NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4693-14T4
A-4746-14T4
IN THE MATTER OF THE
TRUST OF DR. MERRITT
EVAN LONDON, M.D.,
DECEASED.
——————————————————————————
Argued June 8, 2017 – Decided September 6, 2017
Before Judges Hoffman, O'Connor and Whipple.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Monmouth County, Docket No.
P-283-13/S#236312.
Kenneth L. Moskowitz argued the cause for
appellants Mark London and Patricia London
Thieffry in A-4693-14 (Brown Moskowitz &
Kallen, PC, attorneys; Mr. Moskowitz and
Steven R. Rowland, of counsel and on the
briefs).
Derek M. Cassidy argued the cause for
appellant Thomas Arnold in A-4746-14 (The
Cassidy Law Firm, attorneys; Mr. Cassidy and
Harold J. Cassidy, on the briefs).
James M. Nardelli argued the cause for
respondents The Salvation Army, NYU Langone
Medical Center, Simon Wiesenthal Center,
Jewish Family and Children's Service of
Greater Monmouth County, and B'nai B'rith
Foundation of the United States (Parsons &
Nardelli, attorneys; Mr. Nardelli, on the
briefs).
Marc Krefetz, Deputy Attorney General, argued
the cause for respondent Attorney General of
New Jersey, in the position of parens patriae
(Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
attorney, joins in the brief of respondents).
PER CURIAM
This consolidated appeal concerns the distribution of the
estate of Dr. Evan Merritt London (decedent). The appellants are
plaintiffs Patricia London Thieffrey (Patti) and Mark London
(Mark), decedent's niece and nephew, and Thomas Arnold (Thomas),
decedent's long-time friend. These parties appeal from separate
summary judgment orders of the Chancery Division, Probate Part,
dismissing plaintiffs' verified complaint and Thomas's
counterclaim. Having thoroughly reviewed the record and
applicable law, we affirm.
We begin by reciting the relevant procedural history. On
August 29, 2013, plaintiffs filed a two-count verified complaint,
seeking in count one a judgment declaring that an unsigned trust
prepared in May 2013 "is valid and enforceable," and "supersedes"
a trust decedent signed in 2012. In count two, plaintiffs sought
a declaration that Thomas was entitled to one of decedent's two
IRA accounts, and that they were entitled to the second.
The New Jersey Attorney General filed an answer and
affirmative defenses to plaintiffs' complaint, on behalf of
various charitable organizations that would be impacted by the
2 A-4693-14T4
unsigned 2013 trust. Shortly thereafter, respondents NYU Langone
Medical Center (NYU Langone), Simon Wiesenthal Center, the
Salvation Army, B'nai B'rith Foundation of the United States (B'nai
B'rith), and Jewish Family and Children's Service of Greater
Monmouth County (Jewish Service) (collectively, charitable
organizations), filed an answer and affirmative defenses.
Respondent Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo Bank), as trustee
of decedent's 2012 trust, also filed an answer and affirmative
defenses. Thomas filed an answer, counterclaim, and cross-claim,
seeking a declaration that he was entitled to three of decedent's
private bank accounts, including one of decedent's IRAs.
On June 20, 2014, Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC (WFA), the
custodian of decedent's IRA accounts, filed an intervenor answer,
affirmative defenses, and a complaint for interpleader, requesting
the court determine the beneficiaries of the IRA accounts. In
July 2014, the charitable organizations and Wells Fargo Bank filed
a joint motion for partial summary judgment on count one of
plaintiffs' complaint. Plaintiffs then filed a cross-motion for
summary judgment on count one. On October 31, 2014, the court
granted respondents' motion and entered an order dismissing count
one of plaintiffs' complaint.
Following additional discovery, the charitable organizations
again moved for summary judgment, seeking to dismiss count two of
3 A-4693-14T4
plaintiff's complaint and the counterclaim filed by Thomas. WFA
also moved for summary judgment on its interpleader complaint, and
plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. On May 12,
2015, after oral argument, the court granted respondents' motion
and entered an order dismissing count two of plaintiffs' complaint
and Thomas's counterclaim.
This appeal followed. Given the nature of the record, we
first address the issues pertaining to count one, and then we
separately address the issues concerning count two.
I.
We discern the following facts relating to count one, viewed
in the light most favorable to appellants, the non-moving parties.
Ramos v. Flowers, 429 N.J. Super. 13, 16 (App. Div. 2012).
Decedent enjoyed a long career as a medical doctor,
specializing in ophthalmology. He married twice but produced no
children from either marriage. However, decedent maintained a
friendship with Thomas for over forty years, and Thomas certified
he was decedent's close companion. Toward the end of decedent's
life, Thomas saw him on a daily basis, serving as his "driver,
deliveryman, confidante, business associate, [and] adviser."
Plaintiffs are the children of decedent's once-estranged
brother, and were decedent's next closest relatives. According
4 A-4693-14T4
to their complaint, decedent referred to plaintiffs as "his only
family."
