespass to try title action); Cause No. 13-10-22074-CV, styled Coyle Farms Partnership v. James
Coyle, filed in the 38th Judicial District Court of Medina County (partnership/injunction action);
and Cause No. 2013-0019FD, styled Coyle Family Farm, Inc. v. James Coyle, filed in the Justice
Court, Pct. 1, of Medina County (eviction action). 1 The three lawsuits were dismissed with
prejudice as part of the Settlement Agreement. Under the express terms of the Settlement
Agreement, the parties’ mutual releases forever discharged each party from “any and all claims,
actions, [and] causes of action . . . including but not limited to those . . . that relate in any way to
the lawsuits” and “any claims that were asserted or could have been asserted in the lawsuits.” The
agreement further expressed the parties’ intent that the releases “be given the broadest possible
interpretation so that any further litigation between the parties, except for the obligations of
consideration required by Paragraph 2, is waived such that the parties to this agreement waive
every claim and cause of action against any other party to this agreement . . . .” Section 17.3 of
the Settlement Agreement requires that, “[a]ny disputes concerning this Agreement” must first be
submitted to mandatory mediation, and if mediation is unsuccessful, then to binding arbitration.
Finally, section 19 provides that “all future rights and obligations of the Parties shall be governed
solely by this Agreement.”
According to the plain, unambiguous language of the Settlement Agreement, it fully
addressed and resolved any and all issues pertaining to the ownership and right to possession of
the Property. On the date of the agreement’s execution, Coyle’s contractual obligation to vacate
the Property by December 31, 2015 was a future obligation created by, and to be performed under
and “governed solely by,” the Settlement Agreement. By seeking to remove Coyle from the
Property, CFFI is in essence seeking specific performance under the Settlement Agreement.
1
All three cases were consolidated into Cause No. 13-10-22080-CV.
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Specific performance is an equitable remedy that may be granted upon proof of a breach of
contract. Levetz v. Sutton, 404 S.W.3d 798, 805 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied). A party
seeking specific performance must plead and prove “(1) compliance with the contract including
tender of performance unless excused by the defendant’s breach or repudiation and (2) the
readiness, willingness, and ability to perform at relevant times.” Id. (citing DiGiuseppe v. Lawler,
269 S.W.3d 588, 593-94, 601 (Tex. 2008)). As with any other breach of contract claim, a claim
for breach of a settlement agreement is subject to the same requirements of pleading, defenses,
discovery, and proof. Ford Motor Co. v. Castillo, 279 S.W.3d 656, 663 (Tex. 2009); Levetz, 404
S.W.3d at 805-06. “[T]he law does not recognize the existence of any special summary proceeding
for the enforcement of a written agreement, even one negotiated in the context of a mediation.”
Levetz, 404 S.W.3d at 805 (quoting Gunter v. Empire Pipeline Corp., 310 S.W.3d 19, 22 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied)). CFFI was not entitled to use the summary forcible detainer
procedure to enforce Coyle’s obligation under the Settlement Agreement.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and render judgment
dismissing CFFI’s forcible detainer action with prejudice to refiling.
Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
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