MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any
Sep 14 2017, 8:49 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
estoppel, or the law of the case. Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Ellen F. Hurley Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Christina D. Pace
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Darrell Daniels, September 14, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1703-CR-522
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Marc T.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Rothenberg, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G02-1307-FA-46959
Robb, Judge.
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Case Summary and Issue
[1] Following a bench trial, Darrell Daniels1 was convicted of Class A felony
neglect of a dependent. Daniels appeals, raising the sole issue that the evidence
was insufficient to prove that the child was in his care, that he placed the child
in a situation that endangered her life, or that he knew the child required
medical attention. Concluding the State presented sufficient evidence to
support the conviction, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On the morning of May 4, 2013, an ambulance was dispatched to a home in
Marion County, Indiana, regarding a report of cardiac arrest. Upon entry,
paramedics found the lifeless body of a fifteen-month-old girl. The girl,
A.S.-D., was not breathing, unresponsive, and cold to the touch. In addition to
post-mortem rigor mortis and liver mortis, paramedics noted the body had
visible bruises on the head, face, torso, and stomach.
[3] Daniels lived at the small duplex along with his girlfriend, Nikita Dunn. Dunn
moved in two months prior, followed by her two children, including then
fourteen-month-old A.S.-D. Daniels was also regularly visited by his two
young children from a prior marriage.
1
We note the Appellant’s name is “Darrell Daniels” not “Darrell Daniel” as this court’s docket and some
trial court documents incorrectly indicate.
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[4] Daniels recounted the events surrounding A.S.-D.’s death during two
interviews with police on May 4 and May 6, 2013. During the first interview,
Daniels attributed A.S.-D.’s bruising to falling out of her playpen and the fact
she was recently hit in the eye with a hairbrush by her sister. Daniels stated the
evening before A.S.-D.’s death, he had watched her while Dunn ran errands,
gave his two children a shower, and cooked hotdogs for dinner. When the
children went to bed around 10:00 or 10:30 p.m., A.S.-D. was put to bed on the
couch because she had recently learned how to climb out of her crib.
[5] Daniels recalled on the morning of May 4, he played a video for his children
and gave them cereal, believing A.S.-D. was still asleep on the couch. Dunn
and Daniels showered and when Dunn returned to the living room, she
screamed Daniels’ name. Daniels said he ran to the living room to find A.S.-D.
not breathing, stiff and cold. He told Dunn to call 9-1-1 and began CPR,
moving A.S.-D. to the floor.
[6] An autopsy revealed A.S.-D. had numerous injuries. Externally, A.S.-D.
suffered from abrasions on her head; a contusion underneath her right eye; a
laceration and torn frenulum inside her mouth; several small contusions on her
torso, abdomen and head; a burst vein on the left side of her temple; and
hemorrhaging to the white of her right eye. Dr. Brewer-Paul, the forensic
pathologist who performed the autopsy, explained that the injuries inside
A.S.-D.’s mouth could be explained by the child biting her own lip or some
other blunt force that pushed her lip against her tooth. The contusions on her
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torso, abdomen and head were also likely the result of blunt force, some of
which Dr. Brewer-Paul believed to have been at least three days old.
[7] Internally, A.S.-D. had cerebral edema (swelling of the brain), subgaleal
hemorrhaging (bleeding inside the scalp), an injury to the dura (the fibrous layer
covering the brain), hematoma of the liver (bleeding of the liver), mesenteric
hemorrhaging (bleeding of the layer of fat that covers the abdominal organs),
and hemorrhages within the pancreas, peripancreatic tissue, and diaphragm.
Based on the existence of a blood-clot in the peritoneal cavity, Dr. Brewer-Paul
believed there was bleeding inside the abdominal cavity for three to four days,
thereby allowing time for the blood to clot. She concluded that A.S.-D. died six
to eight hours before paramedics arrived as the result of multiple blunt force
traumatic injuries and if the child had received medical attention, she “[v]ery
likely” would have survived. Transcript, Volume II at 65.