In the summer of 2012, decedent became ill from complications
of prostate cancer and a colostomy, resulting in a lengthy stay
at Riverview Hospital (Riverview) from June 16, 2012 through August
24, 2012. Following this stay, at the urging of plaintiffs and
Thomas, decedent agreed to move into the Brandywine assisted living
facility (Brandywine). Decedent passed away on May 24, 2013,
after being rushed from Brandywine to the Riverview emergency
room.
Decedent executed several wills and trusts over his lifetime,
the first on July 14, 1998 (1998 Will). The 1998 Will devised a
large portion of decedent's estate to plaintiffs.
Over ten years later, in the spring of 2010, decedent hired
attorney Stephen J. Oppenheim to handle his estate planning
matters. Oppenheim testified at deposition that he recommended
decedent "use a revocable trust as the primary vehicle to dispose
of his [e]state[,] with a beneficiary designation for his IRA[,]"
in addition to creating a "pour-over" will.1 He noted that in
2010, decedent's estate was valued at approximately six million
dollars.
1
Oppenheim explained that a "pour-over" will adds an estate
"to the trust fund to be administered and distributed as the trust
agreement provided."
5 A-4693-14T4
On July 9, 2010, decedent executed a trust document, titled
"Trust Agreement[,] The Merritt E. London Trust" (July 2010 trust).
This trust provided for a one-time $100,000 bequest to each
plaintiff, and created trusts for each plaintiff, with each trust
funded by 40 percent of the residual estate. It further provided
for a $25,000 bequest to decedent's housekeeper, and $10,000
bequests to Thomas and sixteen other friends and relatives; the
trust further provided for bequests to three listed charities, and
bequeathed 10 percent of the residual estate to six charitable
organizations.
Two years later, during his hospitalization at Riverview in
the summer of 2012, decedent executed several revised trust
documents, each time altering the amounts devised to plaintiffs
and certain charitable organizations. First, on June 22, 2012,
decedent executed a will, beneficiary designation, and trust (June
2012 Trust), which lowered the one-time bequests to plaintiffs to
$50,000 each. It further lowered the percentage of their residual
estate trusts to 25 percent each and divided 40 percent among six
named charitable organizations. It also granted Thomas a $75,000
specific bequest.
Shortly thereafter, on July 7, 2012, decedent executed a new
trust agreement (July 2012 Trust), will, beneficiary designation,
and power of attorney. In relevant part, the July 2012 Trust
6 A-4693-14T4
eliminated the one-time specific bequests to plaintiffs and
reduced the amount they would receive in trust to $600,000 each;
it also granted decedent's housekeeper a $500,000 trust. The
remainder was to be placed in trust for named charitable
organizations. Thomas retained his $75,000 bequest.
Next, on August 17, 2012, Oppenheim met with decedent at
Riverview, where he executed a new will, trust agreement, and
beneficiary designation. The trust, dated August 21, 2012 (August
2012 Trust), increased the amount for plaintiffs to $1,000,000
each, in trust, and retained the housekeeper's trust. It devised
the remainder as 19 percent each to the Riverview Medical Center
Foundation, NYU Langone, the Simon Wiesenthal Center, the
Salvation Army, and Jewish Service, and 5 percent to B'nai B'rith.
It further maintained a $75,000 specific bequest for Thomas.
On October 4, 2012, decedent executed a document revising the
August 2012 trust, titled "The Merritt E. London Trust[,] First
Amendment of Trust Agreement." (October 2012 Amendment). The
October 2012 Amendment removed Riverview as a beneficiary of the
residual estate, instead dividing 95 percent equally to the
remaining organizations and continuing 5 percent to B'nai B'rith.
Several months later, on April 5, 2013, Oppenheim wrote to
decedent and enclosed copies of several pages of the July 2012
Trust. Oppenheim noted that these pages listed "the names of
7 A-4693-14T4
[decedent's] beneficiaries, the amounts provided for each of them,
and for [decedent's] [t]rusts for the benefit of [his housekeeper],
Patti, and Mark, and the [o]rganizations' shares of any
distribution provided for them." At deposition, Oppenheim could
not recall why he sent these documents to decedent, but noted it
must have stemmed from "a conversation with somebody."
Decedent's Wells Fargo financial advisor, Anthony Frigoletto,
testified at deposition that approximately one month later, on May
11, 2013, he met with decedent at Brandywine to discuss changes
to his estate plan, which he marked on a copy of the July 2012
Trust. These changes involved granting decedent's brother a
$100,000 bequest, granting Riverview 28 percent of the residuary
reserved for the organizations, and decreasing NYU Langone's share
to 10 percent. Frigoletto faxed Oppenheim a copy of the marked
document on May 13, 2013, informing him decedent "still wants
changes."
Oppenheim then met with decedent at Brandywine on May 15,
2013. According to Oppenheim's memorandum of that date, he and
decedent discussed changes to his trust agreement, which included
giving "specific amounts to the beneficiary organizations" and
"divid[ing] the balance of the trust fund between Patti and Mark."
