FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
SEP 14 2017
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 16-50198
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
3:15-cr-00596-BEN-4
v.
DAVID NAVARRETE, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Roger T. Benitez, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted August 10, 2017
Pasadena, California
Before: REINHARDT, KOZINSKI, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
“We review the district court’s interpretation of the [U.S. Sentencing]
Guidelines de novo, the district court’s application of the Guidelines to the facts of
the case for abuse of discretion, and the district court’s factual findings for clear
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
error.” United States v. Treadwell, 593 F.3d 990, 999 (9th Cir. 2010). We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. The record establishes that the district court considered the enumerated
factors in the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 when assessing whether Navarrete
should receive a sentence reduction for playing a minor role in the offense. See
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, cmt. n.3(C) (2015). Defense counsel listed all five factors in the
guidelines commentary, and the district court stated that it had “considered all of
the application notes of 3B1.2.” “We assume that district judges know the law and
understand their obligation to consider all of the [sentencing] factors.” United
States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008). “The district court need not tick
off each of the [sentencing] factors to show that it has considered them.” Id. The
district court did not improperly rely solely upon Navarrete’s “essential role” in the
conspiracy, and did not abuse its discretion in denying a minor role sentence
reduction.
2. Navarrete’s sentencing chart and the base offense level used by the
district court establish that he was not sentenced as a direct money launderer, and
there is no doubt that Navarrete knew the laundered funds were the proceeds of
cocaine sales or were intended to promote the distribution of cocaine. The district
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court therefore properly applied a six-level enhancement under U.S.S.G.
§ 2S1.1(b)(1).
3. The record establishes that the district court considered all relevant
factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including mitigating factors, see Carty, 520
F.3d at 992, and under plain error review, Navarrete cannot show that the district
court’s reliance on any extraneous information caused him significant prejudice,
see United States v. Warr, 530 F.3d 1152, 1162–63 (9th Cir. 2008). Navarrete’s
sentence was thus not procedurally or substantively unreasonable.
AFFIRMED.
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