JARROD KAUFMAN VS. LUMBER LIQUIDATORS, INC (L-5358-14, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)Â

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3278-14T1

JARROD KAUFMAN, RACHEL KAUFMAN,
WILLIAM QUICK and NANCY QUICK,
on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

LUMBER LIQUIDATORS, INC. and
ROBERT M. LYNCH,

Defendants-Respondents.
_________________________________

Argued September 21, 2016 – Decided August 22, 2017

Before Judges Fuentes, Simonelli and Carroll.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Docket
No. L-5358-14.

Andrew R. Wolf argued the cause for appellants
(The Wolf Law Firm, LLC, attorneys; Mr. Wolf,
Matthew S. Oorbeek, Henry P. Wolfe, Andrew W.
Li and Daniel I. Rubin, on the briefs).

Brian E. O'Donnell argued the cause for
respondents (Riker Danzig Scherer Hyland &
Perretti, LLP, attorneys; Mr. O'Donnell,
Michael P. O'Mullan, Jeffrey M. Beyer and
Casey A. Boyle, of counsel and on the brief).
 Gavin J. Rooney argued the cause for amicus
curiae The New Jersey Civil Justice Institute
and Chamber of Commerce of the United States
of America (Lowenstein Sandler, LLP,
attorneys; Mr. Rooney and Naomi D.
Barrowclough, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiffs Jarrod and Rachel Kaufman and William and Nancy

Quick are two sets of consumers who filed a putative class action

suit against defendant Lumber Liquidators, Inc. and its Chief

Executive Officer, Robert M. Lynch. In their complaint, plaintiffs

alleged they purchased "wood flooring and associated merchandise"

from Lumber Liquidators "several times from August 29, 2012 through

October 20, 2012." The sales invoices defendants provided did not

contain language promising plaintiffs that "the merchandise" they

ordered would be delivered by a specific date. (Emphasis added).

Plaintiffs claimed Lumber Liquidators' failure to include the

precise "delivery date" language on its sales invoices violated

the Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act (TCCWNA),

N.J.S.A. 56:12-14 to -18; the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), N.J.S.A.

56:8-1 to -20; and the Delivery of Household Furniture and

Furnishings Regulations, N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.1 to -5.4. Plaintiffs

do not allege defects or deficiencies in the products they

received. In fact, they suffered no actual damages. They seek

only statutory civil penalties in the amount of $100 for each

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alleged violation of the TCCWNA and reasonable attorney's fees

pursuant to N.J.S.A. 56:12-17.

The Law Division granted defendants' motion to dismiss

plaintiffs' complaint as a matter of law for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. See R. 4:6-2(e). The

dispositive issue is whether the hardwood flooring plaintiffs

purchased from Lumber Liquidators constitutes "household

furniture" under N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.1(d), which provides as

follows: "For purposes of this rule, 'household furniture'

includes, but is not limited to, furniture, major electrical

appliances, and such items as carpets and draperies."

Applying the well-settled standards established by the

Supreme Court in Printing-Mart Morristown v. Sharp Electronics

Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989), Judge Andrea G. Carter concluded

"a plain reading" of N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.1(d) shows the term

"household furniture" does not include hardwood flooring. Judge

Carter found no reason to include non-moveable improvements to

real property, such as hardwood flooring or wall-to-wall

carpeting, in the regulatory definition of "household furniture."

Plaintiffs argue Judge Carter erred in adopting such a narrow

reading of the regulation. Defendants urge us to uphold Judge

Carter's analysis and ultimate conclusion. The New Jersey Civil

Justice Institute and the United States Chamber of Commerce filed

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a joint brief as amici curiae, urging us to use this case as an

opportunity to adopt "a rigorous standard" for defining what

constitutes a "clearly established legal right of a consumer"

under the TCCWNA. See N.J.S.A. 56:12-15.

We agree with Judge Carter's analysis and affirm. The long-

established canon of ejusdem generis provides that "'where general

words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general

words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to

those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.'" Wilson

ex rel. Manzano v. City of Jersey City, 209 N.J. 558, 584 (2012)

(quoting Massachi v. City of Newark Police Dep't, 415 N.J. Super.

518, 543–44 (App. Div. 2010)). The objects provided to illustrate

the limits of the regulation's reach clearly exclude items such

as hardwood floors, which, as Judge Carter noted, constitute

permanent improvements to property. When "the plain language

yields the meaning of the statute [or regulation], then our task

is complete." State v. Williams, 218 N.J. 576, 586 (2014) (citing

DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)).

We thus affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by

Judge Carter in her oral opinion delivered from the bench on

February 20, 2015. In this light, we decline Amici Curiae's

invitation to go beyond the four corners of plaintiffs' pleading

4 A-3278-14T1
to resolve the straightforward dispositive legal question

presented here.

Affirmed.

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