NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 17-1737
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ANTHONY PARKER,
Appellant
v.
LEHIGH COUNTY DOMESTIC
RELATIONS COURT
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 5-17-cv-00564)
District Judge: Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
August 16, 2017
Before: SHWARTZ, COWEN and FUENTES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 17, 2017)
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OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
In February 2017, Anthony Parker filed a civil rights complaint in the District
Court against the Domestic Relations section of the Family Division of the Lehigh
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
County Court of Common Pleas (“Family Court”). Parker claimed that the Family Court
had violated his constitutional rights by dismissing his petition to modify his support
order and seizing money from his bank account. Parker asked the District Court to order
the Family Court to reopen the support proceedings so that he could lodge various
objections. The District Court dismissed the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e) because, among other reasons, Parker’s claims were barred by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine. Parker appealed.1
We will affirm the District Court’s judgment. The District Court lacked
jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to review, either directly or indirectly,
the Family Court case. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S.
280, 284 (2005) (explaining that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars suits “brought by
state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered
before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and
rejection of those judgments”).
1
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over
the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e). See Allah v.
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).
2