Cite as 2017 Ark. App. 426
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CV-17-219
Opinion Delivered September 6, 2017
AMANDA THREADGILL APPEAL FROM THE YELL
APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
NORTHERN DISTRICT
V. [NO. 75NJV-15-33]
HONORABLE TERRY SULLIVAN,
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN JUDGE
SERVICES AND MINOR CHILD
APPELLEES AFFIRMED
LARRY D. VAUGHT, Judge
This is an appeal from an order entered on December 19, 2016, by the Yell County
Circuit Court, terminating appellant Ethel “Amanda” Thomas Threadgill’s parental rights to
her minor child, I.T. (born January 25, 2004). 1 Amanda argues that the circuit court clearly
erred in terminating her parental rights because appellee, the Arkansas Department of Human
Services (DHS), failed to prove grounds supporting termination. We affirm.
The record shows that the initial removal by DHS of I.T. and her older sister, T.W.
(born December 16, 1998), 2 from Amanda’s custody was on July 31, 2015, based on allegations
1The parental rights of I.T.’s father, Anthony Triggs, were also terminated pursuant to
the same order, but he has not appealed.
2T.W. was part of this case; however, because she was three months from her
eighteenth birthday at the time the petition to terminate parental rights was filed, DHS did not
pursue termination of Threadgill’s rights to her.
Cite as 2017 Ark. App. 426
of neglect; specifically, failure to protect. The affidavit filed with the petition for emergency
custody and dependency-neglect alleged that the Arkansas State Police had an open
investigation of sexual abuse of T.W. 3 perpetrated by Amanda’s husband, Isaiah. As part of
that investigation, Amanda had agreed to keep I.T. and T.W. away from Isaiah at all times. It
was alleged in the affidavit, however, that Amanda, I.T., and T.W. had been seen in a vehicle
with Isaiah and that Amanda admitted Isaiah was in the car with her and the girls.
The circuit court adjudicated I.T. and T.W. dependent-neglected on October 7, 2015.
The court found that T.W. gave a video-taped statement claiming that Isaiah sexually abused
her and that she had been diagnosed with a sexually transmitted disease. The court also found
that there was evidence that T.W. had been sexually abused in the past by her grandfather, her
uncle, and her mother’s ex-boyfriend. Amanda testified at the adjudication hearing, denying
that Isaiah sexually abused T.W. and claiming that T.W. made up the story. Amanda conceded
that she broke her promise not to have Isaiah around T.W. or I.T. The court did not find that
Isaiah sexually abused T.W.; however, the court did find that T.W. had been sexually abused
in the past and now had a sexually transmitted disease. The court further found that Amanda
had failed to comply with the protection plan and that T.W. was fearful to go home. The court
found that the goal of the case was reunification and ordered Amanda to submit to drug
testing; attend and complete parenting classes; obtain and maintain stable housing and income;
attend counseling; cooperate with DHS; and comply with the case plan.
3The record reflects that T.W. has the mental capacity of a kindergartner.
2
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A review-hearing order was entered on December 11, 2015, wherein the circuit court
found that Amanda was complying with the case plan by attending counseling, parenting
classes, and NA/AA meetings; attending visitation; and maintaining transportation. However,
she was living with Isaiah, and he was her main source of income. A second review-hearing
order was entered on April 22, 2016. In that order, the circuit court found that Amanda was
complying with the case plan by completing parenting classes; attending counseling and visits;
and having appropriate housing, income, and transportation.
Following a permanency-planning hearing, an order was entered on August 10, 2016,
wherein the circuit court found that there had been some progress toward the case plan but
without further detail, found that not enough progress had occurred for reunification. The
court set the matter for a fifteen-month permanency hearing, adding that the case could be
heard as a termination-of parental-rights case if DHS filed and properly served a petition.
DHS filed a petition for termination of parental rights on September 23, 2016. DHS
alleged two grounds to support termination against Amanda—“failure to remedy,” Arkansas
Code Annotated section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i)(a) (Repl. 2015) and “subsequent factors,”
Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(vii)(a).
After a hearing, the court, from the bench, granted DHS’s petition to terminate
Amanda’s parental rights to I.W. The court found that DHS had made meaningful efforts to
rehabilitate Amanda, which included parenting classes; counseling, which Amanda attended
sporadically; visitation; and other assessments “to no avail.” The court found that Amanda
had had domestic-violence issues with her husband, Isaiah, to whom she was still married; she
had very recently revealed that she had an addiction to methamphetamine; she had used
3
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methamphetamine during the case; she had moved numerous times during the case; and she
was living with a new boyfriend, who gave her $300 a month to meet her expenses. The court
lastly found that affording Amanda three additional months to work on her case would not
result in reunification. The court stated that “there is just too much turmoil in this matter . . .
we have had probably more hearings 4 in this case in fourteen months than we have had in I
don’t know how many cases that I have heard as a judge . . . I just don’t see we are making
progress . . . and this child needs permanency.”
In the termination order entered on December 19, 2016, the circuit court found that
Amanda had an unstable financial situation; she failed to display improvement of her parenting
skills; she failed to support her children during the case; she had an unstable relationship with
Isaiah and had left him; 5 and she had moved back in with I.T.’s father for a day and a half in
August 2016, during which time she had used methamphetamine with him. This appeal
followed.