[8] Daniels was confronted with the results of the autopsy in his second interview
with police. He stated that in the two weeks preceding A.S.-D.’s death, no
other adult besides he and Dunn were alone with A.S.-D. When shown
photographs of A.S.-D. depicting bruising on her torso, Daniels repeated he
believed the bruises were the result of A.S.-D. falling out of her playpen or from
learning to walk. Upon further questioning, however, Daniels admitted
A.S.-D. must have been abused by Dunn because they were the only ones who
had been alone with the child in the preceding weeks but stated he never
witnessed it.
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[9] At trial, the State presented testimony from Dr. Harris, a pediatrician
specializing in child abuse. Dr. Harris testified that A.S.-D.’s bruising was
excessive for a toddler of her age and “A typical [sic] for an accidental injury.”
Tr., Vol. II at 88. She explained that newly-walking toddlers sometimes bruise
their foreheads but bruises are uncommon on the sides of the head. She
rejected the contention that A.S.-D.’s abdominal injuries were the result of a fall
from her playpen because the abdomen is not easily bruised and when children
fall from a height, they are much more likely to injure their forehead or a limb.
Dr. Harris also noted that although a hairbrush could have caused bruising, it
would only account for one of the contusions on A.S.-D.’s face.
[10] According to Dr. Harris’ testimony, A.S.-D. would have exhibited various
symptoms visible to an adult caretaker. The injury to A.S.-D.’s head may have
caused her to lose consciousness, develop seizures, begin vomiting, and
decreased her activity and appetite. The injury to A.S.-D.’s abdomen would
have been very painful and caused her to indicate pain. Typically, Dr. Harris
explained, children with similar abdominal injuries are very thirsty but
experience vomiting and a loss of appetite. In Dr. Harris’ opinion, A.S.-D.’s
abdominal injuries were less than a week old and the head injuries occurred
within forty-eight to seventy-two hours before her death.
[11] The State charged Daniels with neglect of a dependent by placing A.S.-D. in a
situation that endangered her life or health as a Class A felony because it
resulted in death. After a bench trial, the trial court found Daniels guilty as
charged. Daniels now appeals his conviction.
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Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
[12] Our standard of review upon a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is
well established: we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of
witnesses. McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 2005). We examine
only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom that support
the conviction. Lock v. State, 971 N.E.2d 71, 74 (Ind. 2012). “[W]e affirm if
there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the
crime from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Davis v. State, 813 N.E.2d 1176, 1178 (Ind.
2004).
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[13] The statute defining neglect of a dependent states:
(a) A person having the care of a dependent, whether assumed
voluntarily or because of a legal obligation, who knowingly or
intentionally:
(1) places the dependent in a situation that endangers the
dependent’s life or health;
***
commits neglect of a dependent, a Class D felony.
(b) However, the offense is:
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***
(3) a Class A felony if it is committed under subsection
(a)(1) . . . by a person at least eighteen (18) years of age
and results in the death of a dependent who is less than
fourteen (14) years of age;
Ind. Code § 35-46-1-4(a)(1), (b)(3) (2012).
[14] Daniels contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove that A.S.-D. was in
his care, that he placed A.S.-D. in a situation that endangered her life, or that
he knew A.S.-D. required medical attention.
A. Voluntary Assumption of Care
[15] To convict Daniels, the State first had to prove that Daniels was “[a] person
having the care of a dependent, whether assumed voluntarily or because of a
legal obligation . . . .” Ind. Code § 35-46-1-4(a).
[16] A “dependent” for the purposes of this statute means either “(1) an
unemancipated person who is under eighteen (18) years of age; or (2) a person
of any age who has a mental or physical disability.” Ind. Code § 35-46-1-1.
Because Daniels was not A.S.-D.’s parent or legal guardian, he had no legal
obligation to provide care for A.S.-D. Cf. Kellogg v. State, 636 N.E.2d 1262,
1264 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (noting “[p]roof that the defendant is the parent or
legal guardian of the dependent establishes care ‘because of a legal
obligation’”). The State therefore had to prove that Daniels had assumed a
voluntary obligation. Whether a child is a “dependent” is a question of fact.
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State v. Springer, 585 N.E.2d 27, 30 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), trans. denied. Our
review reveals sufficient evidence to support the fact-finder’s conclusion that
Daniels voluntarily assumed care of A.S.-D.
