[Cite as State v. Williamson, 2017-Ohio-7363.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
DEFIANCE COUNTY
KIMBERLY A. WILLIAMSON,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, CASE NO. 4-17-06
v.
BUREAU OF MOTOR VEHICLES, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 4-17-07
v.
KIMBERLY A. WILLIAMSON, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeals from Defiance Municipal Court
Trial Court Nos. CI1700049 and TRC 1605231
Judgments Affirmed
Date of Decision: August 28, 2017
APPEARANCES:
Danny A. Hill, II for Appellant
Carson L. Slade for Appellee
Case Nos. 4-17-06, 4-17-07
PRESTON, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Kimberly A. Williamson (“Williamson”), appeals
the March 7, 2017 judgment entry of the Defiance Municipal Court in case number
TRC1605231 convicting her of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence
of alcohol or drugs of abuse (“OVI”), a marked-lanes violation, and an expired-tags
violation after her motion to suppress evidence was denied. Williamson also
appeals the February 22, 2017 judgment entry of the Defiance Municipal Court in
case number CI1700049 denying her appeal of an administrative license suspension
(“ALS”) following her OVI arrest. We affirm.
{¶2} On November 5, 2016, at approximately 1:14 a.m., Ohio State Highway
Patrol Trooper Matthew J. Gardner (“Trooper Gardner”) initiated a traffic stop of
the vehicle operated by Williamson after Trooper Gardner observed Williamson
commit marked-lanes violations while travelling on State Route 281 in Defiance
County. (Feb. 10, 2017 Tr. at 14-15). After Trooper Gardner stopped Williamson,
he detected that her vehicle’s registration was expired. (Id. at 15). Following
Williamson’s refusal to submit to chemical testing to determine her level of
intoxication, she was arrested and charged with OVI in violation of R.C.
4511.19(A)(1)(a), a first-degree misdemeanor, operating a vehicle with an expired
registration in violation of R.C. 4503.11, a fourth-degree misdemeanor, and the
failure to drive within the marked lanes in violation of R.C. 4511.33, a minor
-2-
Case Nos. 4-17-06, 4-17-07
misdemeanor. (Case No. TRC1605231 Doc. No. 1). Because Williamson refused
chemical testing, her license was administratively suspended. (Case No.
TRC1605231 Doc. No. 2).
{¶3} On November 9, 2016, Williamson appeared and entered pleas of not
guilty. (Case No. TRC1605231 Doc. No. 3). On January 20, 2017, Williamson
filed a motion to suppress evidence arguing that Trooper Gardner lacked a
reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe that she committed a marked-lanes
violation. (Case No. TRC1605231 Doc. No. 17). That same day, Williamson
appealed her ALS. (Case No. CI1700049 Doc. No. 1). After a hearing on February
22, 2017, the trial court denied Williamson’s motion to suppress evidence. (Case
No. TRC1605231 Doc. No. 20). Because the trial court denied Williamson’s
motion to suppress evidence after concluding that Trooper Gardner had a
reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe that she committed a marked-lanes
violation, the trial court denied Williamson’s ALS appeal. (Case No. CI1700049
Doc. No. 4).
{¶4} On March 7, 2017, a change-of-plea hearing was held. (Mar. 7, 2017
Tr. at 35); (Case No. TRC1605231 Doc. No. 22). Pursuant to a negotiated plea
agreement, Williamson withdrew her pleas of not guilty and entered no-contest
pleas to the charges. (Id.); (Id.). The trial court accepted Williamson’s no-contest
pleas, found her guilty, and sentenced her based on the joint-sentencing
-3-
Case Nos. 4-17-06, 4-17-07
recommendation of the parties. (Id. at 40-41); (Case No. TRC1605231A Doc. No.
22); (Case No. TRC1605231B Doc. No. 1); (Case No. TRC1605231C Doc. No. 1).1
The trial court sentenced Williamson to 180 days in jail, suspended 170 of those
days, and ordered her to pay a $750 fine as to the OVI charge, to pay a $25 fine as
to the marked-lanes charge, and to pay court costs as to the expired-tags charge. (Id.
at 40-41); (Id.); (Id.); (Id.).
