J-S45037-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
RAFAEL CRESPO,
Appellant No. 575 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 14, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0007959-2013
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 11, 2017
Rafael Crespo (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed after a non-jury trial where he was found guilty of first-degree
murder, rape, sexual assault, corruption of minors, possession of an
instrument of crime, and indecent assault. We affirm.
The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history of this
case as follows.
On September 30, 1996, seventeen[-]year[-]old [A.M.],
the victim herein, went missing. At about 2:45 a.m., on October
2, 1996, police were alerted that a body had been found inside
an abandoned house in the 1700 block of Hope Street. Upon
examining the body, which was [lying] face up and nude, police
ascertained that the victim was dead. Subsequent investigation
revealed that the body was that of the victim herein. An autopsy
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S45037-17
on the victim’s body revealed that she had been beaten and
strangled to death.
The matter remained dormant for several years. In 2012,
authorities received results of a DNA test performed on evidence
recovered from the victim’s body. It revealed, inter alia, that
some of the evidence originated from [Appellant]. Upon
receiving results of the DNA test[,] police tracked [Appellant] to
Florida, where he was in custody.
On May 30, 2012, Philadelphia Homicide Detective John
McDermott traveled to Florida to interview [Appellant]. Prior to
commencing the formal interview of [Appellant], the detective
administered Miranda[1] warnings to [Appellant] who thereafter
answered the seven questions posed to him to ascertain whether
he understood his rights in a manner indicating that he
understood them and knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
wished to waive them. During the subsequent interview,
[Appellant] stated that after a night of drinking he met the
victim, who appeared to be on her way to school, during the
morning of September 30, 1996, and that he propositioned her
for sex. She agreed to have sex with him for $20.00, after
which she took him to an abandoned house where they had sex.
Following this, according to [Appellant], the victim and he stood
up and the victim asked him to choke her. He complied and as
he was choking her with his hands and her shirt, her body went
limp. He released his grip and she fell to the floor. After
checking her to see if she was alive and getting no response, he
told the detective that he got scared and left the house. He told
the detective that when he did not see a story in the news about
the incident he forgot about it.
Trial Court Opinion, 11/9/2016, at 2-3.
Appellant was charged with the aforementioned crimes. Prior to trial,
Appellant requested the trial court suppress the statements given by
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1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Appellant while incarcerated in Florida.2 The trial court heard testimony
from the Detective McDermott with respect to this issue, and the trial court
denied Appellant’s motion.
After the non-jury trial, Appellant was convicted of all charges. On
January 14, 2016, Appellant was sentenced to, inter alia, life in prison
without parole. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal, and both Appellant
and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
On appeal, Appellant argues the trial court erred by denying his
motion to suppress. Appellant’s Brief at 4. Appellant contends that based on
the totality of the circumstances, specifically “the lengthy interrogation and
the fact [Appellant] was incarcerated[,] combined to render [Appellant’s]
confession invalid as a matter of law.” Id. at 10.
We review this issue mindful of the following.
[O]ur standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial
court’s denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining
whether the factual findings are supported by the record and
whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are
correct. We are bound by the suppression court’s factual
findings so long as they are supported by the record; our
standard of review on questions of law is de novo. Where, as
here, the defendant is appealing the ruling of the suppression
court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth
and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains
uncontradicted. Our scope of review of suppression rulings
includes only the suppression hearing record and excludes
evidence elicited at trial.
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2
The certified record does not contain a written suppression motion.
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***
It is well-established that when a defendant alleges that
his confession was involuntary, the inquiry becomes not whether
the defendant would have confessed without interrogation, but
whether the interrogation was so manipulative or coercive that it
deprived the defendant of his ability to make a free and
unconstrained decision to confess. The voluntariness of a
confession is determined from a review of the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the confession. The Commonwealth
has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant confessed voluntarily.
When examining the voluntariness of a statement pursuant
to the totality of the circumstances, a court should consider: the
duration and means of the interrogation; the defendant’s
physical and psychological state; the conditions attendant to the
detention; the attitude exhibited by the police during the
interrogation; and all other factors that could drain a person’s
ability to resist suggestion and coercion. Additional relevant
factors include: the accused’s age and level of education and
experience; his extent of previous experience with the police;
whether the accused was advised of his constitutional rights;
whether he was injured, ill, drugged, or intoxicated when he
confessed; whether he was deprived of food, sleep or medical
attention, and whether he was abused or threatened with abuse.
Commonwealth v. Yandamuri, 159 A.3d 503, 516-25 (Pa. 2017) (internal
citations omitted).
At the suppression hearing, Detective McDermott testified that he
traveled to Florida where Appellant was incarcerated for unrelated crimes.
At 11:14 a.m. on May 30, 2012, Detective McDermott explained to Appellant
that he had the right to remain silent; that anything he would say can and
will be used against him; that he has the right to speak to an attorney
before answering questions; and that he was entitled to a free attorney if he
could not afford one. N.T., 9/3/2015, at 12-13. Detective McDermott
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testified that Appellant responded that he did not wish to speak with an
attorney and that he was willing to answer questions of his own free will. Id.
at 13. Furthermore, Appellant signed his name across the written warnings.
Id. at 16.
Questioning of Appellant began at 11:20 a.m. Detective McDermott
memorialized all of Appellant’s answers, which resulted in a ten-page
statement from Appellant. The interview concluded at 2:14 p.m. and
Detective McDermott gave Appellant the written statement to review and
sign. Appellant reviewed the statement and signed the bottom of each
page. Id. at 19.
Based on this testimony, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion. Id.
at 31. The trial court specifically points this Court to the following factors in
support of its conclusion that the motion was denied properly.
[Appellant]: 1.) was an adult; 2.) appeared to fully understand
his rights and was competent; 3.) was not physically or mentally
abused or promised anything; 4.) was given an opportunity to
read his statement after it was completed and appeared to do
so; 5.) signed each page of it; 6.) was not interviewed for a
lengthy period of time; and 7.) knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily gave the statement.
Trial Court Opinion, 11/9/2016, at 4-5.
We discern no error of law or abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
conclusions. Appellant, in custody on unrelated charges, was read Miranda
warnings and questioned for approximately three hours. There is no
indication that he was threatened or coerced in any fashion by Detective
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McDermott. Thus, we agree with the trial court that based upon the totality
of the circumstances, Appellant’s statement was given knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily and therefore did not warrant suppression. See
Commonwealth v. Harrell, 65 A.3d 420, 435 (Pa. Super. 2013) (holding
the trial court did not err in denying a motion to suppression where “[t]he
totality of the circumstances indicate[d] that [Harrell] knowingly and
voluntarily chose to waive his Miranda rights and make a statement”).
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/11/2017
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