REVERSE and REMAND; and Opinion Filed August 1, 2017.
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-16-00547-CR
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant
V.
DALE LEE GILLILAND, Appellee
On Appeal from the 416th Judicial District Court
Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 416-82279-2014
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Bridges, Myers, and Brown
Opinion by Justice Brown
The State of Texas appeals the trial court’s order granting Dale Lee Gilliland’s motion to
dismiss the indictment against him for lack of a speedy trial. In a single issue, the State contends
the trial court erred because the Barker v. Wingo factors weighed against dismissal. We agree.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
On July 20, 2011, Gilliland was arrested for aggravated sexual assault of a child. He
appeared before a magistrate on July 22. The magistrate set his bond at $75,000, and Gilliland
posted bond.
Over three years after his arrest, on September 30, 2014, Gilliland was indicted for
continuous sexual abuse of a young child, rather than aggravated sexual assault of a child. See
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02 (West Supp. 2016). The indictment alleged that the offense
occurred on or about June 1, 2009, through June 30, 2011. Gilliland was arrested again on the
new charge in late 2014 and was again released on bond.
Between January and December 2015, the case was passed six times. It was eventually
set for a jury trial on April 25, 2016. On April 8, 2016, about two weeks before the trial setting,
Gilliland requested a speedy trial. In his motion for a speedy trial, he asserted that if the trial did
not go forward on April 25, he would be prejudiced due to the extensive pre- and post-indictment
delay. Three days later, Gilliland filed a motion to dismiss the case for want of a speedy trial.
At a hearing on the motion to dismiss, the court heard argument of counsel and testimony
from two defense witnesses, Gilliland and his wife. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial
court indicated it was leaning toward granting the motion to dismiss and asked the parties for
briefs on the issue. After the parties briefed the issues, the court granted Gilliland’s motion to
dismiss. The State timely filed a notice of appeal.
APPLICABLE SPEEDY TRIAL LAW
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant in a criminal prosecution the right to a
speedy trial. Hopper v. State, No. PD-0703-16, 2017 WL 2457442, at *5 (Tex. Crim. App. June
7, 2017). In Barker v. Wingo, the United States Supreme Court established a balancing test to be
used in analyzing a speedy-trial complaint, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and
defendant are weighed. Id. (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530–32 (1972)). Courts are
to consider four factors: the length of delay, the reasons for delay, to what extent the defendant
asserted his right to a speedy trial, and any prejudice suffered by the defendant. Id. Before a
court engages in an analysis of each Barker factor, however, the accused must first make a
showing that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing
ordinary from presumptively prejudicial delay. Gonzalez v. State, 435 S.W.3d 801, 808 (Tex.
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Crim. App. 2014). Presumptive prejudice simply marks the point at which courts deem the delay
unreasonable enough to trigger further inquiry. Id.
If a defendant makes a threshold showing of presumptive prejudice, a court must proceed
to consider and weigh the remaining Barker factors. Id. Courts first weigh the strength of each
factor and then balance their relative weights. Cantu v. State, 253 S.W.3d 273, 281 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2008). No one factor is either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a
deprivation of the right to a speedy trial. Id. The four factors are related and must be considered
together along with any other relevant circumstances. Id. While the State has the burden of
justifying the length of the delay, the defendant has the burden of proving the assertion of the
right and showing prejudice. Id. at 280. The defendant’s burden of proof varies inversely with
the State’s degree of culpability for the delay. Id. Thus, the greater the State’s bad faith or
negligence and the longer its actions delay a trial, the less a defendant must show actual
prejudice or prove diligence in asserting his right to a speedy trial. Id. at 280–81.
In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a speedy-trial claim, we apply a bifurcated standard
of review. Id. at 282. We apply an abuse of discretion standard for the factual components, and
a de novo standard for the legal components. Id. Review of the individual Barker factors
necessarily involves fact determinations and legal conclusions, but the balancing test as a whole
is a purely legal question. Id. Under the abuse of discretion standard, appellate courts defer not
only to a trial judge’s resolution of disputed facts, but also to his right to draw reasonable
inferences from those facts. Id. Deference to the trial court is especially appropriate when
credibility is involved. Kelly v. State, 163 S.W.3d 722, 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). In
assessing the evidence at a speedy-trial hearing, all of the evidence must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the ultimate ruling. Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 282.