Oppenheim made notations of these changes on an unexecuted copy
8 A-4693-14T4
of the August 2012 Trust. At deposition, he described the meeting
as follows:
I sat down with [decedent], and I had a
copy of the last trust agreement with me. I
knew what he wanted. Generally[,] he wanted
to talk to me about changes. And we went over
that trust agreement paragraph by paragraph.
And he told me about the changes that he wanted
to make. And I made little notes on my copy
of the trust agreement.
Oppenheim affirmed he was "absolutely certain" that his
notations were the changes decedent described at their May 15
meeting. He thus prepared a new trust agreement (May 2013 Trust),
granting eleven specific bequests to eleven friends and relatives,
including $50,000 for Thomas and $100,000 for decedent's brother.
The trust further devised the residual estate to Patti and Mark
in equal shares, replacing the charities previously designated,
minus the $500,000 trust fund still allocated to his housekeeper.
The revised plan further granted specific bequests to the following
charities: $10,000 to the United Way of Monmouth County, $10,000
to the Foodbank of Monmouth and Ocean Counties, $70,000 to
Riverview, $40,000 to NYU Langone, $40,000 to the Simon Wiesenthal
Center, $40,000 to the Salvation Army, $40,000 to Jewish Service,
and $25,000 to B'nai B'rith.
Oppenheim testified he hand-delivered an unsigned copy of the
May 2013 Trust to Brandywine at 8:00 a.m. on May 22, 2013, leaving
it with a member of the staff for delivery to decedent. Although
9 A-4693-14T4
he could not remember the exact date, Oppenheim recalled a
subsequent phone conversation where decedent said he received the
document and "was going to look at it"; however, Oppenheim added
he did not believe decedent did so.
Oppenheim further stated he did not know whether decedent was
going to sign the May 2013 Trust, because he "expected [decedent]
to review it and to let [him] know whether he approved of it. And
if he did, then [they would] have a signing ceremony." When asked
if the document he dropped off "could have been executed[,]"
Oppenheim answered, "Not really. It could have been executed if
the execution was accompanied by witnesses and by a Notary and if
we had done it in the formal way." He added, "If [decedent]
approved it, we would not have had to make any change. I might
have prepared another document . . . or I might not have. But
that certainly could have been used, yes."
Oppenheim also attached a cover sheet to the May 2013 Trust,
which he testified summarized the major changes "in a very
abbreviated form." The cover sheet stated that if decedent found
the May 2013 Trust satisfactory, Oppenheim would prepare a will,
new beneficiary designation, and power of attorney, and help
decedent execute the documents. Oppenheim asked decedent to call
him "after you complete your review of the new Trust Agreement."
10 A-4693-14T4
Frigoletto testified decedent called him after he received
the new document, requesting he "come down there and see him
because he wanted me to read something with him, the new draft,
and he wanted my opinion with what was written." Frigoletto then
called Oppehnheim to obtain a copy of the trust. Frigoletto
received an email from Oppenheim, dated May 22, 2013, containing
a copy of the May 2013 Trust and advising that decedent "decided
recently that his niece and nephew should receive the biggest part
of his estate, free of trust, instead of the organizations named
by his current Trust Agreement." After receiving this email,
Frigoletto again spoke to decedent, who asked Frigoletto "what
[he] thought" and "pleaded with [Frigoletto] to come down" to meet
with him.
When asked whether he believed decedent had reviewed the May
2013 trust, Frigoletto stated, "Oh, I know he hadn't reviewed it.
I know he hadn't read it because he said he was waiting to see me.
He certainly knew what was in it because he knew what I was talking
about in our conversation, and he seemed apprehensive, but that's
just an opinion." Later in the deposition, Frigoletto stated he
was unsure whether decedent reviewed the document at the time of
the second phone call, but he knew decedent did not have it in
front of him when they spoke. Frigoletto then described the
conversation that followed:
11 A-4693-14T4
Q. And did you read the document to him
line-by-line?
A. No.
Q. Did you read any specific provisions to
him?
A. Yes.
Q. Which ones did you read to him?
A. The main – the addition of his brother,
the changes of some of the moving parts, and
that's about it, and then it concluded with
that I was – based on every single
conversation that I've ever had with him that
I was surprised about the size and how big
this change was, but that being said, "It's
your money. You can give it away however you
like, obviously. You don't need me to come
down there and review it with you if this is
what you want to do."
And then, again, he asked me if I would
come down and he wanted me there fast.
. . . .
Q. And did he indicate to you that he
intended to sign the document as written?
A. No, he never indicated that.
Q. And at the end of the call did he still
express a desire to review the document with
you?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you make plans to go and review
the document with him?
A. Sure, but at that point I was concerned
about the fact that I thought he knew what was
in the document and I didn't really know why
12 A-4693-14T4
he needed me to endorse it, and I told him
again "you don't need me to drive down there
for you to do what you want to do." You know,
"If you want, just do what you need to do,
sign it and send it in."
Q. But he still expressed the desire to
speak with you?
. . . .
A. Yes.
Q. And to review the document with you?
. Yes.
