J-S33040-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
W.A.H., III, :
:
Appellant : No. 1516 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 14, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County
Civil Division at No(s): 2015-190
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OTT, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED AUGUST 01, 2017
W.A.H., III (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence entered
July 14, 2016, following his conviction for indirect criminal contempt of a
temporary Protection from Abuse (PFA) order.1 We affirm.
The trial court aptly set forth the relevant factual and procedural
history of this matter as follows.
On January 14, 2015, [Appellant’s] wife, [T.A.H.] filed a
[PFA petition] seeking protection from [Appellant]. On January
15, 2015, the Honorable Carol L. Van Horn entered a temporary
PFA order which prohibited [Appellant] from, inter alia, abusing,
harassing or contacting [T.A.H.], and from contacting [Appellant]
and [T.A.H.’s] children, [including the parties’ daughter, G.H.,]
pending the outcome of a final hearing on the matter. On
February 5, 2015, Sergeant Matthew T. Cody of the
Chambersburg Police Department filed a criminal complaint
against [Appellant], alleging a violation of the temporary PFA
1
23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101-6122.
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S33040-17
order. On February 12, 2015, the Honorable Douglas W. Herman
entered a final [PFA] Order. Following a hearing on March 12,
2015, the court determined that [Appellant had] violated the
provisions of the temporary PFA Order entered against him by
contacting [T.A.H.], and engaging in conduct which was
harassing to her.
At [Appellant’s] March 12, 2015 hearing, [T.A.H.’s] aunt,
[M.B.], testified that [Appellant] sent an envelope with a letter
enclosed to [M.B.’s] home, addressed to [M.B.] with attention to
G.H., [Appellant] and [T.A.H.’s] daughter. [M.B.] testified that
inside the envelope, in [Appellant’s] handwriting, were the words
“I love you very much, all you girls. I love your mother. Stop the
hate.” The envelope was admitted into evidence as
Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1. [M.B.] testified that she initially
opened the envelope and read the letter and after reading it,
informed G.H. to not read the letter. [M.B.] also testified that the
letter enclosed in the envelope was two and one half pages long
and dated January 28, 2015. The letter was admitted into
evidence as Commonwealth’s Exhibit 2. After [M.B.] testified,
the Commonwealth requested that the court read the letter,
Commonwealth’s Exhibit 2, in its entirety.
In the letter, addressed [to] G.H., [Appellant] wrote that
most, if not all, of [T.A.H.] and [Appellant’s] arguments are
because [T.A.H.] refuses to confront any wrongdoing against
their family and [T.A.H.] refuses to tell the truth. [Appellant]
called [T.A.H.] a severe hypocrite and two-faced. [In the letter,
T.A.H.] is alleged to be a backstabber and [Appellant] further
alleges that her communication skills are passive. He claimed
that [T.A.H.] has a “nasty” habit of believing everything she
hears and refuses to get to the facts. [T.A.H.’s] previous
relationships were discussed; those before she and [Appellant]
were married. [Appellant] alleged [T.A.H.] is playing the system
because of her false/fabricated PFA statements and [indicated
that] he has a lot of anger issues with [T.A.H.’s] manipulation
and backstabbing. Hatred for [T.A.H.] was discussed, as
[Appellant] stated that he hates [T.A.H.’s] actions and that
[T.A.H.] and [Appellant] need counseling to fix their situation.
He claimed that [T.A.H.] has walked away from him and from
what has [“]unlawfully[”] happened to [Appellant]. The letter
concluded with, “I love all of you - I love your mother very much
and I wish (pray to God) your mother realizes she’s hurting
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everyone with her passive/aggressive behavior. I pray for my
wife (your mom) - I pray for ending stress/anger, I pray for
healing, I pray for faith and love. I pray for myself to remove the
anger and resentment your mother caused everyone.”
By order of court dated March 12, 2015, [the court found
Appellant in indirect criminal contempt of the temporary PFA
order and Appellant’s] sentencing hearing was scheduled for
March 26, 2015. On March 26, 2015, counsel for [Appellant]
requested a continuance to explore the possibility of filing a
motion to have a mental health evaluation for [Appellant]. A stay
of prosecution was entered on April 7, 2015 for all of
[Appellant’s] cases pending in Franklin County, including two
criminal cases. On April 27, 2015, at the request of counsel for
[Appellant] and without objection from the Commonwealth, the
court ordered [Appellant] undergo a mental health evaluation,
over [Appellant’s] strenuous objection. At a hearing held
December 8, 2015, pursuant to the Mental Health Procedures
Act, the Honorable Carol L. Van Horn determined [Appellant]
was incompetent to stand trial and ordered the stay of
prosecution to continue until [Appellant’s] incapacity was
restored through treatment. By order of court dated May 20,
2016, the stay of prosecution was vacated and directed the case
to be listed for sentencing. On June 7, 2016, the court ordered
sentencing to be held on June 27, 2016. Sentencing was later
deferred to July 14, 2016, because counsel for [Appellant] was
never notified of [Appellant’s] original sentencing date.
