IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2015-CT-01142-SCT
WINFRED FORKNER
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/25/2015
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. LILLIE BLACKMON SANDERS
TRIAL COURT ATTORNEY: WINFRED FORKNER (PRO SE)
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: WILKINSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: WINFRED FORKNER (PRO SE)
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: LAURA HOGAN TEDDER
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DISPOSITION: THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS IS REVERSED. THE JUDGMENT
OF THE WILKINSON COUNTY CIRCUIT
COURT IS VACATED - 08/31/2017
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC.
KITCHENS, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. This Court has granted Winfred Forkner’s petition for certiorari for the purpose of
correcting the erroneous disposition of his appeal by the Mississippi Court of Appeals. Years
after his direct appeal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, Forkner filed a motion for post-
conviction relief in the Circuit Court of Wilkinson County. The circuit court denied the
motion as untimely. Forkner appealed, and the Court of Appeals found that the circuit court
was without authority to adjudicate the appeal because Forkner had not obtained the required
permission from this Court to file his motion for post-conviction relief in the circuit court.
See Miss. Code Ann. 99-39-7 (Rev. 2015). The Court of Appeals also held, erroneously, that
the circuit court’s lack of authority to entertain the motion deprived the Court of Appeals of
jurisdiction over the appeal. Thereupon, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, thus
allowing the circuit court’s erroneous judgment to stand.
¶2. Because the Court of Appeals did have jurisdiction to consider the lawfulness of the
circuit court’s judgment, it erroneously dismissed Forkner’s appeal. Therefore, we reverse
the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Because the circuit court lacked authority to entertain
Forkner’s motion, as the Court of Appeals rightly determined, we vacate the circuit court’s
judgment.
DISCUSSION
¶3. On February 26, 2001, a Wilkinson County jury convicted Winfred Forkner of the
crime of burglary of a storehouse. See Miss. Code Ann. § 97-17-33 (Rev. 2014). The Circuit
Court of Wilkinson County sentenced him as an habitual offender to life without the
possibility of parole. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-83 (Rev. 2015). Forkner appealed, and
this Court assigned his appeal to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed his conviction and
sentence. See Forkner v. State, 902 So. 2d 615, 626 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004). Within a five-
year period, Forkner filed three separate applications for permission to file a motion for post-
conviction relief in the trial court. See Miss. Code Ann.§ 99-39-7. This Court denied
Forkner’s first motion and dismissed his second and third motions as procedurally barred.
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Forkner never obtained permission from this Court to file a motion for post-conviction relief
in the circuit court.
¶4. On January 9, 2014, Forkner filed a document entitled “Motion Pursuant to Rule
60(b)(4), (6) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure” in the Circuit Court of Wilkinson
County. The circuit court found that this motion, in which Forkner sought relief from his
conviction and sentence for burglary of a storehouse, was in the nature of a motion for post-
conviction relief. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(1) (Rev. 2015). The circuit court
determined that the motion was procedurally barred because it was filed outside the three-
year limitation period provided by the Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act
(UPCCRA). Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 2015). Therefore, the circuit court denied
the motion.
¶5. Forkner appealed, and this Court assigned the case to the Court of Appeals, which
found that the circuit court had lacked authority to entertain Forkner’s motion. Forkner v.
State, 2016 WL 4376520, at *2 (Miss. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2016). The Court of Appeals found
that the circuit court correctly had deemed Forkner’s filing a motion for post-conviction
relief. Id. The Court of Appeals noted that, under Section 99-39-7 of the UPCCRA, when a
petitioner has appealed and the conviction and sentence have been affirmed, “the motion
under this article shall not be filed in the trial court until the motion shall have first been
presented to a quorum of the Justices of the Supreme Court . . . and an order granted allowing
the filing of such motion in the trial court.” Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-7 (Rev. 2015). Id. at
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*1. Thus, the Court of Appeals found that Forkner, having taken a direct appeal from his
conviction, was not allowed to seek post-conviction relief in the circuit court without first
having been granted permission to do so by this Court. Id. at *2. Because Forkner had not
obtained permission to file a motion for post-conviction relief in the circuit court, the Court
of Appeals correctly determined that the circuit court had lacked authority to adjudicate
Forkner’s motion. Id.
¶6. But the Court of Appeals went on to conclude that, because the circuit court had no
authority to consider Forkner’s motion, “we lack jurisdiction over his appeal.” Id. Due to the
Court of Appeals’ perceived lack of jurisdiction, it dismissed the appeal. Id. The Court of
Appeals correctly found that, because Forkner had filed his motion in the wrong court,
neither it nor the circuit court had authority to adjudicate the merits of the motion. But the
Court of Appeals incorrectly found that it lacked jurisdiction to determine whether the circuit
court had authority to entertain the motion. A final judgment from which a timely notice of
appeal was filed confers jurisdiction upon an appellate court to determine whether the circuit
court’s disposition was lawful. M.R.A.P. 4(a). Thus, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction
to determine whether the circuit court’s disposition of Forkner’s motion was lawful, and it
erred by failing to recognize its jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ dismissal
of the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction was erroneous. Because the Court of Appeals
had jurisdiction to consider Forkner’s appeal, it should have vacated the order of the circuit
court that erroneously adjudicated his motion for post-conviction relief without authority.
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Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and vacate the order of the
Wilkinson County Circuit Court.
¶7. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS REVERSED. THE
JUDGMENT OF THE WILKINSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS VACATED.
WALLER, C.J., DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, P.JJ., KING, COLEMAN,
MAXWELL, BEAM AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ., CONCUR.
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