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1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
2 YOLANDA MATTISON,
3 Petitioner-Appellee,
4 v. No. 36,083
5 JASON MATTISON,
6 Respondent-Appellant.
7 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
8 Debra Ramirez, District Judge
9 Yolanda Mattison
10 Albuquerque, NM
11 Pro se Appellee
12 Arash Kashanian
13 Albuquerque, NM
14 for Appellant
15 MEMORANDUM OPINION
16 GARCIA, Judge.
17 {1} Respondent has appealed from an order of protection. We issued a notice of
18 proposed summary disposition in which we proposed to affirm in part and reverse in
1 part. Respondent has filed no response, and Petitioner has filed a memorandum in
2 partial opposition. After due consideration, we adhere to our initial assessment.
3 {2} Because we previously described the pertinent background and applicable
4 principles of law in the notice of proposed summary disposition, we will avoid undue
5 repetition here. Instead, we will focus on the content of Petitioner’s response.
6 {3} Petitioner does not take issue with our analysis with respect to the first two
7 issues. [MIO 1] However, Petitioner disagrees with our suggestion that the district
8 court erred in upholding the portion of the special hearing officer’s decision by which
9 Respondent was ordered to “return” a vehicle to her. [RP 37, 88] We understand
10 Petitioner to contend that insofar as the order did not affect title to the vehicle, and
11 “only changed possession” to the title holder, it should be upheld. [MIO 2] However,
12 as we observed in the notice of proposed summary disposition, the Family Violence
13 Protection Act (FVPA) generally provides that orders of protection may neither
14 “affect title to any property” nor “transfer, conceal, encumber, or otherwise dispose
15 of” property. NMSA 1978, § 40-13-5(E) (2008). Insofar as the order requires a party
16 to “transfer” property, it runs afoul of this statutory provision.
17 {4} In her memorandum in opposition Petitioner further suggests that the portion
18 of the order requiring Respondent to transfer the vehicle to her should be regarded as
19 “injunctive relief” authorized under Section 40-13-5(A)(7). [MIO 1] Petitioner
2
1 relatedly argues that property exchanges are authorized, with law enforcement present.
2 [MIO 2] However, to the extent that injunctive relief is awarded and exchanges occur
3 pursuant to a FVPA order, the statutory requisites must be satisfied. Because we find
4 no indication in the record that the transfer of the vehicle is “necessary for the
5 protection of a party,” as Subsection (A)(7) explicitly requires, we decline the
6 invitation to rely on that provision as a basis for upholding the decision rendered
7 below.
8 {5} Finally, we understand Petitioner to contend that protected parties should be
9 permitted to obtain court orders pursuant to the FVPA in order to recover personal
10 property. [MIO 2] Be that as it may, we cannot disregard the plain language of the
11 statue. Protected parties remain at liberty to seek relief relative to property issues; the
12 FVPA is simply not the appropriate vehicle.
13 {6} Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the notice of proposed summary
14 disposition and above, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further
15 proceedings consistent herewith.
16 {7} IT IS SO ORDERED.
17 ________________________________
18 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge
19 WE CONCUR:
3
1 _______________________________
2 LINDA M. VANZI, Chief Judge
3 _______________________________
4 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge
4