We review termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo. Knuckles v. Ark. Dep’t of
Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 463, at 2, 469 S.W.3d 377, 378. At least one statutory ground
must exist, in addition to a finding that it is in the child’s best interest
to terminate parental rights; these must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Id., 469
4The court stated that it had had seven hearings in the case.
5The court referred to an incident during the case, in June 2016, when Amanda and
Isaiah were traveling to Little Rock to visit I.T., and they got into an altercation in the vehicle.
Amanda testified that Isaiah had been drinking, and he abandoned her in Little Rock. She said
that she had to call I.T.’s foster mom to pick her up and drive her to Dardanelle. Amanda
further stated that she and Isaiah separated a couple of months later because he was physically
abusing her.
4
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S.W.3d at 379 (citing Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341 (Supp. 2013); M.T. v. Ark. Dep’t of Human
Servs., 58 Ark. App. 302, 952 S.W.2d 177 (1997)). Clear and convincing evidence is that degree
of proof that will produce in the fact-finder a firm conviction as to the allegation sought to be
established. Id., 469 S.W.3d at 379. The appellate inquiry is whether the circuit court’s finding
that the disputed fact was proved by clear and convincing evidence is clearly erroneous. Id.,
469 S.W.3d at 379. Credibility determinations are left to the fact-finder, here, the circuit court.
Id., 469 S.W.3d at 379. Only one statutory ground is necessary to terminate parental rights.
Sanford v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 578, at 11, 474 S.W.3d 503, 510.
In this appeal, Amanda challenges the circuit court’s finding of grounds used to
terminate her parental rights. 6 Regarding the subsequent-factors ground, she argues that the
evidence does not support the circuit court’s finding that DHS provided appropriate family
services.
The subsequent-factors ground, section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(vii)(a), states:
That other factors or issues arose subsequent to the filing of the original petition for
dependency-neglect that demonstrate that placement of the juvenile in the custody of
the parent is contrary to the juvenile’s health, safety, or welfare and that, despite the
offer of appropriate family services, the parent has manifested the incapacity or
indifference to remedy the subsequent issues or factors or rehabilitate the parent’s
circumstances that prevent the placement of the juvenile in the custody of the parent.
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(vii)(a). Amanda argues that there was no evidence that
DHS offered “appropriate family services.” 7 She contends that although DHS provided
6Amanda does not challenge the circuit court’s finding that termination was in I.T.’s
best interest.
7Amanda does not dispute the other required elements of the subsequent-factors
ground.
5
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general services to her, i.e., parenting classes, counseling, and visitation, no services were
offered to address Amanda’s specific needs, i.e., her drug addiction or her volatile marriage
with Isaiah.
DHS contends that Amanda’s argument is procedurally barred because she did not
appeal from prior orders in which the circuit court found reasonable efforts by DHS despite
the fact that, under Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-9(a)(1), they were final, appealable orders.
DHS contends that the failure to appeal from any of the previous orders in which a circuit
court has determined that DHS made meaningful efforts toward reunification precludes this
court from reviewing those findings with respect to the periods of time covered by those prior
orders.
In Schubert v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, the supreme court stated that,
“[p]ursuant to Rule 6-9(a)(1)(B), disposition, review, and permanency planning orders are only
appealable . . . if the court enters an order in compliance with Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (2009).
Thus, not every order entered in a dependency-neglect case can be immediately appealed[.]”
2009 Ark. 596, at 5, 357 S.W.3d 458, 461; see also Bean v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2016 Ark.
App. 58, at 3.
Here, the circuit court found that DHS had made reasonable efforts to provide family
services in its December 11, 2015 review order; its April 22, 2016 review order; and its October
20, 2016 fifteen-months review order. However, none of these orders have Rule 54(b)
certificates. Further, Amanda raised the argument at the termination hearing. Accordingly, she
has not waived her argument regarding the services offered by DHS.
6
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In reaching the merits of this argument, we hold that the circuit court did not clearly
err in finding that DHS provided appropriate family services to Amanda. DHS provided foster
care, therapeutic foster care, case-management services, PACE evaluation, DDS referrals,
medical services, counseling for the juveniles, counseling for Amanda and Isaiah,
transportation, parenting classes, visitation, and transitional life services for T.W. There was
evidence that the parenting classes addressed domestic-violence issues. Further, while Amanda
argues that she needed drug treatment, the evidence shows that Amanda did not disclose her
methamphetamine addiction to DHS. She testified that she did not tell DHS or the circuit
court about her meth addiction when they asked because “it seemed like you all wasn’t really
serious.” She first shared this information with her counselor in September 2016—just one
month prior to the termination hearing. At the hearing, she testified that she was an addict
and that she had used methamphetamine during the case. Finally, the circuit court stated in its
oral findings that, based on the “turmoil” in the family, three months’ additional time
requested by Amanda for further DHS services would not result in the progress needed to
reunite her with I.T. Based on this evidence, we hold that the circuit court did not clearly err
in finding that DHS provided appropriate family services to Amanda sufficient to support the
subsequent-factors ground. We affirm. 8
Affirmed.
KLAPPENBACH and MURPHY, JJ., agree.
Leah Lanford, Arkansas Public Defender Commission, for appellant.
Andrew Firth and Mary Goff, Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee.
Chrestman Group, PLLC, by: Keith L. Chrestman, attorney ad litem for minor child.
8Because we are affirming the subsequent-factors ground, we need not address
Amanda’s challenge to the failure-to-remedy ground.
7