NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2156-15T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JUSTIN HUGHES,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Submitted August 30, 2017 – Decided September 8, 2017
Before Judges Rothstadt and Vernoia.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Union County,
Indictment No. 11-02-0198.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Steven E. Braun, Designated
Counsel, on the brief).
Grace H. Park, Acting Union County
Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Stephen
William Bondi, Special Deputy Attorney
General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of
counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Justin Hughes appeals from the denial of his
petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary
hearing. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Defendant pled guilty to second-degree possession of a
controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute,
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(2), and second-
degree possession of a firearm while in the course of committing
a narcotics offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1(a). On October 26,
2012, the sentencing court imposed an aggregate sentence of
eleven years subject to a three-year period of parole
ineligibility.
The details of the events leading to defendant's arrest and
conviction need not be repeated here for our purposes. Suffice
it to say at the time defendant pled guilty, he had been charged
in an eleven count indictment that exposed him to a possible
sentence of sixty-five years, and the court had already denied
his motion to suppress. His plea agreement called for the
dismissal of all but two counts and recommend a maximum exposure
of eleven years.
Defendant filed a direct appeal, and an excessive
sentencing panel of this court affirmed his sentence but
remanded the matter for the trial court to correct the judgment
of conviction so that it reflected that the sentence on each
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count ran consecutively. State v. Hughes, No. A-3621-12 (App.
Div. June 3, 2014). The sentencing court entered an amended
judgment of conviction on June 24, 2014.
Defendant filed a PCR petition on August 13, 2014, in which
he did not argue any specific acts of ineffective assistance of
counsel, but contended that while he recognized his petition
could not be a substitute for direct appeal, "under the unique
circumstances here present this matter falls under the
exceptions . . . in R[ule] 3:22-4(a)."
A brief and amended petition were subsequently submitted on
behalf of defendant. In the brief, defendant argued that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial
counsel's conflicts that were created by "ethics violations" and
by counsel's "failure to call a key witness." Defendant also
claimed that counsel failed to adequately "investigat[e] and
prepare a defense," and properly cross-examine a State's
witness, "did not use reports or testimony by a hired private
investigator," and failed to supply a written notice of
witnesses, consult with defendant to "prepare the case," and
"develop mitigating circumstances for sentencing purposes." In
addition, defendant explained that he filed an ethics claim
3 A-2156-15T1
against trial counsel who was suspended from the practice of law
after the date of defendant's sentencing.1
Judge Stuart Peim, who had decided the suppression motion
and accepted his plea, denied defendant's petition after
considering counsels' oral arguments by order dated August 26,
2015, accompanied by a sixteen-page statement of reasons. In
his comprehensive written statement, Judge Peim reviewed
defendant's contentions and the applicable law. Judge Peim also
observed that trial counsel's ethics issues related to claims
totally unrelated to defendant and were not the subject of any
investigation or involvement by the same prosecutor's office
that was responsible for the claims against defendant, but
resulted in counsel being barred from the practice of law before
defendant was sentenced. In addition, the judge found that
defendant's allegations of ineffective assistance were not
supported by any proof.
Defendant presents the following issues for our
consideration in his appeal:
1
In fact, trial counsel had been suspended after defendant
pled guilty but before his sentencing. See In re Chambers, 217
N.J. 196 (2014). A different attorney appeared on defendant's
behalf at sentencing.
4 A-2156-15T1
POINT I
THE FACT THAT TRIAL DEFENSE
COUNSEL'S MISCONDUCT OCCURRED
OUTSIDE OF UNION COUNTY IS NOT
DISPOSITIVE OF THE ISSUE OF
WHETHER [DEFENDANT] WAS DENIED
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL;
RATHER, ANY INSTANCE OF ILLEGAL
CONDUCT BY AN ATTORNEY IN NEW
JERSEY SHOULD AMOUNT TO [PER SE]
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
FOR ANY CLIENT ABSENT A VALID
WAIVER BY THE CLIENT.
POINT II
TRIAL DEFENSE COUNSEL DID NOT
ADEQUATELY INVESTIGATE THE CASE,
THEREBY RESULTING IN INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
We are not persuaded by any of these arguments. We
conclude that defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of
ineffectiveness of trial counsel, see Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); State v.
Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (1987), and affirm substantially for the
reasons expressed by Judge Peim in his thoughtful written
decision. Accordingly, Judge Peim correctly concluded that an
evidentiary hearing was not warranted. See State v. Preciose,
129 N.J. 452, 462-63 (1992). We only add our observation that
"allegations of defense counsel's . . . disciplinary problems
are, standing alone, insufficient to establish that defense
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of
5 A-2156-15T1
reasonableness, as required under the first prong under the
Strickland/Fritz standard." State v. Allegro, 193 N.J. 352, 369
(2008). They may be relevant, however, if the questioned
conduct that was the subject of such proceedings is similar to
the issues raised on the PCR. Id. at 372. Defendant here
failed to satisfy that standard.
Affirmed.
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