Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed August 9, 2017.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D17-915
Lower Tribunal No. 15-134
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Priority Medical Rehabilitation Inc., a/a/o Maykel Coroas,
Petitioner,
vs.
United Automobile Insurance Company,
Respondent.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade
County, Appellate Division, Dennis J. Murphy, Mindy Sue Glazer, and Milton
Hirsch, Judges.
Christian Carrazana, P.A. and Christian Carrazana, for petitioner.
Michael J. Neimand, House Counsel, for respondent.
Before SUAREZ, SCALES, and LUCK, JJ.
SUAREZ, J.
Priority Medical Rehabilitation Inc. [“Priority Medical”] petitions this Court
for a second-tier writ of certiorari to quash the order of the appellate division of the
Eleventh Judicial Circuit which affirmed summary judgment in favor of United
Automobile Insurance Company [“United Auto”] in this PIP matter. Because we
find that the appellate division provided due process and applied the correct law,
we deny the petition.
Factual Background
United Auto issued a PIP policy to Pedro Coroas. After the policy was
issued, Coroas’s son was involved in an accident and sustained injuries while
driving the insured vehicle. Priority provided treatment to the son in exchange for
assignment of the PIP benefits. After Priority’s claim was made for treatment of
the son, United Auto discovered that the son had not been disclosed as a member
of the household at the time the policy was applied for. United Auto did not
rescind the policy or refund the premium paid. United paid the collision claim for
repair of the vehicle but declined to pay the PIP claim submitted by Priority
Medical.
Priority Medical filed a breach of contract claim and United Auto defended,
in part, by arguing that liability was barred under Florida Statute Section 627.409
(2004) because the son had not been listed on the application and the omission was
material.
After proceedings which are irrelevant here, the trial court entered summary
judgment in favor of United Auto. Priority Medical appealed to the Circuit Court
Appellate Division, which affirmed per curiam.
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In granting summary judgment for United Auto, the trial court found that
this case was “almost identical” to Martinez v. General Ins. Co., 483 So. 2d 892,
894 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). In Martinez, Mrs. Martinez’ son was living in her
household at the same time she submitted her application to renew her automobile
insurance. She failed to list her son on the application. He was then involved in an
accident while driving one of the insured vehicles. This Court found that the
insured’s omission of her son’s name from an application for renewal of
automobile insurance
did not serve to vitiate the policy from its inception for
claims unrelated to the omission. The failure to list [the
son] on the renewal application precluded coverage only
for a claim arising out of [the son’s] driving a vehicle
insured under the policy. [The insured] herself was
covered throughout the entire period that the policy was in
force, and it is this coverage, and no other, that was
acknowledged by the insurer when it retained the
premium.
Applicable Law
A district court’s standard of review of a petition for second tier certiorari is
very limited. “[W]hen a district court considers a petition for second-tier certiorari
review, the ‘inquiry is limited to whether the circuit court afforded procedural due
process and whether the circuit court applied the correct law,’ or, as otherwise
stated, departed from the essential requirements of law.” Custer Med. Ctr. v.
United Auto. Ins. Co., 62 So. 3d 1086, 1092 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Haines City
Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523,
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530 (Fla. 1995)); accord Ivey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 So. 2d 679, 682 (Fla. 2000)
(“[T]he proper inquiry under certiorari review is limited to whether the circuit
court afforded procedural due process and whether it applied the correct law.”). A
second-tier certiorari proceeding “cannot be used to grant a second appeal to
correct the existence of mere legal error,” and “a district court should exercise its
discretion to grant review only when the lower tribunal has violated a clearly
established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice.” Custer, 62 So.
3d at 1092–93; accord Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kaklamanos, 843 So. 2d 885, 889 (Fla.
2003); Ivey, 774 So. 2d at 682, 683 (stating that a court's misapplication of the
correct law or “erroneous interpretation of [a] law” is not a departure from the
essential requirements of the law).
Priority Medical does not argue that it was not afforded procedural due
process. We concluded that the appellate division, as well as the trial court,
applied the correct law and did not depart from any essential requirement of law.
The trial court was correct in finding that this matter is controlled by Martinez v.
General Ins. Co., 483 So. 2d 892, 894 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). United Auto was not
required to return the premium where the coverage continues for the named
insured. On the other hand, it may deny coverage for the loss claimed as the loss
was a result of a risk United did not assume under the contract because of an
omission in the application process. Petition for second tier certiorari is denied.
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