NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 14 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RAGHVENDRA SINGH, No. 16-15626
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:14-cv-02382-JAM-KJN
v.
MEMORANDUM*
COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 9, 2017**
Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Raghvendra Singh appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various federal and state law
claims related to his real property. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review for an abuse of discretion a dismissal for failure to comply with court
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
orders. Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2004). We
may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Johnson v. Riverside
Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
Dismissal of Singh’s action was proper because Singh failed to allege facts
sufficient to state any plausible claims. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42
(9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, a plaintiff
must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see
also Edwards, 356 F.3d at 1063 (setting forth de novo standard of review for
dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)).
Dismissal of Singh’s third amended complaint without leave to amend was
proper because the district court provided Singh with three opportunities to amend,
and further amendment would have been futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide
Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of
review and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper when
amendment would be futile). We do not consider Singh’s contention that Karen
Singh was not given an opportunity to amend the complaint because Karen Singh
is not a party to the appeal.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in not appointing counsel
because Singh did not file a motion for the appointment of counsel, and did not
demonstrate exceptional circumstances. See Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214, 1218
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(9th Cir. 2014) (setting forth standard of review and requirements for appointment
of counsel).
Singh’s request for the appointment of counsel, set forth in his opening brief,
is denied.
AFFIRMED.
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