NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2790-15T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
WESLEY CLAY,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________
Submitted May 16, 2017 – Decided August 14, 2017
Before Judges Sumners and Mayer.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Somerset County, Municipal
Appeal No. 26-15-C.
Mitchell E. Ignatoff, attorney for appellant.
Michael H. Robertson, Somerset County
Prosecutor, attorney for respondent
(Alexander Mech, Assistant Prosecutor, of
counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Wesley Clay entered a conditional guilty plea in
Bound Brook Borough Municipal Court to driving while intoxicated
(DWI), N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, specifically preserving his right to
appeal the denial of his motion seeking discovery of the New Jersey
State Police Manual (NJSP Manual) governing the administration of
standardized field sobriety tests. In his trial de novo appeal
to the Law Division, defendant also contended that his plea should
be vacated because he failed to give a factual basis for DWI. For
the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Defendant was arrested and charged with DWI by a New Jersey
State Trooper. Prior to trial, defendant requested that the State
provide him with a copy of the NJSP Manual. When the State did
not comply with the request, defendant filed a motion with the
municipal court. The municipal court initially denied the request
on the belief that the NJSP Manual was available to the public on
the internet; however, once defendant discovered that the manual
was not available, he filed a reconsideration motion. The
municipal court acknowledged that it was mistaken about the
availability of the NJSP Manual, yet denied reconsideration. After
expressing concern about whether the state trooper who
administered the field sobriety tests to defendant received
1
training based upon the NJSP Manual, the municipal court
determined that the NJSP Manual was not relevant because defendant
1
It was later stipulated that the state trooper had received New
Jersey State Police field sobriety test training prior to
administering the test to defendant.
2 A-2790-15T4
was not solely charged due to a failed field sobriety test. The
state trooper also charged defendant based upon observation of
defendant's driving, defendant's watery eyes, the smell of alcohol
on defendant's breath, and the breathalyzer results above the
legal limit.2
A week after the reconsideration motion was denied, defendant
entered his conditional plea to DWI, his third such offense. To
establish a factual basis for DWI, the following colloquy took
place:
THE COURT: Okay. On October 15, 2014[,] were
you driving here in Bound Brook?
DEFENDANT: Yes, I was.
THE COURT: . . . before you were driving in
Bound Brook had you imbibed any alcoholic
beverages?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
. . . .
THE COURT: All right. Can you give me any
estimate as to how many beers there were? And
I'm – don't think I'm holding you to it as far
as –
DEFENDANT: Yeah, I'm not really sure on that
because I -- probably -- maybe three beers,
four beers at the most.
2
According to the record, defendant had a blood alcohol content
of .19, which is well above the .08 limit set forth in N.J.S.A.
39:4-50(a).
3 A-2790-15T4
THE COURT: Okay. And did the beer that you
imbibed, did that affect your capability of
driving an automobile?
DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: No?
DEFENDANT: Not normally. Yeah
(Indiscernible) -- I guess I probably --
obviously does everybody, yeah.
. . . .
THE COURT: Okay. And after you drank these
beers you got into your automobile and then
. . . you were pulled over by the Bound Brook
Police.
DEFENDANT: Well[,] I went down and picked up
some pizza and food [] for the friend. And I
was bringing it back there, just across town,
and came back. And before I got back to the
house[,] I got pulled over.
The municipal court then explained to defendant the jail
term, loss of driving privileges, fines and penalties that would
be imposed for his third DWI offense. Based upon the court's
inquiry, defendant indicated that he was entering his plea freely,
voluntarily, without coercion and not under the influence of any
alcohol or drugs affecting his decision to enter his plea.
Defendant appealed his DWI conviction to the Law Division.
He argued that the municipal court erred in denying his discovery
motion and accepting his guilty plea without a factual basis as
4 A-2790-15T4
to the time he drank beer and that it affected his ability to
drive.