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Barker Analysis
With these principles in mind, we turn to consider the four Barker factors.
1. Length of Delay
The length of delay is measured from the time an accused is arrested or formally accused.
Gonzalez, 435 S.W.3d at 809. The length of delay is a double inquiry: A court must consider
whether the delay is sufficiently long to even trigger further analysis of all the Barker factors,
and if it is, then the court must consider to what extent the delay stretches beyond the triggering
length. Hopper, 2017 WL 2457442, at *5. When the length of delay stretches well beyond the
bare minimum needed to trigger a full Barker analysis, the length of delay weighs against the
State. Gonzalez, 435 S.W.3d at 809. The longer the delay, the more prejudice is compounded.
Id. There is no set time that triggers a full speedy trial analysis. State v. Thomas, 453 S.W.3d 1,
4 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.). In general, delay approaching one year is sufficient. Id.
In this case, there was a total delay between Gilliland’s arrest and trial setting of 57
months. The delay between his arrest and subsequent indictment was 38 months, and the delay
between indictment and trial setting was 19 months. The State acknowledges that either the total
time period or the pre-indictment delay alone is sufficient to trigger a full speedy trial analysis.
In the trial court, Gilliland focused on the pre-indictment delay; his counsel told the court,
“I’m not necessarily complaining about [the post-indictment delay] here except as it adds to the
overall time.” Because Gilliland complained primarily about the pre-indictment delay, we will
focus on that time period as well. The length of the delay between the arrest and indictment
stretched well beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim.
This factor alone weighs heavily against the State. See Zamorano v. State, 84 S.W.3d 643, 649
(Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (“plain-vanilla DWI case” with delay of almost four years between
arrest and plea hearing); McGregor v. State, 394 S.W.3d 90, 113 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
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Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d) (capital murder case with delay of three years and ten months between
arrest and hearing on motion to dismiss).
2. Reasons for the Delay
Again, in considering this factor, we focus on the delay between Gilliland’s arrest and
indictment. When asked by the trial judge about the reason for the delay, the prosecutor stated
that the complaint was made to the Allen Police Department on July 19, 2011, the day before
Gilliland’s arrest. The Collin County District Attorney’s Office received the case from the
police department on February 4, 2014, and presented it to the grand jury seven months later on
September 30, 2014. Appellant was indicted that day. The State provided no information to
explain the delay in getting the case from the police.
In assessing the reasons for a delay, a court must accord different weights to different
reasons, and it must ask whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for
the delay. Hopper, 2017 WL 2457442, at *5. When, as here, the State offers no reason for the
delay, this factor weighs in favor of finding a violation of the speedy trial right. Dragoo v. State,
96 S.W.3d 308, 314 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); see State v. Jones, 168 S.W.3d 339, 348 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2005, pet. ref’d) (unexplained delay, even if by sheriff’s office, is attributable to
State for speedy trial purposes). However, this factor does not weigh heavily in favor of finding
a violation of the right. Dragoo, 96 S.W.3d at 314. In the absence of an assigned reason for the
delay, a court may presume neither a deliberate attempt on the part of the State to prejudice the
defense nor a valid reason for the delay. Id. Thus, the lack of reason for the delay weighs
against the State, but not heavily.
3. Defendant’s Assertion of the Right to a Speedy Trial
A defendant bears the responsibility to assert his right to a speedy trial. Cantu, 253
S.W.3d at 282. The defendant’s assertion of the right or his failure to assert it is entitled to
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strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the right.
Balderas v. State, 517 S.W.3d 756, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). A defendant’s lack of a timely
demand for a speedy trial indicates strongly that he did not really want one. Id. Further, the
point at which the defendant asserts his right is important because it may reflect the seriousness
of the personal prejudice he is experiencing. Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 284. Also, filing for a
dismissal instead of a speedy trial will generally weaken a speedy-trial claim because it shows a
desire to have no trial instead of a speedy one. Id. at 283.
Gilliland first asserted the right to a speedy trial over four-and-a-half years after his initial
arrest and about 18 months after he was indicted. 1 He did so by filing a motion requesting a
speedy trial on Friday April 8, 2016, about two weeks before April 25, 2016 trial setting.
Nothing in the record indicates the case would not have gone to trial as scheduled. Then on
Monday April 11, 2016, Gilliland filed a motion to dismiss for violation of his speedy trial
rights.