Mark certified that on the afternoon of May 22, decedent told
him, "I am signing a new [w]ill, and I am providing for your father
for the first time." Thomas similarly certified that "[a] few
days before his death[, decedent] told me his will was dropped off
and it reflects his 'wishes' or 'desires.'"
On May 23, 2013, decedent complained of severe pain, prompting
Thomas and Felipe Alicos, decedent's caretaker, to drive decedent
to the emergency room in Thomas's car. Both men certified that
on the way to the emergency room, decedent asked to return to
Brandywine so he could sign his "will"; however, Thomas refused
to turn around because he felt decedent needed urgent care. Alicos
further certified that after arriving in the emergency room,
decedent continued to insist on signing his will.
Thomas eventually traveled to Brandywine and located a manila
envelope on decedent's desk, as decedent had instructed. However,
13 A-4693-14T4
he was unable to see decedent until 4:00 p.m. the next day, May
24, 2013; by that point, decedent was not in a condition to sign
the documents. Decedent passed away without signing at 11:30 p.m.
that night.
On May 25, 2013, Oppenheim met with Mark and Thomas at
Brandywine. He testified that the envelope containing the May
2013 Trust was "sealed in just the same way that [he had] sealed
it," but he also admitted his secretary could have closed the
envelope. Oppenheim opened the envelope, verifying decedent had
not signed the document. Oppenheim said he had hoped to find
decedent's signature, but acknowledged he was "expecting it had
not been signed."
Following oral argument on count one, the motion judge
rendered a decision from the bench, granting summary judgment for
respondents. Applying our holding in In re Probate of Will and
Codicil of Macool, 416 N.J. Super. 298 (App. Div. 2010), the judge
concluded:
. . . [I]t is clear to the [c]ourt that
the Macool test has not been met by the
petitioners in this case. I find that
pursuant to Macool . . . , we hold for a
writing to be admitted into probate as a
[w]ill under [N.J.S.A.] 3B:3-3 the proponent
of the writing intended to constitute such a
[w]ill must prove, and we're talking about a
trust here, by clear and convincing evidence
that 1) the decedent actually reviewed the
document in question, and 2) thereafter gave
his or her final assent to it. Absent either
14 A-4693-14T4
one of these elements a trier of fact can only
speculate as to whether the proposed writing
accurately reflects the decedent's final
testamentary wishes.
And in this case it is clear to the
[c]ourt that the plaintiffs have not shown by
clear and convincing evidence that the
decedent actually reviewed the document in
question. Mr. Oppenheim testified that the
envelope was in the exact same condition that
he had delivered it to Dr. London. Although
there is some testimony by Mr. Frigoletto that
he went over this testimony, reviewed this
testimony with Dr. London I find that that is
not sufficient, and that the testimony really
is that he never reviewed it with Dr. London.
. . . [I]n Macool . . . [the testator]
never had the opportunity to confer with
counsel after reviewing the document to clear
up any ambiguity, modify any provision or
express her final assent to this rough draft.
And that's exactly what happened here. I
find that the decedent never actually reviewed
the document in question and he never, ever
gave his final assent to it. Neither elements
have been proven by the plaintiffs by clear
and convincing evidence.
I also find that it's not clear that Dr.
London actually reviewed it. He talked it
over with Mr. Frigoletto and they talked about
various parts of it, but . . . I find that
that review was not sufficient in this case.
And also, I find that, so the first prong
is not met, and the second prong, giving his
final assent to it, that wasn't met either
because the circumstances show that he never
gave his final assent to that [w]ill, to that
alleged [w]ill.
So I find that [N.J.S.A.] 3B:3-3 has not
been complied with, that the test set forth
15 A-4693-14T4
in Macool has not been complied with by
plaintiffs. There are no issues of material
fact at this point and I will grant partial
summary judgment to . . . the respondents in
this case. The writing that purports to be
the trust of Merritt London will not be
admitted.
We review a grant of summary judgment under the same standard
as the motion judge and accord "no special deference" to the
judge's legal determinations. Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v.
Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016).
We must grant summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment or order as a matter of law." Ibid. (quoting R.
4:46-2(c)). "The inquiry is 'whether the evidence presents a
sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether
it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of
law.'" Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Nowell Amoroso, P.A., 189
N.J. 436, 445-46 (2007) (quoting Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.
of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 536 (1995)).
Ordinarily, a will2 must comply with the following
requirements of N.J.S.A. 3B:3-2:
2
If an instrument is clearly testamentary in nature, its validity
depends upon whether the proofs demonstrate that it was executed
16 A-4693-14T4
a. Except as provided in subsection b. and in
[N.J.S.A.] 3B:3-3, a will shall be:
(1) in writing;
(2) signed by the testator or in the
testator's name by some other individual
in the testator's conscious presence and
at the testator's direction; and
(3) signed by at least two individuals,
each of whom signed within a reasonable
time after each witnessed either the
signing of the will as described in
paragraph (2) or the testator's
acknowledgment of that signature or
acknowledgment of the will.
b. A will that does not comply with subsection
a. is valid as a writing intended as a will,
whether or not witnessed, if the signature and
material portions of the document are in the
testator's handwriting.
c. Intent that the document constitutes the
testator's will can be established by
extrinsic evidence, including for writings
intended as wills, portions of the document
that are not in the testator's handwriting.