On July 14, 2016, [Appellant] was sentenced for the
indirect criminal contempt conviction and ordered to pay a fine
of $300.00, pursuant to 23 P[a].C.S.[] § 6114(b)(1)(i)(A), and
to serve 180 days in the Franklin County Jail, with credit for 180
days of time served from February 5, 2015.
[Appellant], through [counsel], filed a notice of appeal on
August 8, 2016. Thereafter, [Appellant’s] actions caused a
breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. New counsel was
appointed and granted an extension of time within which to file a
concise statement of matters complained of on appeal pursuant
to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). [Appellant’s] concise statement was
ultimately filed on November 11, 2016.
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Trial Court Opinion, 12/13/2016, at 2-5 (citations to notes of testimony,
footnotes, and unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to find him in
contempt of the temporary PFA order. Appellant’s Brief at 6. “When
reviewing a contempt conviction ... we are confined to a determination of
whether the facts support the trial court decision. We will reverse a trial
court’s determination only when there has been a plain abuse of discretion.”
Commonwealth v. Kolansky, 800 A.2d 937, 939 (Pa. Super. 2002)
(citations omitted). Further,
Our standard of review in assessing whether
sufficient evidence was presented to sustain
Appellant’s conviction is well-settled. The standard
we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial
in the light most favorable to the verdict winner,
there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder
to find every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. In applying [this] test, we may
not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment
for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts
and circumstances established by the
Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility
of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s
guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the
evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a
matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn
from the combined circumstances. The
Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving
every element of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.
Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire
record must be evaluated and all evidence actually
received must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact
while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and
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the weight of the evidence produced, is free to
believe all, part or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Brumbaugh, 932 A.2d 108, 109–10 (Pa.
Super. 2007) (citations omitted). To establish indirect criminal
contempt, the Commonwealth must prove: 1) the order was
sufficiently definite, clear, and specific to the contemnor as to
leave no doubt of the conduct prohibited; 2) the contemnor had
notice of the order; 3) the act constituting the violation must
have been volitional; and 4) the contemnor must have acted
with wrongful intent. Id. 932 A.2d at 110 (citation omitted).
Commonwealth v. Walsh, 36 A.3d 613, 618–19 (2012).
In his brief, Appellant concedes the first three prongs of the
aforementioned test. Appellant’s Brief at 14. Appellant focuses his
argument on the fourth prong, arguing that the Commonwealth “failed to
produce sufficient evidence to allow the trial court to conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that Appellant intended to communicate with [T.A.H.]
through his letter to G.H.” Id. The lower court addressed Appellant’s
argument as follows.
Last, there is sufficient evidence to show that [Appellant]
acted with wrongful intent by writing and sending a letter which
contained references to and about [T.A.H.]. The temporary PFA
order [entered] against [Appellant] specifically directed him not
to have any contact of any type with [T.A.H.] and to refrain from
harassing her. [Appellant] was directed to refrain from
communicating to or about [T.A.H.] through [] third persons,
including their children. [Appellant] mailed the envelope and
letter to [M.B.’s] home address just fifteen (15) days after the
temporary PFA order was issued. [Appellant] clearly acted with
wrongful intent when he sent messages to a third party about
[T.A.H.] in violation the temporary PFA order.
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Trial Court Opinion, 12/13/2016, at 8-9 (unnecessary capitalization
omitted).
We agree. Moreover, the temporary PFA order prohibited Appellant
from, inter alia, having contact with T.A.H. or any of the couple’s
children, including G.H., pending the outcome of the final PFA hearing.
Temporary PFA Order, 1/15/2015, ¶¶ 4, 14(b) and (c). Appellant concedes
that he was aware of the strict no-contact provisions of the temporary PFA
order; nonetheless, barely two weeks after the order took effect, he wrote a
letter detailing his anger at T.A.H. and her perceived shortcomings which he
then sent to M.B.’s residence, to the attention of the parties’ daughter, G.H.
There was a substantial certainty that the letter would be read by either
G.H. or T.A.H.; thus, wrongful intent can be imputed. Accordingly, because
we find no error in the court’s determination that the Commonwealth met its
burden of establishing that Appellant violated the temporary PFA order, we
affirm the court’s order holding him in indirect criminal contempt of the
same.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/1/2017
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