MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Sep 05 2017, 6:35 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, Court of Appeals
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jacob P. Wahl Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Ripstra Law Office Attorney General of Indiana
Jasper, Indiana
Jodi Kathryn Stein
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jason W. Green, September 5, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
51A01-1702-CR-428
v. Appeal from the
Martin Circuit Court
State of Indiana, The Hon. Lynne E. Ellis, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
Appellee-Plaintiff.
51C01-1608-F4-123
Bradford, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] After a police search of Appellant-Defendant Jason Green’s truck uncovered,
inter alia, methamphetamine, the State charged Green with Level 4 felony
dealing in methamphetamine, Level 6 felony methamphetamine possession,
Level 6 felony maintaining a common nuisance, and Class C misdemeanor
paraphernalia possession. Green pled guilty to Level 5 felony dealing in
methamphetamine pursuant to a written plea agreement in which he agreed to
a three-year sentence in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges against
him. Additionally, Green’s placement was left to the discretion of the trial
court. The trial court sentenced Green to three years in the purposeful
incarceration program1 in the Department of Correction (“DOC”). Green
contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering incarceration and
that his placement is inappropriately harsh. Because we disagree, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On August 17, 2016, Green’s vehicle was stopped by Major T.A. Burkhardt of
the Martin County Sheriff’s Department after Green failed to completely stop
his truck at a stop sign. A K-9 conducted a sweep of Green’s vehicle and
indicated the presence of narcotics. Major Burkhardt searched the vehicle,
1
Purposeful incarceration is for “chemically addicted offenders” who, upon successful completion of an
“IDOC Therapeutic community[,]” can seek a sentence modification. See http://www.in.gov/idoc/
2798.htm (last visited August 25, 2017).
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discovering Green’s wallet and driver’s license under the driver seat, $1189.00
in cash, scales, and 1.4 grams of methamphetamine.
[3] On August 18, 2016, the State charged Green with Level 4 felony dealing in
methamphetamine, Level 6 felony methamphetamine possession, Level 6
felony maintaining a common nuisance, and Class C misdemeanor
paraphernalia possession. On January 31, 2017, Green pled guilty pursuant to
a written plea agreement to Level 5 felony dealing in methamphetamine and
agreed to a three-year sentence in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining
charges. Placement of Green—whether in the DOC or in the Martin County
Community Corrections program—was left to the trial court’s discretion.
[4] Green admitted at the sentencing hearing that he had been dealing
methamphetamine in the community “on occasion” and for a “few months.”
Tr. p. 24. Finding Green’s guilty plea mitigating, the trial court found two
aggravating circumstances: 1) Green’s act of dealing methamphetamine in the
community and 2) that Green failed to join a substance abuse treatment class
while in jail. The trial court sentenced Green to three years in the DOC,
allowing for purposeful incarceration.
Discussion and Decision
[5] At the outset, we note that Green incorrectly claims that his plea agreement
capped his sentence at three years when, in fact, the record is clear that he
agreed to a three-year executed sentence with only the question of placement
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being within the trial court’s discretion. Consequently, we review Green’s
claims in terms of his placement, not the length of his sentence.
I. Abuse of Discretion
[6] Under our current sentencing scheme, “the trial court must enter a statement
including reasonably detailed reasons or circumstances for imposing a
particular sentence.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007),
modified on other grounds on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2008) (“Anglemyer II”).
We review the sentence for an abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion
occurs if “the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances.” Id.
[7] A trial court abuses its discretion if it (1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at
all[,]” (2) enters “a sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a
sentence–including a finding of aggravating and mitigating factors if any–but
the record does not support the reasons,” (3) enters a sentencing statement that
“omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for
consideration,” or (4) considers reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.”
Id. at 490-91. If the trial court has abused its discretion, we will remand for
resentencing “if we cannot say with confidence that the trial court would have
imposed the same sentence had it properly considered reasons that enjoy
support in the record.” Id. at 491. However, the relative weight or value
assignable to reasons properly found, or to those which should have been
found, is not subject to review for abuse of discretion. Id. There is no
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requirement that a trial court generate a list of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, only that it state reasonably detailed reasons. Id. at 490. A
single aggravating factor can support upper-level sentences. See Willey v. State,
712, N.E.2d 434, 446 (Ind. 1999) (stating that a single aggravating circumstance
may be sufficient to support an enhanced sentence). Although material
elements of the crime may not be considered as aggravating factors at
sentencing, the particularized circumstances of the elements properly may be
considered as such. See, e.g., McElroy v. State, 865 N.E.2d 584, 598-99 (Ind.
2007); Scott v. State, 840 N.E.2d 376, 382 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
A. Aggravating Circumstances
[8] The trial court found two aggravating circumstances:2 1) Green’s act of dealing
methamphetamine in the community and 2) that Green failed to join a
substance abuse treatment class while in jail. Green argues that the trial court
abused its discretion in finding the first aggravating circumstance on the basis
that it is merely restating an element of his crime, dealing in methamphetamine.