At the hearing in the trial court, the State asserted that Gilliland’s recent assertion of the
right weighed heavily against him. The prosecutor also argued, “[T]hey didn’t ask for it to be
indicted, they didn’t follow the State while the case is being investigated those months.” In
addition, the prosecutor told the judge that the State had demanded the case be set for trial.
Gilliland’s attorney disputed the prosecutor’s representation that the State demanded the
trial setting. Counsel stated the current prosecutor had not been present when the case was set
for trial and that the prosecutor was incorrect about who demanded the trial setting. Defense
counsel also told the court that at some point after Gilliland’s arrest and before his indictment,
counsel called the prosecutor in the Crimes Against Children division and was told there was no
1
Gilliland asserts in his brief that he did not learn of his September 2014 indictment until he was rearrested about three months later in
December 2014. He does not provide a record reference for this assertion, and we have not found this information in the record.
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case yet. Counsel asked to be notified when the district attorney’s office did have a case “so we
can present a Grand Jury packet.” He heard nothing about the case for three years and was not
given notice of the grand jury setting. Gilliland’s counsel questioned where he would have
asserted his demand for a speedy trial when no case had been filed. Similarly, in his appellate
brief, Gilliland challenges the notion that he should have “fought harder to hurry up and get
indicted.” The trial judge agreed that the idea was “a little specious.”
But there is case law from the court of criminal appeals supporting the idea that a
defendant who has been arrested but not indicted bears some responsibility to bring his case to
court. Gilliland’s situation is similar to that of the defendant in Cantu. Cantu was arrested for
driving while intoxicated and was released on bond the next day. Sixteen months later he was
formally charged with the offense. Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 277.
The court of criminal appeals stated that although a person cannot file a motion for
speedy trial until formal charges are made, the right to one can be asserted in other ways. Id. at
284 (citing Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975) (“invocation of the speedy trial
provision . . . need not await indictment, information or other formal charge”)). The court went
on to state:
An accused in appellant’s place — arrested but not formally charged — has a
choice: He can wait until he is charged, then file a motion for a speedy trial, and,
if this request is not honored, he can file a motion to dismiss because he has
diligently sought what he is entitled to — a speedy trial. Or he can wait until he is
charged and simply file a motion to dismiss if he can show that he diligently tried
to move the case into court before formal charges were filed.
Id. (footnotes omitted). In support of the above proposition, the court of criminal appeals cited
Sinclair v. State, 894 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, no pet.). Id. at 284–85 n.54 & 55.
In Sinclair, the defendant was accused of embezzling from her employer and was arrested
for theft. She was indicted three years and ten months after her arrest. The record supported a
conclusion that the delay was due to prosecutorial negligence. Sinclair, 894 S.W.2d at 440. A
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relatively short time after indictment, the defendant moved to dismiss for want of a speedy trial.
The court of appeals determined that the defendant’s failure to diligently assert her right to a
speedy trial during the time period between arrest and indictment weighed heavily against her.
Id. As in this case, the defendant asserted there was little she could have done to assert her right
to a speedy trial prior to indictment. Prior to indictment, defense counsel had written a letter to
the district attorney’s office asking that his client be allowed to appear before the grand jury, and
he spoke with prosecutors about the case on three occasions. The Austin court determined,
however, that “an attorney whose client was truly interested in the prompt disposition of the
accusations against her” would have done more. Id. The court upheld the trial court’s decision
to overrule the defendant’s motion to dismiss. Id.
As set out in Cantu, Gilliland had two choices. After he was indicted, he could have first
filed a motion for speedy trial and then moved to dismiss if his request was not honored. Cantu,
253 S.W.3d at 284. Or he could have proceeded straight to filing a motion to dismiss after
indictment if he could show he diligently tried to move the case into court before indictment. Id.
Gilliland did not properly assert either choice.
At the speedy trial hearing, defense counsel told the court that prior to indictment, he
made one phone call to the district attorney’s office to ask to be notified when the case was
presented to the grand jury. In his brief to the trial court after the hearing, Gilliland asserted his
attorney “made several more phone calls over the course of the years and always received the
same answer — we don’t have the case and we don’t know anything about it.” Also in his trial
brief, Gilliland asserted his attorney contacted the police department several times to inquire
about the status of the case and either did not receive a call back or was informed it was “not my
case.” The State contends counsel should have provided the additional information contained in
the trial brief at the hearing when the State had the opportunity for rebuttal in open court. But
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even if we consider that several phone calls were made to the district attorney and to police,
these efforts are similar to those which were found to be insufficient in Sinclair. See Sinclair,
894 S.W.2d at 440. Further, Gilliland did not promptly move to dismiss after the indictment.
As for his other option, Gilliland did not promptly request a speedy trial. He moved for a
speedy trial about 18 months after he was indicted. And he did so two weeks before trial.