{¶5} Williamson filed notices of appeal on March 24, 2017 in case number
TRC1605231 and case number CI1700049. (Case No. TRC1605231 Doc. No. 25);
(Case No. CI1700049. Doc. No. 5). Because the outcome of Williamson’s ALS
appeal is contingent on our disposition of Williamson’s appeal in her traffic case,
the cases were consolidated. Williamson raises one assignment of error for our
review.
Assignment of Error
The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Suppress Evidence, and
Denying Appellant’s Administrative License Suspension Appeal,
as the Standard of Reasonable Articulable Suspicion Required for
the Traffic Stop Was Not Met.
{¶6} In her assignment of error, Williamson argues that the trial court erred
by denying her motion to suppress evidence. In particular, she argues that the trial
1
For purposes of disposition, the trial court’s clerk created separate dockets for the three charges under case
number TRC1605231—TRC1605231A, TRC1605231B, and TRC1605231C. The only document included
in the dockets for case numbers TRC1605231B and TRC1605231C is the judgment entry of conviction and
sentence. (See Case No. TRC1605231B Doc. No. 1); (Case No. TRC1605231C, Doc. No. 1). All other
documents related to case numbers TRC1605231B and TRC1605231C are included in the record for case
number TRC1605231A.
-4-
Case Nos. 4-17-06, 4-17-07
court erred by concluding that Trooper Gardner had a reasonable, articulable
suspicion to believe that she committed a marked-lanes violation. Because she
argues that Trooper Gardner lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe
that she committed a marked-lanes violation, Williamson also contends that the trial
court erred by denying her ALS appeal.
{¶7} A review of the denial of a motion to suppress involves mixed questions
of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. At a
suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and, as such, is
in the best position to evaluate the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Id. See
also State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 552 (1995). When reviewing a ruling on a
motion to suppress, “an appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact
if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.” Burnside at ¶ 8, citing State
v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19 (1982). With respect to the trial court’s conclusions of
law, however, our standard of review is de novo, and we must independently
determine whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. Id., citing State v.
McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706 (4th Dist.1997).
{¶8} “[I]n order to constitutionally stop a vehicle, an officer must, at a
minimum, have either: (1) a reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and
articulable facts, that criminal behavior has occurred, is occurring, or is imminent;
or (2) a reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that the
-5-
Case Nos. 4-17-06, 4-17-07
vehicle should be stopped in the interests of public safety.” State v. Anthony, 3d
Dist. Seneca No. 13-09-26, 2009-Ohio-6717, ¶ 10, citing State v. Moore, 3d Dist.
Marion No. 9-07-60, 2008-Ohio-2407, ¶ 10, citing State v. Andrews, 3d Dist.
Auglaize No. 2-07-30, 2008-Ohio-625, ¶ 8, citing State v. Chatton, 11 Ohio St.3d
59, 61 (1984), and citing State v. Purtee, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-04-10, 2006-Ohio-
6337, ¶ 9, citing State v. Norman, 136 Ohio App.3d 46, 53-54 (3d Dist.1999).
{¶9} “An officer’s ‘reasonable suspicion’ is determined based on the totality
of the circumstances.” Id. at ¶ 11, citing Moore at ¶ 11, citing Andrews at ¶ 8, citing
State v. Terry, 130 Ohio App.3d 253, 257 (3d Dist.1998), citing State v. Andrews,
57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87 (1991). “‘“Specific and articulable facts” that will justify an
investigatory stop by way of reasonable suspicion include: (1) location; (2) the
officer’s experience, training or knowledge; (3) the suspect’s conduct or
appearance; and (4) the surrounding circumstances.’” Id., quoting Purtee at ¶ 9,
citing State v. Gaylord, 9th Dist. Summit No. 22406, 2005-Ohio-2138, ¶ 9, citing
State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 177, 178-79 (1988), and citing State v. Davison, 9th
Dist. Summit No. 21825, 2004-Ohio-3251, ¶ 6.