Following a trial de novo on the record, Judge Bruce A. Jones,
issued an order and written decision on January 4, 2016, denying
defendant's appeal. The judge reasoned that pursuant to State
v. Robertson, 438 N.J. Super. 47, 66 (App. Div. 2004), and State
v. Ford, 240 N.J. Super. 44, 48 (App. Div. 1990), defendant was
not entitled to discovery of the NJSP Manual because the field
sobriety test was not relevant and it did not affect his guilty
plea. The judge recognized, as did the municipal court, that the
DWI charge was not solely based on the field sobriety test, but
also upon the state trooper's observation and the breathalyzer
result. Thus, the judge concluded, "[t]here is no reasonable
basis to assert that if the [NJSP] Manual was produced it would
have provided [] [d]efendant with a defense." In reviewing
defendant's plea colloquy, the judge was "satisfied that an
adequate factual basis was provided on the record to justify a
plea of guilty." This appeal followed.
Before us, defendant reiterates the arguments that he was
entitled to a copy of the NJSP Manual and that he failed to provide
a factual basis for his guilty plea. We find no merit to either
contention.
5 A-2790-15T4
We review a court's denial of discovery requests under an
abuse of discretion standard. State v. Enright, 416 N.J. Super.
391, 404 (App. Div. 2010), certif. denied, 205 N.J. 183 (2011).
"[T]he liberal approach to discovery in criminal cases is
applicable in municipal court cases." State v. Stein, 225 N.J.
582, 594 (2016). A defendant, "on written notice to the municipal
prosecutor . . . shall be provided with copies of all relevant
material . . ." R. 7:7-7(b). "'Relevant evidence' is defined as
'evidence having a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any
fact of consequence to the determination of the action.'" State
v. Gilchrist, 381 N.J. Super. 138, 146 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting
N.J.R.E. 401). "In determining whether evidence is relevant, the
inquiry should focus upon 'the logical connection between the . .
. evidence and a fact in issue.'" State v. Darby, 174 N.J. 509,
519, (2002) (quoting State v. Hutchins, 241 N.J. Super. 353, 358
(App. Div. 1990)). Moreover, "[a] DWI defendant's 'right to
discovery . . . is limited to items as to which 'there is a
reasonable basis to believe will assist a defendant's defense.'"
State v. Robertson, supra, 438 N.J. Super. at 66 (citing State v.
Carrero, 428 N.J. Super. 495, 507 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting State
v. Ford, 240 N.J. Super. 44, 48 (App. Div. 1990))).
Guided by these principles, we conclude there was no abuse
of discretion in denying defendant's discovery motion. Under
6 A-2790-15T4
certain circumstances, it may be relevant whether a state trooper
acted in conformance with the NJSP Manual when administering a
field sobriety test. Here, however, the NJSP Manual was not
relevant to proving that defendant was guilty of DWI because the
State's proofs were based upon the state trooper's observation of
defendant's driving and physical appearance, and the breathalyzer
results. Thus, we discern no reason to disturb Judge Jones'
discovery ruling.
Lastly, defendant contends that his conviction should be
vacated because he did not provide a factual basis for his DWI
guilty plea. In particular, he contends no facts were presented
during his plea colloquy indicating the time of day that he
consumed alcohol before he was pulled over and charged with DWI.
In order to properly accept a plea of guilty, a municipal
court judge must address the defendant personally and must
determine "that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding
of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea and
that there is a factual basis for the plea." R. 7:6-2(a)(1).
Indeed, constitutional law requires that a guilty plea be entered
knowingly and voluntarily. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,
748, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1468-69, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747, 756 (1970).
After a careful review of the record, we find no basis to set
aside the DWI plea. Defendant was represented by counsel, and a
7 A-2790-15T4
sufficient factual basis for the plea was developed. Defendant
admitted in his own words that his driving was affected because
he drank three to four beers before driving. Despite the fact
there was no indication of the time defendant consumed the beer,
the record supports a finding that defendant drove his vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol. We are mindful that
defendant's breathalyzer results were not stipulated at the plea
hearing. Nevertheless, we are satisfied that defendant's
admission of erratic driving adequately supported a guilty plea.
Affirmed.
8 A-2790-15T4