15-4015
Zheng v. Sessions
BIA
Poczter, IJ
A087 633 730
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
2 the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
3 Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
4 31st day of August, two thousand seventeen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 DENNIS JACOBS,
8 ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
9 CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 GANG ZHENG,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 15-4015
17
18 JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III,
19 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL*,
20 Respondent.
21 _____________________________________
22
23 *Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General
24 Jefferson B. Sessions III is automatically substituted for former Attorney
25 General Loretta E. Lynch as Respondent.
26
27
1 FOR PETITIONER: Zhen Liang Li, New York, N.Y.
2
3 FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal
4 Deputy Assistant Attorney
5 General; Stephen J. Flynn,
6 Assistant Director; Annette M.
7 Wietecha, Attorney, Office of
8 Immigration Litigation, United
9 States Department of Justice,
10 Washington, D.C.
11
12 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
13 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
14 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is
15 DENIED.
16 Petitioner Gang Zheng, a native and citizen of China, seeks
17 review of a November 16, 2015, decision of the BIA affirming
18 a July 14, 2014, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying
19 Zheng’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and
20 relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re
21 Gang Zheng, No. A087 633 730 (B.I.A. Nov. 16, 2015), aff’g No.
22 A087 633 730 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City July 14, 2014). We assume
23 the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
24 procedural history in this case.
25 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both
26 the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.”
27 Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir.
28 2006). The applicable standards of review are well
2
1 established. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder,
2 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009). As discussed below, the
3 agency did not err in concluding that Zheng failed to establish
4 a well-founded fear of persecution.
5 Absent past persecution, an alien may establish
6 eligibility for asylum by demonstrating a well-founded fear of
7 future persecution, which is a “subjective fear that is
8 objectively reasonable.” Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d
9 277, 284 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
10 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2); see also Y.C.
11 v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013) (“For an asylum
12 claim, the applicant must show a reasonable possibility of
13 future persecution.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). “An
14 asylum applicant can show a well-founded fear of future
15 persecution in two ways: (1) by demonstrating that he or she
16 ‘would be singled out individually for persecution’ if
17 returned, or (2) by proving the existence of a ‘pattern or
18 practice in [the] [. . .] country of nationality [. . .] of
19 persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to the
20 applicant’ and establishing his or her ‘own inclusion in, and
21 identification with, such group.’” Y.C., 741 F.3d at 332
22 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii)).
3
1 First, the agency did not err in concluding that Zheng
2 failed to show a reasonable possibility that he would be singled
3 out individually for persecution. See Jian Xing Huang v. INS,
4 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (“In the absence of solid
5 support in the record” a fear of persecution is not objectively
6 reasonable and is “speculative at best.”). “Importantly, ‘to
7 establish a well-founded fear of persecution in the absence of
8 any evidence of past persecution, an alien must make some
9 showing that authorities in his [or her] country of nationality
10 are either aware of his [or her] activities or likely to become
11 aware of his [or her] activities.’” Y.C., 741 F.3d at 332
12 (quoting Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir.
13 2008)). We agree with the agency that Zheng failed to make this
14 showing because he did not assert that Chinese authorities are
15 aware of his religious practice, he testified that no one in
16 China other than his family knows that he became a Christian
17 in the United States, and he does not challenge the agency’s
18 finding that his prospective practice of Christianity in China
19 was speculative given his failure to attend church regularly
20 in the United States. The agency also properly concluded that
21 the reasonableness of Zheng’s fear was diminished by the fact
22 that his mother has continued to attend her underground church
4
1 in China without incident. See Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191
2 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding fear of future persecution
3 weakened when similarly-situated family members remain
4 unharmed in petitioner’s native country).
5 Second, the agency did not err in concluding that Zheng
6 failed to establish a pattern or practice of persecution of
7 Christians in China. The agency reasonably found that
8 religious activities, such as attending underground churches
9 or proselytizing, are not punished or restricted nationwide.
10 See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342
11 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that the weight accorded to an
12 applicant’s evidence “lie[s] largely within the discretion of
13 the IJ” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The 2012
14 International Religious Freedom Report states, for example,
15 that “[i]n some parts of the country . . . local authorities
16 tacitly approved of or did not interfere with the activities
17 of unregistered groups.” Given this nationwide variation, the
18 agency reasonably concluded that Zheng failed to establish a
19 pattern or practice of persecution of Christians in China. See
20 Santoso v. Holder, 580 F.3d 110, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming
21 agency’s finding of no pattern or practice of persecution of
22 Catholics in Indonesia where evidence showed that religious
5
1 violence was not nationwide and that Catholics in many parts
2 of the country were free to practice their faith).
3 Because the agency reasonably found that Zheng failed to
4 demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution, it did not err
5 in denying asylum or in concluding that he necessarily failed
6 to meet the higher burden required for withholding of removal.
7 See Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2010). Zheng
8 does not challenge the agency’s denial of CAT relief on appeal.
9 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
10 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal
11 that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED.
12 Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED
13 in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
14 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
15 FOR THE COURT:
16 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
6