. l|VlPORTANT NOT|CE
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TH|S OPlNlON lS DES|GNATED ”NOT TO BE PUBL|SHED.”
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF ClVlL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(€),
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UNPUBL|SHED`KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECIS|ONS,
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MoDl`FIED= AUGUST 24, 2017 "
RENDERED. MARCH 23-, -2017
‘ No'r To BE __ 13 rqHE'D
§11]11~121112 Tn11rf of mm A.__-_¢
2014- SC- 000_558- DG
2015- SC 000321 DDATE_(§!U-Km-@MW DC»
COMMON_WEALTH OF KENTUCKY - APéELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
'- - ~oN REVIEW F'RoM coUR'r oF APFEALS
' v. - = cAsE No. 2012 cA-oo 1240 '
JEFFERSON cIRcUIT coURT No. 05 cR~000740
'TERRANCE_: MILEs `. ` APPELLEE/cRoss-APPELLANT
MEmonAnbum o_PmIoN or THE coun'r '
l ' REVERsmd ' d
Terrance Miles is currently serving `a fifty-year sentence following
convictions for the 'murder of Michael Teasley, for first-degree wanton _ .
endangerment, for tampering with- physical evidence,_ and for‘bei`ng a s.econd- l
degree Persistent Felony 'Offender (PFO). Miles moved-the trial court for relief
.from the judgment under Kentucky Rule of Criminal Proc_edure (RCr] 111 .42. - .
The trial court _condncted an evidentiary hearing o_n Teasle_r/’s claims, after
which it entered an order denying relief. -On apneal, the flourt'of Appeals
_ reversed the trial court’s order. n
We granted cross~motions for discretionary review. The C`ommonv`vealth
asserts the Court of Appeals erred 'in its conclusion that Miles had received
ineffective assistance `of trial counsel. Miles on the other hand, while agreeing
with the Court-of'Appeals’ reversal of the trial court’s order, argues in his
cross- -motion for discretionary review that it erred when it failed to find error in
the trial court’ s finding that trial counsel’s failure to call an important witness
at trial was not unreasonable trial strategy. k`
` For' the reasons below,' we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals '
and reinstate the trial court’s order denying Miles’s"RCrl 1 1.4_2 motion.
_ i. FAc'i‘UAL _Aim rRocEDURAL'BAcKGRoU`ND.
-Michael Teasley, a club bouncer,` was shot and killed while trying to
disperse a crowd after the club had closed for the night Miles was tried and
convicted for killing Teasley, and this Court affirmed the judgment of conviction
and sentence on direct appeal. Miles filed a pro se motion under RCr 1 1.42 to
vacate his convictions, claiming tliat‘his trial counsel was ineffective. Before us.
are four of his eleven complaints made in the RCr 1 1.42 motion: (1) the . .
admission at trial of Miles’s_riick name ““OG” or “Onginal Ga:¢_igster”;l (2) the
failure of trial counsel to objectdto testimony about a gun-found at Miles’s
d residence-that indisputably had no connection to the crime; (3) the failure of
trial counsel to object to hearsay testimony; and (4) the~failure. of trial counsel
to call Heather St. Clair as a defense witness.
The trial court conducted a series of three separate evidentiary hearings,
spanning five days, to address Miles’ s RCr 1 1. 42 allegations The trial court
ultimately denied Miles’s motion. q '
The' Court of Appeals undertook review on appeal. Th`at court determined
that the trial court erred by denying »RCr 1 1142 relief to Miles because his trial
counsel was ineffective.- Mcre specifically, the ccui,‘t found that Miles’s counsel
was ineffective on three separate instances:_( 1) the admission of'Miles’s nick
_ name “OG” or “Oiiginal Gangster’f’; (2) the failure to object to testimony about a
gun found at Miles’ s residence; and (3) the failure to object to hearsay l
testimony. ‘l`hc courtnrema'n_ded the"case to the trial court for further
' proceedings v v n
_. _ ii. ANALYsil.
A. Standard` of 'Review. l '
A ciiininal defendant has a constitutional light t_o effective assistance of
'counsel. This right is'guaranteed under the Sixth'and Fourteenth amendments
of the Constitution of the United States and ‘Sec`t'i_on Eleveii of the Kentucky ‘
4 Coi"is't:itut;ion.1 A criminal defendant is entitled to" effective assistance 'of
counsel,,but he is not entitled to perfect counsel._2
This Court reviews an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under
Stn'cltland q. liifci.`sl'iington.,3 which we adopted in G`all v. Commoriwealtlt‘* The
"Strickland standard requires Miles to prove both prongs in a_ two-part analysis.
First, Miles must show tiial-couiisel’s performance was deficient Seccnd, Miles
_'must prove that the deficiency by counsel prejudiced his defense. 5 Strickland
further elaborated that “[t]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective
assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address
both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing
t
1 U. S. Const. amend. XI; U. S. Const. amend. XIV; Ky. Con_st. § 11.
2 Si'nmions v. Comm,onwealth, 191 S. W. 3d 557, 561 (Ky. 2006) (“A defendant is
not guaranteed errorless counsel or counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but
counsel likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance.” (citations
omitted]].
3 Stfickland v. WaShl'ngtOT|.', 466 U. S. 668 [1984].
4 Gall v. Comn_wnw€alth, 702 S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 1985].
' 5 Strickla_n,d, 466 U.S. at 687.'
on one. In particular, a court need not determine whether counsel’s '
performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by'_ the
defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies [i]f it is easier to dispose of
an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we
expect Will often be so, that course should be followed.'°'\'s
'Proving both deficient performance and prejudice is a substantial
burdcn, especially in the context that counsel’s conduct is presumed
reasonable and effective7 Ac_cording to.-Strickland, “def`icient perforrnance”
requires error “so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘cl`ounsel’
guaranteed the defendant by the‘ Sixth Amendment.’JB And`to prove prejudice,'
' Miles must demonstrate that “coun'sel’s errors were so serious as to deprive
l[hiin] of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”9 Stated another way, “the' n
defendant must show that__there is a reasonable probability that,' but for
_ counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been n
different A reasonableprobability-isa probability sufficient toiindei'rninel
confidence in the outcome.""10
v 'As the Court of Appeals in this case noted, “[A] court must indulge a
‘strong presumption’ that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance because it is all too‘easy to conclude that a
6_1¢11. at 697. _ ' _ _ _
v Humph.vey v. commonwealth 692 s.w..zc_i 870,'873` (1