Further, he filed his motion for a speedy trial on a Friday and then on Monday asked for the case
to be dismissed. Under these circumstances, Gilliland’s motion requesting a speedy trial was
merely perfunctory and does not reflect a true desire for a speedy trial. See Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at
283. Gilliland’s failure to timely and diligently assert his right to a speedy trial weighs heavily
against him.
4. Prejudice to the Defendant
The last Barker factor is prejudice to the defendant. State v. Munoz, 991 S.W.2d 818,
826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). The prejudice factor is assessed in light of the interests the right to
a speedy trial is designed to protect. Hopper, 2017 WL 2457442, at *5; Munoz, 991 S.W.2d at
826. These interests are: (1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration, (2) minimizing
anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) limiting the possibility that the defense will be
impaired. Hopper, 2017 WL 2457442, at *5. Of these interests, the most serious is the last
because the inability of the defendant to adequately prepare his case skews the fairness of the
entire system. Munoz, 991 S.W.2d at 826. Affirmative proof of particularized prejudice is not
essential to every speedy-trial claim because excessive delay presumptively compromises the
reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify, and its
importance increases with the length of the delay. Hopper, 2017 WL 2457442, at *5. In such
instances, the defendant is absolved from the requirement that he demonstrate prejudice.
Gonzalez, 435 S.W.3d at 812.
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At the hearing, Gilliland’s wife Lesa testified that the complainant, P.W., lives in the
Gillilands’ neighborhood. P.W. and the Gillilands’ daughter K.G. went to the same school and
were playmates. K.G. was eleven when the allegations against her father arose, and P.W. was
one year older than K.G. Other children in the neighborhood came to the Gillilands’ home and
played with both K.G. and P.W. In the time between Gilliland’s arrest and indictment, three
girls who frequented the Gilliland home moved out of the country. Lesa testified that those girls
had knowledge of the relationship between P.W., K.G., and Gilliland. They were also present at
the community swimming pool where the most serious of the allegations, involving oral sex,
allegedly occurred. Defense counsel asked Lesa, “Are these children outside of both your
jurisdiction to ask them to come, and outside of your financial means to ask them to come back
to testify?” Lesa replied, “Absolutely.” At the time the girls moved, Gilliland had not been
formally charged with a crime and they had not begun to formulate a defense.
Lesa further testified that K.G. continued to attend school with P.W. for three years after
the arrest. During those years, K.G. suffered ostracism, embarrassment, bullying, and “general
girl meanness.” Females at school told K.G. her father was a child molester and would soon be
in prison. Lesa stated K.G. has suffered tremendously from social anxiety and alienation. Much
of the bullying was instigated by P.W. K.G. did not have the intellectual and emotional capacity
to deal with those things. Lesa noticed that her daughter was depressed and isolated. When
K.G. was in ninth grade, before Gilliland was indicted, the situation reached a “breaking point.”
K.G. did not come out of her room for three days. She would not eat or talk to her family. The
Gillilands decided to pull K.G. out of school and homeschool her. When asked if she believed
K.G. would have had the social and intellectual means to combat the accusations against her at
school if “you had been able to address the issues . . . within a year of the original arrest . . . and
your husband had been exonerated,” Lesa testified she thought K.G. could have combatted them.
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In addition, Lesa testified the family had become isolated. The parents’ participation in
church and school activities changed after the allegation and the delay.
Gilliland testified that he was arrested at his house on July 20, 2011. He paid $7,500 to
bond out of jail and was required to check in with the bail bondsman weekly. He was repeatedly
told “we have no court date.” Gilliland testified that after the indictment was filed, he was
arrested again in November 2014, and spent one day in jail. 2
Gilliland testified that he had been an insurance agent for State Farm for eighteen years.
After he was indicted, State Farm ran a periodic background check on him and terminated his
contract on December 3, 2015. Gilliland attempted to find other work in the insurance field, but
was out of work until April 2016, because of the charges against him. The time he was
unemployed caused financial strain on his household. They exhausted their savings to pay
household expenses and medical bills. Gilliland also had to pay for legal representation.