[17] In Dowler v. State, 547 N.E.2d 1069 (Ind. 1989), a fifteen-month-old child
resided with his father and two other men who would often care for the child
when his father was gone. After the child died of injuries similar to those
presented here, the defendant, one of the two men residing with the child’s
father, was charged with neglect of a dependent. Id. at 1070. The record
established the defendant fed, bathed, watched, and disciplined the child but the
child’s father testified the defendant did not have care of the child. Id. at 1070,
1072. Our supreme court held that evidence the defendant cared for the child
sometimes at the request of the child’s father and sometimes voluntarily
because no one else would care for him was sufficient to establish the defendant
had assumed responsibility for the child. Id. at 1072.
[18] Although A.S.-D. had only been living in Daniels’ home for a month, there is
ample evidence that Daniels assumed her care. Daniels rented the property that
he allowed Dunn and her two children to move into. The record reveals that
Daniels would often watch Dunn’s children and that he cooked for the children
and changed their diapers. On the evening before A.S.-D.’s death, Daniels
watched the children while Dunn ran errands and cooked them dinner. This
evidence is sufficient to establish Daniels assumed responsibility for A.S.-D.
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[19] Daniels argues there “was evidence of a clear delineation of care between
Daniels and Dunn regarding their respective children[,]” because they bathed
and disciplined their own children. Brief of Appellant at 14. This argument is
merely an invitation to reweigh the evidence which we cannot do.
B. Knowing Endangerment
[20] Daniels next contends that he did not knowingly place A.S.-D. in a situation
that endangered her life or health. Having established above that Daniels
voluntarily assumed A.S.-D.’s care, Indiana Code section 35-46-1-4(a)(1)
requires proof he knowingly or intentionally placed A.S.-D. in a situation that
endangered her life or health. Whether a dependent was placed in a situation
endangering his or her life or health is a question of fact. Kerlin v. State, 573
N.E.2d 445, 448 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), trans. denied.
[21] An accused acts knowingly if he was “subjectively aware of a high probability
that he placed the dependent in a dangerous situation.” Gross v. State, 817
N.E.2d 306, 308 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (quotation omitted); see also Ind. Code §
35-41-2-2(b). Because such a finding requires the fact-finder to infer the
defendant’s mental state, “this Court must look to all the surrounding
circumstances of a case to determine if a guilty verdict is proper.” Villagrana v.
State, 954 N.E.2d 466, 468 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
[22] The State presented circumstantial evidence from which a fact-finder could
conclude Daniels was subjectively aware of a high probability that he placed
A.S.-D. in a dangerous situation. Daniels observed multiple bruises on A.S.-D.
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throughout the time they lived together, beginning with a large bruise on
A.S.-D.’s cheek when she first moved in. When Daniels was shown
photographs of the bruising on A.S.-D.’s torso, which the detective described as
fist-shaped, Daniels recalled that there were similar bruises that had already
disappeared. Finally, on the morning of A.S.-D.’s death, paramedics
immediately noticed bruises “on her head and her face and her torso and her
belly.” Tr., Vol. II at 10. The State presented testimony that the contusions
were at least three days old, and along with the other external injuries to
A.S.-D., these injuries would have been visible prior to A.S.-D.’s death.
[23] Moreover, the State presented testimony of a litany of symptoms that would
have been displayed before A.S.-D.’s death, all of which would be detectable by
an adult caretaker. Among them, Dr. Harris listed a loss of consciousness,
seizures, vomiting, increased thirst, and a decrease in activity and appetite. We
are not, of course, suggesting that the failure to detect the slightest symptom
exposes a caregiver to criminal liability. Rather, the facts presented here are
sufficient for a fact-finder to determine that either Daniels abused A.S.-D.
himself or by way of observing external injuries, the manifestation of
symptoms, and the circumstances under which they occurred, Daniels knew
with a high probability that A.S.-D. was in a dangerous situation due to abuse
by others.
[24] Daniels argues that even if he was aware of A.S.-D.’s dangerous situation, he
had no authority to separate her from her mother. In support of his argument,
Daniels relies heavily on Fisher v. State, 548 N.E.2d 1177 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
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There, the defendant allowed a mother and her child to stay at his residence.
