RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4746-15T3
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD
PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
M.A.C., JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP
OF TYL.A.C. and TYM.A.C.,
Minors.
_________________________________
Submitted March 1, 2017 – Decided March 7, 2017
Before Judges Simonelli, Carroll and Gooden
Brown.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex
County, Docket No. FG-07-0131-16.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Theodore J. Baker, Designated
Counsel, on the briefs).
Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
attorney for respondent (Andrea M. Silkowitz,
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Chanel
J. Van Dyke, Deputy Attorney General, on the
brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law
Guardian, attorney for minors (Toya Davis,
Designated Counsel, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant M.A.C., Jr., the biological father of TYL.A.C.,
born in 2013, and TYM.A.C., born in 2014, appeals from the June
22, 2016 Family Part judgment for guardianship, which terminated
his parental rights to the children.1 On appeal, defendant
challenges the trial judge's finding that respondent New Jersey
Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) proved
prong three of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) by clear and convincing
evidence. Defendant argues that: (1) the Division did not make
reasonable efforts to provide tailored services given his
intellectual deficits and mental health condition, or accomplish
reunification with him; and (2) the judge committed reversible
error in rejecting his adoptive godmother, K.L., and uncle, C.W.,
as alternatives to termination. We affirm.
We will not recite in detail the history of the Division's
involvement with the family. Instead, we incorporate by reference
1
The judgment also terminated the parental rights of the
children's biological mother, defendant T.J.C., who executed an
identified surrender to the foster parent who wants to adopt the
children. T.J.C. does not appeal.
2 A-4746-15T3
the factual findings set forth in Judge Linda Lordi Cavanaugh's
comprehensive and well-reasoned June 15, 2016 written opinion.
However, we add the following comments.
Defendant has a history of drug use, lack of employment, lack
of stable housing, intermittent incarcerations, and schizophrenia,
for which he unilaterally stopped taking medication. He became
involved with the Division in 2013, shortly after TYL.A.C. was
born. Defendant's involvement with the Division was marked by his
non-compliance with the numerous services the Division offered,
inconsistent visitation with the children, missing status, and
failure to address the issues that led to the children's removal
and continued placement in foster care. The Division's undisputed
expert evidence confirmed that despite the array of services the
Division provided to defendant, he was unwilling or unable to
overcome or remove the harms facing the children, and was not a
viable parenting option at the time of the guardianship trial or
in the foreseeable future.
Defendant had offered K.L. as an alternative placement
option, but the Division ruled her out twice. She was ruled out
based on a home assessment and failure to take the necessary steps
to enable her to be considered as a viable placement option, and
later ruled out on best interests grounds based on the results of
the bonding evaluations between her and the children, and between
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the foster parents and the children. The undisputed expert bonding
evidence confirmed that the children had no bond with K.L.,
whereas, they were securely attached to their foster mother and
would suffer serious and enduring harm if removed from her, which
K.L. could not mitigate. Defendant did not identify C.W. until
December 2015, approximately six months before the guardianship
trial began in June 2016, and he was unavailable to be assessed
until several weeks later. The Division ruled him out on best
interests grounds. Neither K.L. nor C.W. appealed the Division's
determinations.
Judge Cavanaugh reviewed the evidence presented at the trial,
made meticulous factual findings as to all four prongs of N.J.S.A.
30:4C-15.1(a), and thereafter concluded the Division met by clear
and convincing evidence all of the legal requirements for a
judgment of guardianship. The judge's opinion tracks the statutory
requirements of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), accords with N.J. Div. of
Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420 (2012), N.J. Div. of
Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88 (2008), In re
Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337 (1999), In re Guardianship
of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365 (1999), and N.J. Div. of Youth & Family
Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591 (1986), and is more than amply
supported by the record. F.M., supra, 211 N.J. at 448-49.
Affirmed.
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