16-1804
Cinotti v. Adelman
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
New York, on the 15th day of September, two thousand seventeen.
PRESENT:
ROBERT A KATZMANN,
Chief Judge,
ROBERT D. SACK,
PETER W. HALL,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
Lucia Cinotti,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. 16-1804
Gerard I. Adelman,
Defendant-Appellee.*
_____________________________________
FOR APPELLANT: LUCIA CINOTTI, pro se, Shelton, CT.
FOR APPELLEE: MICHAEL K. SKOLD, Assistant Attorney General, for
George Jepsen, Attorney General of the State of
Connecticut, Hartford, CT.
* The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the official caption as shown above.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
(Thompson, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Lucia Cinotti, pro se, appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing her complaint
against a state court judge. Cinotti alleged that the state judge discriminated against her in her
divorce proceeding based on her gender and pro se status, purportedly in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., when he denied her motions
to compel payment of $50,500 and ordered her to vacate her marital home on a certain date. The
district court granted the state judge’s motion to dismiss, holding that federal question jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 was lacking because Title VII was irrelevant to Cinotti’s claims and,
alternatively, that Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity barred her claims. We assume the
parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on
appeal.
We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss, “constru[ing] the complaint liberally,
accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in
the plaintiff’s favor.” Capital Mgmt. Select Fund Ltd. v. Bennett, 680 F.3d 214, 219 (2d Cir.
2012). Courts must liberally construe pro se pleadings, “particularly when they allege civil rights
violations.” McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004). “We may affirm . . . on
any basis for which there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law, including grounds
upon which the district court did not rely.” Leon v. Murphy, 988 F.2d 303, 308 (2d Cir. 1993).
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The district court correctly held that Title VII, an employment discrimination statute, did
not establish a basis for federal question jurisdiction over Cinotti’s complaint. However, we
conclude that, although her pro se complaint does not refer to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the district court
should have construed it liberally as asserting § 1983 claims, which provide a basis for federal
question jurisdiction. A plaintiff asserting a § 1983 violation must show that a person acting
under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a “constitutional or federal statutory right,”
Washington v. Cty. of Rockland, 373 F.3d 310, 315 (2d Cir. 2004), and Cinotti’s complaint alleges
that the state judge violated her due process and equal protection rights while acting under color of
state law, see McEachin, 357 F.3d at 199 n.2 (“[T]he failure in a complaint to cite a statute, or to
cite the correct one, in no way affects the merits of a claim. Factual allegations alone are what
matters.”). Moreover, Cinotti referred to § 1983 in her opposition to the defendant’s motion to
dismiss.
Although the district court should not have dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction,
we nevertheless affirm the dismissal because Cinotti’s § 1983 claims fail. To the extent Cinotti
seeks injunctive relief against the state judge, her claims are barred by the text of § 1983, which
provides that, “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” Cinotti’s complaint does not suggest that the state
judge violated a declaratory decree or that declaratory relief was unavailable.
To the extent Cinotti seeks monetary relief against the state judge in his official capacity,
her claims fail because he is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of
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State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). To the extent Cinotti seeks monetary relief against the state
judge in his individual capacity, her claims fail because he is protected by judicial immunity.
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9–11 (1991) (Per Curiam). We do not decide that the defendant was
or was not correct in his actions or did or did not act properly. We mean only that even if the
judge’s actions were, as the plaintiff asserts, incorrect or improper, the plaintiff is barred by
established law from bringing a lawsuit against the judge to correct or obtain compensation for that
error. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978) (“A judge will not be deprived of
immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his
authority . . . .”).
We have reviewed the arguments raised by Cinotti on appeal and find in them no basis for
reversal. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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