{¶10} Trooper Gardner testified that he stopped Williamson’s vehicle for
violating R.C. 4511.33, which provides, in relevant part:
(A) Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more
clearly marked lanes for traffic, or wherever within municipal
-6-
Case Nos. 4-17-06, 4-17-07
corporations traffic is lawfully moving in two or more substantially
continuous lines in the same direction, the following rules apply:
(1) A vehicle * * * shall be driven, as nearly as is practicable,
entirely within a single lane or line of traffic and shall not be moved
from such lane or line until the driver has first ascertained that such
movement can be made with safety.
R.C. 4511.33(A)(1).
{¶11} At the suppression hearing, Trooper Gardner testified that he stopped
Williamson after observing her commit two marked-lanes violations along with
observing her weaving within the lane. (Feb. 10, 2017 Tr. at 15, 19). He testified,
“I noticed the vehicle, when it went across the bridge, the vehicle, I observed it
weaving within the lane, and then I observed a lane violation, one time over the
centerline by a tire width and one time over the white edge line by a tire width.”
(Id. at 15). (See also id. at 18). The State admitted as evidence the recording from
Trooper Gardner’s dashboard camera, which was played for the trial court. (Id. at
17). Trooper Gardner admitted that Williamson’s marked-lanes violations—
namely, that Williamson’s tire was over the centerline by a tire width and over the
white fog line by a tire width—do not appear as visible on the dashboard-camera
video as he witnessed while following behind Williamson’s vehicle. (See id. at 18,
20-22, 25). He explained,
-7-
Case Nos. 4-17-06, 4-17-07
My car is one of the older vehicles. It’s not equipped with the high
def [sic] camera that some of the newer cars have. There’s times
where if it’s raining or poor lighting, it will just be black and white.
There’s glare. I mean, you can see there, you can’t even see the, you
can’t even make out the license plate there on the video. Whereas me,
I’m sitting in my car, I mean I just called [the license plate] in. You
can’t even tell what state it is. * * * Obviously, what we’re seeing on
the video here is not as clear as what my own eyes are seeing, and
what I’m testifying to[.]”
(Id. at 18-19).
{¶12} According to Trooper Gardner, he stopped Williamson based on an
issue of safety since her vehicle was “coming up on top of [a] hill” and Trooper
Gardner could not see “what was coming down from the other side [of the hill].”
(Id. at 15-16). (See also id. at 18). Trooper Gardner indicated that (1) there was
minimal traffic at the time he stopped Williamson, (2) there were no adverse weather
conditions, and (3) there were no pot holes or other obstructions in the roadway
which would have caused her to leave her lane of traffic. (Id. at 14-15).
{¶13} Based on that evidence, the trial court found Trooper Gardner’s
testimony persuasive and concluded that he had a reasonable, articulable suspicion
-8-
Case Nos. 4-17-06, 4-17-07
to believe that Williamson committed a marked-lanes violation to justify the traffic
stop. In particular, the trial court noted, Trooper Gardner testified
that the video was not as clear as what he could see, but it’s what [law
enforcement has] to work with.
[Trooper Gardner] also pointed out that as observed from the
video, the registration of the vehicle was not able to be seen as to
numbers, letters, or even the state of registration; however, he can be
heard reading the information to the dispatcher over the radio.
Therefore, he could clearly see what the observers in viewing the
video could not.
Upon cross examination, defense counsel asked where the tire
crossed the line, and the trooper noted what he had seen and gave the
corresponding time stamp noted on the video as to when he had
observed the crossing of the marked lines.
(Case No. TRC1605231 Doc. No. 20).
{¶14} On appeal, Williamson challenges the trial court’s legal conclusion
that she committed a marked-lanes violation based on this court’s decision in State
v. Shaffer. 3d Dist. Paulding No. 11-13-02, 2013-Ohio-3581. In Shaffer, we
concluded that the evidence in the record did not support a reasonable, articulable
suspicion to justify the traffic stop of Shaffer based on a marked-lanes violation
-9-
Case Nos. 4-17-06, 4-17-07
where the tires of Shaffer’s vehicle were on the white fog line without evidence that
it was not practicable for Shaffer to remain in her lane of travel or evidence that she
travelled outside her lane for safety purposes. Id. at ¶ 26. In analyzing the
requirements of R.C. 4511.33, we stated:
This conclusion stems in part from the fact that a sudden
deviation from the lane of travel, where there is nothing in the
surrounding circumstances to indicate why it was not practicable for
the driver to remain within the lane, could in itself raise a legitimate
safety concern sufficient to constitute a reasonable, articulable
suspicion of a violation of R.C. 4511.33(A)(1) in the right case.