Gilliland also spoke about the effect the case had on his daughter K.G. He saw K.G.
becoming withdrawn and less interested in school. He testified it was heartbreaking and also that
he felt defenseless watching his child endure something he could not protect her from. Further,
after his arrest, Gilliland stopped going to things his kids were involved in, such as sporting
events and school open houses. He did not want to risk crossing paths with the complainant and
did not want to cause “blowback” for his other children. Gilliland stated his family had become
reclusive. He felt considerable humiliation and shame, as well as stress and anxiety. He stated
he had experienced people looking at him “crossways” in public. He was worried about what
could happen to him and his family if he is convicted.
The State challenged aspects of Gilliland’s evidence of prejudice. The State asked Lesa
when the girls who were potential witnesses had moved. Lesa testified that two girls were sisters
2
The sheriff’s return on the capias for Gilliland’s second arrest shows the date of arrest was December 18, 2014.
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and moved to Sweden three or four years before the hearing. The third girl moved two or three
years before the hearing. Lesa had not contacted them and did not know if they were willing to
come back to the United States for trial or if they were willing to testify on her husband’s behalf.
The prosecutor raised the possibility of the girls testifying via computer. Lesa did not know if
the girls had the capability to do so.
Also, the State asked Gilliland if the delay in indictment allowed him to keep his job
longer. Gilliland acknowledged he would have been terminated before December 2015 if he had
been indicted earlier. Gilliland testified he remembered his interactions with P.W. when she was
in his home and also outside his home at the community pool. He gave a statement to an
investigator after his arrest. He was not sure if the statement was recorded, but assuming it was,
he could watch it to refresh his memory. Gilliland stated nothing in the conditions of his bond
required him to stay away from school events; it was a personal choice he made. Gilliland had
not attempted to contact the three girls who moved away. His daughter would have seen the
same types of interaction between him and the complainant as those three girls. He expected that
her testimony would be substantially similar to theirs. 3
Of the three interests the right to speedy trial is designed to protect, the first, preventing
oppressive pretrial incarceration, is not an issue in this case. Gilliland was released on bond and
spent a minimal amount of time in jail.
The second interest is minimizing anxiety and concern of the accused. As the United
States Supreme Court has stated, “Arrest is a public act that may seriously interfere with the
defendant’s liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, and that may disrupt his employment, drain
his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety
3
We note the clerk’s record reflects the defense subpoenaed four other child witnesses, plus K.G., to testify on Gilliland’s behalf at trial.
These witnesses were not mentioned at the hearing, so we have no information about the knowledge these children possessed.
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in him, his family, and friends.” United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971). Further,
even if an accused is not incarcerated prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged . . . by living under a
cloud of anxiety, suspicion, and often hostility.” Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 654 (quoting Barker,
407 U.S. at 532.). General anxiety is at least some evidence of the type of anxiety that the
Supreme Court considers under the prejudice prong of Barker. Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 285–86.
But evidence of generalized anxiety, though relevant, is not sufficient proof of prejudice under
the Barker test, especially when it is no greater anxiety or concern beyond the level normally
associated with a criminal charge or investigation. Id. at 286.
We disagree with the State’s assertion that the anxiety shown in this case was merely
“general anxiety” associated with a criminal charge. Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the trial court’s ruling, Gilliland presented evidence from which the court could
have determined that the delay between arrest and indictment caused him and his family more
than mere general anxiety. Gilliland presented evidence the charges had an extreme negative
effect on his daughter K.G. and, by extension, him. K.G. was bullied and ostracized at school as
a result of the allegations against her father. She became isolated and depressed, and her parents
eventually pulled her out of school to be homeschooled. This occurred prior to Gilliland’s
indictment.
We note that the evidence of anxiety caused by financial strain was rebutted. Gilliland
lost his job with State Farm when it found out about the indictment. But he admitted the delay in
indictment helped him keep that job longer, and he did find other employment in the insurance
field four months later.
