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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JOSHUA BURNS
Appellant No. 1421 WDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order September 6, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-11-CR-0002024-2015
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., RANSOM, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED AUGUST 11, 2017
Joshua Burns appeals from the order, entered in the Court of Common
Pleas of Cambria County, dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post
Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm based on the well-reasoned
opinion of the Honorable Norman A. Krumenacker, III, P.J.
We adopt the facts set forth by the PCRA court’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
opinion. On January 25, 2016, Burns pleaded guilty to Possession,
Manufacture, Delivery, and Possession With and Intent to Distribute
(heroin),2 after which the trial court sentenced him to 14 to 72 months’
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
2
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
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imprisonment in a state correctional facility. Burns filed a pro se timely
post-trial motion for reconsideration of sentence; however, this motion was
never ruled on, as it was never presented to the trial court. On April 7,
2016, Burns filed a timely PCRA petition. Following a hearing held on August
1, 2016, the court dismissed the petition in an order and opinion dated
September 6, 2016. The instant timely appeal follows, in which Burns raises
the following issue:
Was trial counsel ineffective in supplying incorrect information as
to the recommended sentencing guidelines Burns would be
receiving if he entered a plea and/or in failing to file a
meritorious post-sentence motion to correct the mistake?
Brief of Appellant, at 4.
In reviewing an order denying PCRA relief, our standard of review is
“whether the determination of the PCRA court is supported by the evidence
of record and is free of legal error. The PCRA court’s findings will not be
disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record.”
Commonwealth v. Johnston, 42 A.3d 1120, 1126 (Pa. Super. 2012)
(internal citation omitted).
The governing legal standard of review of ineffective assistance of
counsel claims is well settled:
[C]ounsel is presumed effective, and to rebut that presumption,
the PCRA petitioner must demonstrate that counsel's
performance was deficient and that such deficiency prejudiced
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him. This Court has described the Strickland 3 standard as
tripartite by dividing the performance element into two distinct
components. Accordingly, to prove counsel ineffective, the
petitioner must demonstrate that (1) the underlying legal issue
has arguable merit; (2) counsel's actions lacked an objective
reasonable basis; and (3) the petitioner was prejudiced by
counsel's act or omission. A claim of ineffectiveness will be
denied if the petitioner's evidence fails to satisfy any one of
these prongs. Furthermore, “[i]n accord with these well-
established criteria for review, [an appellant] must set forth and
individually discuss substantively each prong of
the Pierce test.” (citations omitted).
Commonwealth v. Roane, 142 A.3d 79, 88 (Pa. Super. 2016) (internal
citations omitted).
The PCRA correctly determined that (1) Burns entered a knowing and
voluntary guilty plea, (2) Burns’ trial counsel, Maribeth Schaffer, Esquire, did
not provide him incorrect information as to the sentencing guidelines, and
(3) Attorney Schaffer was not ineffective for failing to file a post-sentence
motion for sentence modification. Roane, supra. Accordingly, Judge
Krumenacker properly dismissed Burns’ PCRA petition pursuant to
Pa.R.Crim.P. 907.
After reviewing the parties’ briefs, the record, and the relevant case
law, we conclude that Judge Krumenacker’s well-reasoned opinion
thoroughly and properly disposes of the question of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the PCRA Court’s opinion,
which counsel should attach in the event of further proceedings.
____________________________________________
3
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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Order Affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/11/2017
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Circulated 07/20/2017 01:43 PM