At the same time, we also recognize that there could always exist
something in the surrounding conditions or circumstances that raises
a safety concern regarding the driver’s deviation from the lane that
completely obviates any need to address the issue of the driver’s
practicability in maintaining the lane of travel, all of which could
likewise independently constitute a reasonable, articulable suspicion
of a violation of R.C. 4511.33(A)(1).
Id. at ¶ 24-25. However, we need not reach Williamson’s argument under Shaffer
because the trial court concluded that Trooper Gardner had a reasonable, articulable
suspicion to believe Williamson committed a marked-lanes violation based on
-10-
Case Nos. 4-17-06, 4-17-07
Trooper Gardner’s testimony that he witnessed her vehicle cross the centerline by a
tire width and the white fog line by a tire width.2 See Anthony, 2009-Ohio-6717, at
¶ 12 (“‘[A] traffic stop is constitutionally valid when a law-enforcement officer
witnesses a motorist drift over the lane markings in violation of R.C. 4511.33, even
without further evidence of erratic or unsafe driving.’”), quoting State v. Mays, 119
Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, ¶ 25. In addition, Trooper Gardner’s testimony
reflects that there was nothing in the traffic, road conditions or weather to indicate
that remaining within the lane was not practicable.
{¶15} The trial court’s factual conclusion—that Williamson committed a
marked-lanes violation when her vehicle crossed the centerline by a tire width and
the white fog line by a tire width without a practicable reason to do so—is supported
by competent, credible evidence—Trooper Gardner’s testimony, which the trial
court found credible. See State v. Harrison, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-14-16, 2015-
Ohio-1419, ¶ 24, quoting State v. McClellan, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-09-21, 2010-
Ohio-314, ¶ 38 (“‘A police officer’s testimony alone is sufficient to establish
reasonable articulable suspicion for a stop.’”). Although it is unclear from the
dashboard camera whether Williamson’s vehicle crossed over the lines as Trooper
Gardner testified, Trooper Gardner’s testimony that he had a better view of
2
We continue to decline adopting or endorsing the “tire rule,” which is recognized by other Ohio appellate
districts. See State v. Shaffer, 3d Dist. Paulding No. 11-13-02, 2013-Ohio-3581, ¶ 29. See, e.g., State v.
Parker, 6th Dist. Ottawa No. OT-12-034, 2013-Ohio-3470; Wickliffe v. Petway, 11th Dist. Nos. 2011-L-101,
2011-L-102, 2012-Ohio-2439.
-11-
Case Nos. 4-17-06, 4-17-07
Williamson’s vehicle than the view depicted by the dashboard camera is supported
by the video evidence. That is, Williamson’s license plate is indecipherable on the
video; however, Trooper Gardner can be heard reading the license-plate information
to a dispatcher over his radio. Indeed, in making its credibility determination, the
trial court weighed that fact in favor of finding Trooper Gardner’s testimony
credible. As such, based on Trooper Gardner’s testimony, the trial court did not err
by denying Williamson’s motion to suppress evidence.
{¶16} Williamson also appeals the trial court’s denial of her ALS appeal.
However, Williamson’s ALS terminated when she was convicted after entering a
no-contest plea to the OVI offense. Columbus v. Zimmerman, 10th Dist. Franklin
Nos. 14AP-963 and 14AP-964, 2015-Ohio-3488, ¶ 11, citing R.C. 4511.191(B)(2)
and State v. Gonzaliz, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2013CA00077, 2013-Ohio-5309, ¶ 19.
Based on our determination above, Williamson’s argument is not well taken.
{¶17} Williamson’s assignment of error is overruled.
{¶18} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
Judgments Affirmed
WILLAMOWSKI and SHAW, J.J., concur.
/jlr
-12-
State v. Williamson
Combined Opinion