Plaintiffs acknowledged that decedent did not sign or hand-
write the May 2013 Trust. Rather, they argued the facts supported
in accordance with the formal requirements of the statute of wills,
N.J.S.A. 3B:3-1 to -49, and with the requisite testamentary intent.
See In re Catanio, 306 N.J. Super. 439, 445 (App. Div. 1997)
(holding a document labelled a trust to comprise instead a codicil,
because the document "by its own terms provides that it will become
effective upon the settlor's death," while also noting that the
document had been executed in compliance with the statute of
wills).
17 A-4693-14T4
admitting the trust to probate under N.J.S.A. 3B:3-3, which
provides:
Although a document or writing added upon a
document was not executed in compliance with
[N.J.S.A.] 3B:3-2, the document or writing is
treated as if it had been executed in
compliance with [N.J.S.A.] 3B:3-2 if the
proponent of the document or writing
establishes by clear and convincing evidence
that the decedent intended the document or
writing to constitute: (1) the decedent’s
will; (2) a partial or complete revocation of
the will; (3) an addition to or an alteration
of the will; or (4) a partial or complete
revival of his formerly revoked will or of a
formerly revoked portion of the will.
[N.J.S.A. 3B:3-3.]
As noted, the motion judge rejected this argument, finding
plaintiffs failed to provide evidence that decedent reviewed and
assented to the document prior to his death, as required by Macool,
supra, 416 N.J. Super. 298. Now on appeal, plaintiffs and Thomas
argue the judge erred because she disregarded the summary judgment
standard and made factual conclusions that fell within the purview
of "the trier of fact after a full evidentiary trial," and she
ignored material facts favoring their position. They further
assert the judge erred by failing to distinguish Macool, contending
the record contains material evidence showing decedent did review
and assent to the May 2013 Trust.
In Macool, we held the facts at issue supported the trial
court's refusal to admit an unsigned will to probate. Similar to
18 A-4693-14T4
the instant matter, the testator in Macool met with her attorney
prior to her death to discuss changes to her will. At the meeting,
she gave the attorney a list of handwritten notations, two of
which were unclear as to her intent. Id. at 304, 309. The
attorney "dictated the entire will while [the testator] was there,"
and then had his secretary type a rough draft version. Id. at
304-05. The attorney expected the testator to return to review
the draft; however, she passed away approximately one hour after
leaving his office. Id. at 305.
Construing N.J.S.A. 3B:3-3, we established the following two-
prong test for admitting a writing to probate under this provision:
[F]or a writing to be admitted into probate
as a will under N.J.S.A. 3B:3-3, the proponent
of the writing intended to constitute such a
will must prove, by clear and convincing
evidence, that: (1) the decedent actually
reviewed the document in question; and (2)
thereafter gave his or her final assent to it.
Absent either one of these two elements, a
trier of fact can only speculate as to whether
the proposed writing accurately reflects the
decedent's final testamentary wishes.
[Macool, supra, 416 N.J. Super. at 310.]
We affirmed, in relevant part in Macool, concluding the
testator failed to meet both prongs of the test. Ibid.
Significantly, we observed that the testator "never had the
opportunity to confer with counsel after reviewing the document
to clear up any ambiguity, modify any provision, or express her
19 A-4693-14T4
final assent to this 'rough' draft." Id. at 309. We labeled the
will a "work in progress" because the attorney purposely omitted
two named beneficiaries, and we found the lack of clarity in the
testator's notes "render[ed] their inclusion in the draft will
problematic." Ibid. However, we determined that "a writing
offered under N.J.S.A. 3B:3-3 need not be signed by the testator
in order to be admitted to probate." Id. at 311. We further
noted, "[h]ad [the testator] been able to read the draft will
. . . and thereafter express her assent to its content in the
presence of witnesses or by any other reasonably reliable means,"
the result would have been different. Id. at 312.
We confirmed the Macool holding in In re Estate of Ehrlich,
427 N.J. Super. 64, 71-72 (App. Div. 2012), certif. denied, 213
N.J. 46 (2013). Recognizing that the provisions of N.J.S.A. 3B:3-
3 are remedial in nature and entitled to a liberal interpretation,
we nevertheless observed that "the greater the departure from
[N.J.S.A. 3B:3-2]'s formal requirement, the more difficult it will
be to satisfy [N.J.S.A. 3B:3-3]'s mandate that the instrument
reflect the testator's final testamentary intent." Ehrlich,
supra, 427 N.J. Super. at 72-73. We emphasized that N.J.S.A.
