SUPER|OR COURT
oF THE
STATE OF DELAWARE
VlleN L. MEDlNlLLA LEoNARD L. WlLLlAMS JusTlcE CENTER
JUDGE 500 NoRTH KlNG STREET, sulTE 10400
WlLMlNGToN, DE 19801-3733
TELEPHONE (302) 255-0626
August 2l, 2017
Michael W. Modica, Esq. Phillip M. Casale, Esq.
Michael W. Modica LaW Office Department of Justice
715 N. King Street, Suite 300 Carvel State Building
P.O. BoX 437 820 North French Street
Wilmington, DE 19899 Wilmington, DE 19801
Re: State v. Tyrell Simpson
Case ID No..' 1608013425
Dear Counsel:
This is the Court’s decision on Tyrell Simpson (“Defendant”)’s Motion for
Reargurnent, filed on July 28, 2017. For the reasons stated beloW, Defendant’s
Motion for Reargument is GRANTED, in part; DENIED, in part. Further, after a
reconsideration of Defendant’s Amended Motion to Suppress in light of this Court’s
decision on Defendant’s Motion for Reargurnent, for the reasons stated beloW,
Defendant’s Amended Motion to Suppress is DENIED.
F actual and Procedural Background
The facts underlying Defendant’s Motion for Reargument and Amended
Motion to Suppress have been previously described by this Court in its July 20, 2017
Letter Opinion denying Defendant’s Motion to Suppress. The Court incorporates
that Opinion here and Writes to supplement it as relevant to the Court’s analysis on
the pending Motion for Reargurnent.
After the Court issued its Letter Opinion in this case, the State sought
clarification of the Court’s analysis of the only search Warrant submitted for revieW.
Defendant then filed a Motion for Reargument. The State filed a response to the
Motion for Reargument on July 31, 2017. Meanwhile, upon request of the Court,
Defendant filed an Amended Motion to Suppress on August 8, 2017, attaching the
proper search Warrant for the Court’s consideration A hearing on the Motion for
Reargument Was held on August 14, 2017.
Standard of Review
DelaWare Superior Court Criminal Rule 57(d) states: “In all cases not
provided for by rule or administrative order, the court shall regulate its practice in
accordance With the applicable Superior Court civil rule. . . .”l “Superior Court Civil
Rule 59[] is made applicable to criminal cases by Superior Court Criminal Rule
57(d).”2
Civil Rule 59(e) permits the Court to reconsider “its findings of fact,
conclusions of law, or judgment . . .”3 “Delaware law places a heavy burden on a
[party] seeking relief pursuant to Rule 59.”4 To prevail on a motion for reargument,
the movant must demonstrate that “the Court has overlooked a controlling precedent
or legal principle[], or the Court has misapprehended the law or facts such as Would
have changed the outcome of the underlying decision.”5 Further, “[a] motion for
reargument is not a device for raising new arguments,”6 nor is it “intended to rehash
the arguments already decided by the court.”7 Such tactics frustrate the interests of
judicial efficiency and the orderly process of reaching finality on the issues.8 The
moving party has the burden of demonstrating “nery discovered evidence, a change
of law, or manifest injustice.”9
1 DEL. SUPER. Cr. CRIM. R. 57(d).
2 Guardarrama v. State, 911 A.2d 802, 2006 WL 2950494, at *3 (Del. Oct. 17, 2006) (TABLE).
3 Hessler, Inc. v. Farrell, 260 A.2d 701, 702 (Del. 1969). See DEL. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 59(e).
4 Kostyshyn v. Comm ’rs of Bellefonte, 2007 WL 1241875, at *1 (Del. Super. Apr. 27, 2007).
5 Bd. of Managers of Del. Criminal Justz`ce Info. Sys. v. Gannett Co., 2003 WL 1579170, at *1
(Del. Super. Jan. 17, 2003), ajj”d in part, 840 A.2d 1232 (Del. 2003).
6 Id.
7 Kennea'y v. Invacare Corp., 2006 WL 488590, at *1 (Del. Super. Jan. 31, 2006).
8 See Plummer v. Sherman, 2004 WL 63414, at *2 (Del. Super. Jan. 14, 2004).
9 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & C0. v. Admiral Ins. C0., 711 A.2d 45, 55 (Del. Super. 1995).
2
Discussion
I. Motion for Reargument
The Court begins with a discussion of Defendant’s Motion for Reargument.
At the hearing on this Motion, Defendant made three arguments: (1) the
Court’s earlier decision rested on a supposed “hospital policy” exception to the
Fourth Amendment with respect to the seizure of the vehicle; (2) the Court failed to
consider whether Defendant was “arrested” rather than “detained;” and (3) the
search of the car was tainted by the initial illegal seizure of the vehicle.10 Each of
these will be addressed in turn to assess whether Defendant has met his burden under
Rule 59.
A. Detention of the Vehicle
First, the Court did not rest its earlier decision on a “hospital policy” exception
to the Fourth Amendment. The Court found that the vehicle and, later in the
encounter, Defendant himself, were reasonably detained under 11 Del. C.
§§ l902(a), 1910 and Harris v. State.ll This finding was based on an examination
of “the totality of the circumstances surrounding the situation ‘as viewed through the
eyes of a reasonable, trained [peace] officer in the same or similar circumstances,
combining objective facts with such an officer’s subjective interpretation of those
facts.”’12
Specifically, the Court found that Constable Richardson, prior to the detention
of the vehicle: (1) observed the vehicle arrive at the hospital; (2) noted that
Defendant was the sole occupant of the vehicle; (3) observed bullet holes in the
frame of the vehicle; (4) noted the presence of broken windows on the driver’s side
10 Defense counsel also raised a fourth issue-whether a peace officer has the same power to effect
seizures of property as does a police officer. This issue was not raised in the Motion to Suppress
nor in the Amended Motion to Suppress and is, therefore, not considered here. Nevertheless, the
basis for this proposition appears dubious considering 10 Del. C. § 2705(2): “[A constable shall:]
. . . Exercise the same powers as peace officers and law-enforcement officers, in order to protect
life and property, while in the performance of the lawful duties of employment . . .” 10 Del. C.
§ 2705(2) (2013 & Supp. 2016).
11 622 A.2d 1095, 1993 WL 61667 (Del. 1993) (TABLE).
12 Pumell v. S¢are, 832 A.2d 714, 719 (Del. 2003) (quoting Woody v. smie, 765 A.2d 1257, 1263
(Del. 2001) (quoting J