[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
NOVEMBER 28, 2005
No. 04-14554 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 03-21773-CV-PCH
CHARLES PITTS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY FOR THE DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS, James V. Crosby,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(November 28, 2005)
Before CARNES, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Charles Pitts, a Florida state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
dismissal of his federal habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Because Pitts filed his § 2254 petition after the effective date of the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-32, 110
Stat. 1214 (1996), the provisions of the act govern this appeal. Pitts was sentenced
to life imprisonment plus 35 years following his 1999 state convictions for first
degree murder, attempted robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, and two
counts of false imprisonment. Although Pitts asserted nine grounds in his § 2254
petition, only one of the grounds he raised, Ground 3, is at issue on appeal. In
Ground 3, Pitts alleged that there was insufficient evidence to support his
conviction for false imprisonment, resulting in violations of his constitutional
rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. We granted Pitts’s
request for a certificate of appealability (“COA”), limiting the COA to “[w]hether
the district court erred by concluding that there was sufficient evidence to support
appellant’s conviction for false imprisonment, in light of Walker v. State, 604 So.
2d 475 (Fla. 1992).”
Pitts alleges that false imprisonment is a lesser-included offense of
kidnaping, and he argues that, under Faison v. State, 426 So. 2d 963, 965 (Fla.
1983), kidnaping requires movement or confinement that (a) was not slight,
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inconsequential, and merely incidental to the other crime; (b) was not of the kind
inherent in the nature of the other crime; and (c) had some significance
independent of the other crime in that it makes the other crime substantially easier
to commit or substantially lessens the risk of detection. In the instant case, Pitts
contends, the facts do not indicate that the first prong of Faison was met, as the
movement and confinement of the victims in this case were “inconsequential and
incidental to the robbery,” and, thus, not significant.
Although Pitts filed objections to the findings of fact and conclusions of law
in the magistrate’s report and recommendation (“R&R”) below, he did not object
to the magistrate’s findings in relation to his claim that there was insufficient
evidence to support his false imprisonment convictions. Therefore, the
magistrate’s findings of fact as to the claim at issue, as adopted by the district
court, are reviewed only for plain error, viewing the facts in the light most
favorable to the prosecution to determine if a rational trier of fact could have
convicted the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. See LoConte v. Dugger, 847
F.2d 745, 749-750 (11th Cir. 1988); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99
S. Ct. 2781, 2788-89, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979).
The district court did not commit plain error in denying Pitts’s habeas
petition. The Florida Supreme Court has recently clarified that the “Faison test is
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not applicable to false imprisonment convictions because the test was established
for a particular element of the kidnapping statute that is not included in the false
imprisonment statute.” State v. Smith, 840 So. 2d 987, 989-90 (Fla. 2003). The
Smith court noted that its earlier decision in Bedford v. State, 589 So. 2d 245, 251
(Fla. 1991), “clearly supports the conclusion that the Faison test does not apply to
the offense of false imprisonment.” Smith, 840 So. 2d at 991. Smith also precludes
application of Walker to this case because Walker involved applying the Faison
test to a kidnaping case, which, as the Florida Supreme Court has pointed out, has
no bearing on a false imprisonment case such as the one before this Court. Walker,
604 So. 2d 475.
Furthermore, the district court’s denial of Pitts’s habeas petition was proper
because sufficient evidence supported Pitts’s conviction. According to the trial
testimony, during the commission of the offense, Pitts forced the convenience store
cashier to emerge from behind the counter and escorted the manager and two
bystanders toward the back of the store at gunpoint. Pitts admitted in his sworn
confession that, as he was pushing the manager to the back of the store, a scuffle
ensued, the cashier attempted to grab Pitts’s weapon, and the gun discharged,
killing the cashier. From this testimony, a rational trier of fact could have
determined beyond a reasonable doubt that Pitts had “forcibly, by threat . . .
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confin[ed], abduct[ed], imprison[ed], or restrain[ed] another person without lawful
authority and against her or his will,” and that Pitts was, thus, guilty of false
imprisonment under Florida law. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19, 90 S. Ct. at
2788-89; see also Fla. Stat. § 787.02. Because a rational jury could have found
Pitts guilty of false imprisonment under Florida law, the district court’s denial of
Pitts’s habeas petition was proper. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413, 120
S. Ct. 1495, 1523, 146 L .Ed.2d 389 (2000); Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at
2789.
Finally, to the extent that Pitts challenges the Florida Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Florida statutes regarding kidnaping and false imprisonment as
set forth in Smith, such a claim is not cognizable in a federal habeas petition. See
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S. Ct. 475, 480, 116 L. Ed. 2d 385
(1991) (stating that “it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine
state-court determinations” on questions of state law, but such courts may only
determine “whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States”).
Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and review of the record, we
discern no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of
Pitts’s § 2254 petition.
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AFFIRMED.
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