3B:3-3
places on the proponent of the defective
instrument the burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence that the document was in
fact reviewed by the testator, expresses his
20 A-4693-14T4
or her testamentary intent, and was thereafter
assented to by the testator. In other words,
in dispensing with technical conformity,
[N.J.S.A. 3B:3-3] imposes evidential
standards and safeguards appropriate to
satisfy the fundamental mandate that the
disputed instrument correctly expresses the
testator's intent.
[Id. at 74.]
However, in Ehrlich we affirmed the trial court's admission
of an unsigned will to probate, which had been discovered in a
drawer in the testator's home. Id. at 68. We found that the
testator, a trusts and estates attorney, had clearly prepared and
reviewed the will himself. Id. at 67, 74. We further determined
he gave final assent to the will, because he made a handwritten
notation stating he sent the original to the executor and trustee
of his estate, and "in the years following the drafting of this
document . . . repeatedly orally acknowledged and confirmed the
dispositionary contents therein to those closest to him in life."
Id. at 74-75.
Having considered both Macool and Ehrlich, we agree with the
motion judge that even giving plaintiffs the benefit of all
favorable inferences, the record lacks evidence to support
admission of the May 2013 Trust to probate under N.J.S.A. 3B:3-3.
Nor do we discern any basis to conclude that an evidentiary trial
would yield any additional relevant evidence to satisfy the
requirement of proof, by clear and convincing evidence, that
21 A-4693-14T4
decedent reviewed and assented to the document. Notably, the
record contains no evidence from which a trier of fact could
conclude that decedent "confer[red] with counsel after reviewing
the document to clear up any ambiguity, modify any provision, or
express [his] final assent." Macool, supra, 416 N.J. Super. at
309.
Indeed, Oppenheim only testified he had an initial "s[it]
down" with decedent to go over his changes "paragraph by
paragraph," making handwritten notes on a copy of the August 2012
Trust. This clearly did not constitute review or assent, as the
testator in Macool also discussed changes with her attorney in a
similar manner. Id. at 304-05. Oppenheim clearly expected
decedent to contact him again to express his final approval, which
never occurred. Additionally, although we agree with appellants
that decedent did not have to "read" the document himself,
Oppenheim's testimony regarding the envelope strongly supports the
conclusion decedent did not review its contents.
Furthermore, although Frigoletto testified he went over
"specific provisions" with decedent, his testimony clearly shows
that decedent desired to wait to review the document with him in
person. As in Macool, decedent's knowledge of the contents does
not establish review. Moreover, decedent's repeated requests to
22 A-4693-14T4
meet with Frigoletto strongly suggest uncertainty as to the
finality of the proposed changes.
We are therefore satisfied the record reflects no genuine
issue as to whether decedent reviewed and assented to the May 2013
Trust prior to his death. Since plaintiffs cannot show decedent
reviewed the draft, any further inquiry beyond summary judgment
would be to engage in "speculat[ion] as to whether the proposed
writing accurately reflects the decedent's final testamentary
wishes." Id. at 310. Decedent's emergency requests that Thomas
retrieve his "will" for signing do not show he reviewed the May
2013 Trust or assented to its contents. Consequently, we affirm
the order dismissing count one of plaintiffs' complaint.
II.
We now address the grant of summary judgment on count two,
again reviewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs
and Thomas. Ramos, supra, 429 N.J. Super. at 16. We discern the
following facts from the record.
According to WFA's interpleader complaint, decedent opened
two IRAs with First Union Bank in 1997, under account numbers
xxxx-9415 and xxxx-3249. Wells Fargo later acquired First Union,
including decedent's accounts. At the time of his death, WFA
possessed two IRAs belonging to decedent, account xxxx-3249,
valued at $880,500, and xxxx-7439, valued at $787,086.32.
23 A-4693-14T4
WFA also possessed "undated IRA Account and Simplified
Employee Beneficiary Designations for [d]ecedent's IRA accounts."
These forms designated Patti and Mark as beneficiaries of two
First Union accounts: Simplified Employee Pension Plan (SEP) xxxx-
5059, and IRA xxxx-5019.
WFA further noted it "received an incomplete IRA beneficiary
form in October 2012 that did not have any account numbers on it
and stated 'see attached.'" The attachment listed certain
charitable organizations as the beneficiaries. This is a reference
to the "Beneficiary Designation" form decedent executed on October
4, 2012, in connection with the October 2012 Amendment. The form
states, "All benefits that become payable from my Wells Fargo
individual retirement account in the event of my decease shall be
paid as this Beneficiary Designation provides." It then devises
various portions to the named charitable organizations.
The record shows that in January 2013, decedent advised
Frigoletto that he wanted to open a joint checking account, payable
on death (POD) to Thomas. On January 14, 2013, Wells Fargo
employee Zelmira Cappola opened a "PMA Premier Checking" account
for decedent, account number xxxx-4068, POD Thomas. On January
15, $200,000 was transferred into that account. Next, on January
23, 2013, decedent designated a traditional brokerage account,
number xxxx-8954, as transfer on death (TOD) Thomas. On January
24 A-4693-14T4
28, the $200,000 sum from xxxx-4068 was transferred into this new
brokerage account.