Although the evidence established the mother was beating the child, the State
argued that the Defendant knew and committed neglect by leaving “the
defenseless child to be beaten to death by its mother.” Id. at 1179. This court
reasoned the evidence was sufficient to establish the defendant had voluntarily
assumed care of the child but he did not place the child in the situation and had
no authority to remove the child. Id. at 1179-80. In doing so, the court
explained that the failure to report child abuse was a separate offense and was
insufficient to establish neglect of a dependent. Id. at 1180.
[25] Conversely, in Dowler v. State, as discussed above, a fifteen-month-old child died
at the hands of his father’s two roommates. 547 N.E.2d at 1069. The
defendant appealed his conviction of neglect of a dependent, arguing that he did
not place the child in the situation and that he lacked the authority over him.
Id. at 1071-72. In holding there was “more than sufficient evidence” to support
the jury’s verdict, our supreme court reasoned that, “the statute does not limit
its coverage to those acting only with authority or permission but provides one
having the care of a dependent whether assumed voluntarily or because of a
legal obligation.” Id. at 1072.
[26] The distinguishing factor between Fisher and Dowler is that in Fisher the
custodial parent was known to be the abuser and there was no evidence the
defendant actively participated in the abuse. Conversely, in Dowler, there was
evidence supporting a finding the defendant himself either perpetrated or
observed the violence done to the child while he was in the defendant’s care.
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Here, the evidence shows only Daniels and Dunn cared for A.S.-D. in the last
weeks of her life, and Daniels was the last person to provide care for her before
she was found unresponsive and seriously injured. This evidence was sufficient
for the fact-finder to determine that Daniels either abused A.S.-D. himself or
was complicit in her abuse beyond merely failing to report and therefore
knowingly placed A.S.-D. in a situation that endangered her life or health.
C. Failure to Seek Medical Attention
[27] Lastly, Daniels argues “there is insufficient evidence to show Daniels knew
[A.S.-D.] required emergency medical attention such that he should have called
911.” Br. of Appellant at 17. “When the allegation of neglect is the failure to
provide medical care, the State must show that the need for medical care was
actual and apparent and the accused was actually and subjectively aware of that
need.” Taylor v. State, 28 N.E.3d 304, 307 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.
This, too, is a question of fact. “It is within the legitimate province of the trier
[of fact] to infer from the totality of the circumstances whether or not the
requisite awareness was present, and whether or not the action of the [person]
was reasonable.” Smith v. State, 408 N.E.2d 614, 621 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
[28] We note that the law does not require the danger to a dependent to require
calling 9-1-1 or seeking emergency medical attention. The danger to the
dependent must only be “actual and appreciable.” Gross, 817 N.E.2d at 309.
“When there are symptoms from which the average layperson would have
detected a serious problem necessitating medical attention, it is reasonable for
the [fact-finder] to infer that the defendant knowingly neglected the dependent.”
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Mitchell v. State, 726 N.E.2d 1228, 1240 (Ind. 2000), abrogated on other grounds by
Beattie v. State, 924 N.E.2d 643 (Ind. 2010). However, Daniels argues that since
“[h]e had no authority to take the child to a doctor,” A.S.-D.’s medical
condition must have been severe enough to necessitate calling 9-1-1. Br. of
Appellant at 20 (citing Fisher, 548 N.E.2d at 1180 (“Fisher did not have the
authority to separate [the child and mother].”)).
[29] Although Daniels is correct in asserting he could not separate Dunn and
A.S.-D., there was sufficient evidence to conclude that A.S.-D.’s need for
medical care was actual and appreciable such that Daniels was subjectively
aware of the need. The State presented testimony that, in addition to the many
external injuries Daniels observed over a period of weeks and which alone were
sufficient to have sought medical treatment, A.S.-D. would have displayed any
number of alarming symptoms associated with her internal injuries. This, of
course, is assuming the injuries were inflicted only by Dunn, not Daniels.
However, as we concluded above, the evidence was sufficient for the fact-finder
to determine that Daniels either abused A.S.-D. himself or actively facilitated
A.S.-D.’s abuse. The evidence clearly supports a finding that Daniels was
subjectively aware of A.S.-D.’s need for medical care.
Conclusion
[30] For the reasons set out above, we conclude the State presented sufficient
evidence to support Daniels’ conviction. Daniels’ conviction for neglect of a
dependent is therefore affirmed.
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[31] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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