The third and most important interest is limiting the possibility that the defense will be
impaired. Gilliland put on some evidence that the delay impaired his defense. Prior to his
indictment, three girls who had knowledge of his relationship with P.W. and who had been in his
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home and at the community pool with him and P.W. moved overseas. But the State rebutted this
evidence by showing the Gillilands had not attempted to contact these potential witnesses and
did not know if they would even be willing to testify for Gilliland. See Ortega v. State, 472
S.W.3d 779, 787–88 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (defendant who raised
speedy-trial complaint failed to show she exercised due diligence in attempting to find missing
witnesses and that their testimony would have been material to defense). Further, although
Gilliland suggested the girls may have a reduced recollection of the events, a bare “assertion of
dimming memories” does not constitute some showing of impairment to the defense. See
Munoz, 991 S.W.2d at 829. In addition, Gilliland played some role in any potential reduced
recollection by failing to promptly move for a speedy trial after indictment.
Having considered all three interests the right to speedy trial is designed to protect, we
conclude Gilliland showed some evidence of prejudice, mostly related to the second interest,
anxiety the delay between arrest and indictment caused him. Although he presented evidence of
the most important interest, impairment of his defense, this evidence was not strong as he did not
show that he made any attempt to contact the witnesses he asserted were unavailable. Further,
there was no showing that the witnesses would have been willing to testify on his behalf or that
their testimony would have been material to his defense. On the whole, the prejudice factor
weighs in favor of Gilliland, but not heavily.
Balancing Test
The last step in our analysis is to balance the Barker factors. Of the four factors, three
weigh against the State — the length of the delay between arrest and indictment, which weighs
heavily against the State, the reason for the delay, which weighs slightly against the State, and
the prejudice to the defendant, which weighs slightly against the State. The remaining factor,
assertion of the right, weighs very heavily against Gilliland. He waited 18 months after he was
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indicted to move for a speedy trial. In addition, he first asserted his desire for a speedy trial on a
Friday about two weeks before case was supposed to go to trial, and nothing in the record
indicates the case would not have gone to trial as scheduled. Then, after the weekend, Gilliland
moved on Monday to dismiss for want of a speedy trial. These facts indicate Gilliland wanted a
dismissal rather than a speedy trial. See Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 771 (lack of timely demand for
speed trial strongly indicates defendant did not really want one). We are mindful that we are
required to defer to any implied findings by the trial court. See Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 277, 282
(court of appeals, which reversed trial court’s decision to deny motion to dismiss, did not
properly defer to trial court’s implied factual findings regarding Barker factors). In this case,
however, the facts are largely undisputed. We do not like the unexplained delay of more than
three years between Gilliland’s arrest and indictment. But the delay was not so excessive as to
give rise to a presumption of prejudice. See Jones, 168 S.W.3d at 352. While Gilliland put on
evidence of prejudice, the evidence is slight. Gilliland’s attempt to show that his defense was
impaired due to the delay, the most serious interest the right to speedy trial protects, was
effectively rebutted. Although three potential witnesses moved far away, Gilliland made no
effort to contact them to determine their availability and did not even know if they were willing
to testify on his behalf. See Ortega, 472 S.W.3d at 787–88. Gilliland provided evidence the
delay caused him and his family, particularly his daughter, a great deal of anxiety. But the four
Barker factors are related and must be considered together. The late date at which Gilliland
asserted his right to a speedy trial may be a reflection of the degree of personal prejudice he
experienced. See Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 284. We must apply the balancing test with common
sense and sensitivity to ensure that charges are dismissed only when evidence shows that a
defendant’s actual and asserted interest in a speedy trial has been infringed. Balderas, 517
S.W.3d at 773. On balance, Gilliland cannot overcome the fact that his delay in asserting his
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right to a speedy trial reflects a desire for a dismissal rather than for a speedy trial. This factor
weighs so heavily against Gilliland that it outweighs the other three factors. We conclude the
Barker factors weigh against finding a speedy-trial violation and that the trial court erred in
granting Gilliland’s motion to dismiss. We sustain the State’s sole issue.
We reverse the trial court’s order granting the motion to dismiss and remand the case to
the trial court for further proceedings.
/Ada Brown/
ADA BROWN
JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
160547F.U05
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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant On Appeal from the 416th Judicial District
Court, Collin County, Texas
No. 05-16-00547-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. 416-82279-2014.
Opinion delivered by Justice Brown, Justices
DALE LEE GILLILAND, Appellee Bridges and Myers participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s order granting the motion to
dismiss for violation of the right to a speedy trial is REVERSED and the cause REMANDED
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment entered this 1st day of August, 2017.
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