According to the Wells Fargo system, Cappola entered a note
in "London Household Notes from Client Link," dated January 14,
2013, which appears to indicate she intended to link the new
checking account xxxx-4068 to brokerage account xxxx-8954.
However, for reasons that are unclear, the checking account was
linked to decedent's IRA, xxxx-3249, as part of a Wells Fargo
"Private Banking PMA Package." In addition to accounts xxxx-4068
and xxxx-3249, decedent's PMA Package contained a third account,
xxxx-5162, labeled "Retirement Savings."
The summary pages on decedent's PMA Package statements from
January through April 2013 are labeled "MERRIT EVAN LONDON MD[;]
POD THOMAS ARNOLD." Each statement lists the total combined assets
of the three accounts; the April 30, 2013 statement shows
$834,776.36 in total assets: $834,739.26 from the IRA account,
xxxx-3249, $29.98 from the "Retirement Savings" account, xxxx-
5162, and $7.12 from "PMA Premier Checking Account," xxxx-4068.
However, on the individual pages for each account, only the PMA
Premier Checking Account, xxxx-4068, is listed POD Thomas.
At deposition, Cappola stated the linked accounts were
related "[j]ust for statement purpose[s] . . . . They each have
their own title, so they belong to [decedent], but they're three
25 A-4693-14T4
different accounts." She noted that when customers open a PMA
checking account, they can link other accounts of their choosing,
or they can let Wells Fargo automatically attach all available
accounts that are not otherwise linked, in order to meet the
$25,000 minimum balance for the PMA checking account. She did not
remember if decedent chose to link the accounts at issue but
conceded it was possible he intended to do so.
Frigoletto testified he believed Cappola linked the PMA
checking account "erroneously or for whatever the reason . . . to
two other existing accounts probably in an effort to get some sort
of store credit or something they do in a community bank for
opening accounts." He noted, although the PMA Package statement
listed POD Thomas, the PMA statement had actually "tagged two
accounts . . . that [Thomas] wasn't listed as payable on death
on." He further stated Cappola lacked the authority to change the
beneficiaries on pre-existing accounts. According to Frigoletto,
decedent never executed a change of beneficiary designation
granting Thomas the IRA. However, he conceded decedent never
attempted to remove the POD designation from the PMA Package, and
said it was possible decedent could have spoken to Cappola about
changing the beneficiary designation.
Mark claimed that in early 2013, decedent said he desired to
grant Thomas "less of a specific bequest through his Estate and
26 A-4693-14T4
more outside of his Estate." Thomas similarly claimed that
decedent intended to leave him approximately $1,000,000, as
demonstrated by his "attempt to designate certain bank accounts
as POD Thomas Arnold." Thomas therefore requested a declaration
"that the three accounts located in the Private Banking PMA Package
with account numbers [xxxx-]3249, [xxxx-]5162 and [xxxx-]4068 were
intended by the decedent . . . to be gifted to Thomas Arnold
outside his will and trust associated with the will."
Conversely, respondents contended Cappola "erroneously"
linked checking account xxxx-4068 to one of decedent's IRA
accounts. They further asserted that notwithstanding this error,
decedent's October 4, 2012 Beneficiary Designation form, the last
version decedent executed prior to his death, governed the
beneficiaries of his IRA accounts.
Addressing the parties' arguments from the bench at the motion
hearing, the judge found the PMA Package statements designating
POD Thomas
did nothing to alter the ownership or
beneficiary designation on either Dr. London's
Wells Fargo IRA accounts and other accounts.
So the statement itself makes it clear that
[Thomas] had not been designated as POD
beneficiary on the account. And all the
testimony is clear to the [c]ourt that those
three accounts were for the specific purpose
. . . of making [Thomas] the POD beneficiary
of a certain account, not the brokerage
account 3249.
27 A-4693-14T4
She next addressed the October 4, 2012 Beneficiary
Designation form, which plaintiffs argued should not control
because it stated "account" instead of "accounts," and did not
identify specific account numbers. The judge found:
It's signed and witnessed. It had a
date, 10/4/2012. It's signed by Merritt
London and it is witnessed by Stephen
Oppenheim. And that was the last designation
that Dr. London made.
The [c]ourt finds that the absence of
account numbers are not fatal to the
beneficiary designation forms. That Dr.
London, between June 2010 and October 2012
used the forms given to him by Wells Fargo.
The specific form prescribed by Wells Fargo
was utilized in every instance, there were
attachments to it, each was received by Wells
Fargo and Mr. Frigoletto of Wells Fargo helped
Mr. Oppenheim and [decedent] prepare them.
[N.J.S.A. 17:16I-6] does not require that
the account numbers be specified on the
written notice or order, so I find that the
technical requirements of the statute have
been fully complied with. Each of those
beneficiary designation forms were executed.
There is no room for doubt that Dr. London
intended both of his IRA accounts to be
governed . . . thereby.