Under the circumstances of this case, this is incorrect. Green pled guilty to
possession methamphetamine with the intent to deliver it, not the actual
delivery of it. He did, however, admit to actual dealing of methamphetamine in
2
Green claims that the trial court found four distinct aggravating circumstances. We disagree. Green claims
that the trial court found him responsible for deaths in Martin County and that Green’s son had forgiven
him. The trial court merely observed that “it [(methamphetamine)] is killing people in my community”
without even suggesting that Green himself was responsible for any person’s death. Tr. p. 35. The trial court
also merely observed that Green’s fourteen-year-old son had forgiven him without identifying this fact as
aggravating. In any event, we are at a loss to understand how the forgiveness of Green’s son could be
considered aggravating.
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the community over the course of a few months. Because Green’s dealing of
methamphetamine in the community over the course of a few months was not
the crime to which he pled guilty, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
this regard.
B. Mitigating Circumstances
[9] Green argues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to find the
hardship on his son to be a mitigating circumstance. Determining what is a
proper mitigating circumstance is within the discretion of the trial court. See
Rogers v. State, 878 N.E.2d 269 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. An allegation
that the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor requires the
defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is not only supported by the
record but also that the mitigating evidence is significant. See Anglemyer II, 875
N.E.2d at 220–21.
[10] One of the factors the trial court may consider as mitigating is whether
“[i]mprisonment of the person will result in undue hardship to the person or the
dependents of the person.” See Ind. Code §35-38-1-7.1(b)(10). Green, however,
did not present this allegedly mitigating circumstance to the trial court in any
specific terms. If the defendant does not advance a factor to be mitigating at
sentencing, we will presume that the factor is not significant and the defendant
is precluded from advancing it as a mitigating circumstance for the first time on
appeal. Spears v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1161, 1167 (Ind. 2000). While Green noted
his contribution of child support to his son who lives with his ex-wife, Green
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failed to present any evidence or argument that his ex-wife had inadequate
resources to raise their son during his short period of incarceration. In short,
Green did not argue that his son would suffer any undue hardship during his
incarceration. Consequently, Green has waived this particular claim for
appellate consideration.
II. Appropriateness of Sentence
[11] We “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of
the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in
light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Ind.
Appellate Rule 7(B). “Although appellate review of sentences must give due
consideration to the trial court’s sentence because of the special expertise of the
trial bench in making sentencing decisions, Appellate Rule 7(B) is an
authorization to revise sentences when certain broad conditions are satisfied.”
Shouse v. State, 849 N.E.2d 650, 660 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied (citations
and quotation marks omitted). “[W]hether we regard a sentence as appropriate
at the end of the day turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the
severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that
come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind.
2008). In addition to the “due consideration” we are required to give to the
trial court’s sentencing decision, “we understand and recognize the unique
perspective a trial court brings to its sentencing decisions.” Rutherford v. State,
866 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Following Green’s guilty plea to
Level 5 felony methamphetamine delivery, the trial court sentenced him to
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three years of purposeful incarceration in the DOC. “A person who commits a
Level 5 felony (for a crime committed after June 30, 2014) shall be imprisoned
for a fixed term of between one (1) and six (6) years, with the advisory sentence
being three (3) years.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(b). Again, we limit our review to
whether Green’s placement was appropriate, not the length of his sentence,
which was fixed at three years by the plea agreement.
[12] The nature of Green’s offense justifies incarceration, as opposed to community
corrections. Green was convicted of possessing enough methamphetamine to
support a Level 5 felony conviction, he admitted to facts that would have
supported a Level 4 conviction, see Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1(c)(1), for which he
could have received a sentence of twelve years of incarceration. See Ind. Code §
35-50-2-5.5. Moreover, Green’s offense was admittedly only the latest part of
his ongoing methamphetamine dealing operation in the community. The
nature of Green’s offense justifies his incarceration.
[13] Green’s character also justifies his incarceration. Although Green’s criminal
history is not lengthy, he does have a 1993 conviction for Class B misdemeanor
reckless driving and a 2002 conviction for Class A misdemeanor marijuana
possession. Green, who was forty-four years old at sentencing, admitted to first
taking methamphetamine when he was twenty-three, using it frequently in his
thirties, and taking it last the day before his arrest in this case. Although Green
has graduated from a methamphetamine user to a methamphetamine dealer,
his actions do not show that he has fully acknowledged his substance-abuse
issues, as shown by his failure to enroll in a substance-abuse treatment program
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while in jail prior to his guilty plea in this case. Perhaps commitment to
purposeful incarceration will provide Green with the help he apparently needs.
In light of the nature of his offense and his character, Green has failed to
establish that his commitment to purposeful incarceration in the DOC in
inappropriate.
[14] We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
May, J., and Barnes, J., concur.
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