The forms were prepared by Dr. London's
attorney as part of his estate plan and they
were incorporated by and – the forms were
provided by Wells Fargo. Wells Fargo
representative Anthony Frigoletto actively
was involved in the process which led to the
change of beneficiary forms.
Finally, addressing plaintiffs' argument that the First Union
beneficiary form should control, the judge stated:
28 A-4693-14T4
It is clear to the [c]ourt that the
beneficiary forms of First Union Bank do not
apply in this case. . . . We have no idea
what exactly happened to those accounts,
whether they were changed. And even if they
are the same accounts that were there in many,
many years ago, they have now been changed
over the years by Dr. London.
It is clear to the [c]ourt that Dr.
London sought to change his beneficiaries. He
did it on numerous occasions. . . . It would
be unclear or be improbable that Dr. London
would, after making all these changes in
beneficiaries over those months from 2010 to
2012, would think that his original
designation many, many years ago at First
Union Bank[,] which no longer exists apply.
Now on appeal, Thomas argues the judge erred as a matter of
law by applying N.J.S.A. 17:16I-6, which is not applicable to IRA
accounts, instead of N.J.S.A. 3B:30-1 to -12, which governs IRAs.
Furthermore, both plaintiffs and Thomas argue the judge erred by
misinterpreting the facts to favor respondents.
We first address Thomas's statutory argument. In rendering
her decision, the judge applied the Multiple-party Deposit Account
Act (MDPA), N.J.S.A. 17:16I-1 to -17. The MDPA defines
"[a]ccount[s]" as "contract[s] of deposit of funds between a
depositor and a financial institution," which includes checking
and savings accounts. N.J.S.A. 17:16I-2(a). It defines "multiple-
party account[s]" to include "(1) a joint account, (2) a P.O.D.
account, or (3) a trust account." N.J.S.A. 17:16I-2(e). The MDPA
outlines formal requirements for altering account beneficiaries:
29 A-4693-14T4
The provisions of section 5 as to rights of
survivorship are determined by the form of the
account at the death of a party. This form
may be altered by written notice or order
given by a party to the financial institution
to change the form of the account or to stop
or vary payment under the terms of the
account. The order or request must be signed
by a party, received by the financial
institution during the party’s lifetime, and
not countermanded by other written order of
the same party during his lifetime.
[N.J.S.A. 17:16I-6.]
A different statute, the Uniform TOD Security Registration
Act (UTSRA), N.J.S.A. 3B:30-1 to -12, applies to "[s]ecurity
account[s]," which include "a cash balance in a brokerage account
. . . or a brokerage account." N.J.S.A. 3B:30-2. Importantly,
the UTSRA contains no formal requirement for changing a
beneficiary, instead providing: "A registration of a security in
beneficiary form may be cancelled or changed at any time by the
sole owner or all then surviving owners, without the consent of
the beneficiary." N.J.S.A. 3B:30-7. The act further urges liberal
construction, and allows courts to use "the principles of law and
equity [to] supplement its provisions." N.J.S.A. 3B:30-12.
A review of the statements for the decedent's IRA, xxxx-3249,
show it is a brokerage account dependent on mutual funds, which
suggests the UTSRA applies here as well. Thomas further asserts
that the dispute in this case does not concern multiple-party
deposit accounts but "individually owned security accounts."
30 A-4693-14T4
Nonetheless, we need not make an ultimate determination on
this issue, as we reach the same conclusion under either statute.3
First, the judge correctly determined the October 2012 beneficiary
form met the formal requirements of N.J.S.A. 17:16I-6. Second,
there is no evidence decedent effected a beneficiary change of IRA
xxxx-3249 to satisfy N.J.S.A. 3B:30-7. Review of the entire PMA
Package shows the POD Thomas designation referred to the PMA
Premier Checking Account only. Even if decedent actually intended
to link the accounts, there is no evidence he ever designated
Thomas as a beneficiary of IRA account xxx-3249. Given the lack
of evidence to the contrary, the principles of equity do not
require a different result. N.J.S.A. 3B:30-12.
We reject plaintiffs' and Thomas's remaining arguments,
substantially for the reasons expressed by the motion judge. The
October 2012 beneficiary form, which states "account" in the
singular and does not list account numbers, does not change the
result. We conclude the form applies to both of decedent's IRA
accounts, which he devised to the charitable organizations.
Furthermore, the judge correctly found that the First Union forms,
designating plaintiffs as the beneficiaries of different IRA
3
We have the authority to affirm the lower court "for reasons
other than those expressed by the judge." Price v. N.J. Mfrs.
Ins. Co., 368 N.J. Super. 356, 359 n.1 (App. Div. 2004), aff'd,
182 N.J. 519 (2005).
31 A-4693-14T4
accounts, were not sufficient to entitle plaintiffs to decedent's
second IRA account. Based on the evidence in the record, any
claims regarding decedent's intent to leave Arnold money outside
of his estate do not alter our conclusions. In summary, we are
satisfied the motion judge did not err by granting summary judgment
in favor of respondents. Any arguments not explicitly addressed
lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.
R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
32 A-4693-14T4