J-S46044-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
CHRISTINE A. AMOS : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MATTHEW AMOS :
:
Appellant : No. 2043 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Dated November 17, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
Civil Division at No(s): 2012 CV 6454 DV
BEFORE: BOWES, OLSON, JJ., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 18, 2017
Appellant, Matthew Amos, appeals from the order entered in the Court
of Common Pleas of Dauphin County approving the Report and
Recommendation of the Divorce Master on issues of equitable distribution,
alimony pendent lite, alimony, counsel fees, and costs. In entering such
order, the court also dismissed Appellant’s Exceptions to the Master’s Report
as untimely filed. On appeal, Appellant contends that the court erroneously
dismissed his exceptions, as he substantially complied with rules governing
the timing of such filings. We affirm.
The trial court aptly provides a factual and procedural history of the
case as follows:
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*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S46044-17
On December 11, 2015, the parties, both represented by counsel
at the time, entered into a Stipulation with regard to procedural
aspects of the divorce matter, leaving unresolved the related
claims, and agreed to a bifurcated divorce. The decree in
divorce was filed on December 14, 2015. The parties then
proceeded on with the unresolved issues of equitable
distribution, alimony pendente lite, alimony, counsel fees and
costs. Two days of hearings were held before the divorce Master
on January 25 and 26, 2016. Husband’s counsel had withdrawn
his representation before the hearings and Husband chose to
represent himself at the hearings.
On September 30, 2016, the Divorce Master issued a
comprehensive, fifty-two (52) page Report and
Recommendation. The previous day, September 29, 2016, the
Divorce Master sent an email to both Husband and Wife’s
Counsel, Diane Radcliff advising them that the Report and
Recommendation would be filed [with the Prothonotary] on
September 30, 2016.
On Thursday, October 20, 2016, at 4:59 p.m., Husband emailed
his Exceptions to the Master’s Report with a notation “your copy
paper will fp;;ow [sic].” On Friday, October 21, 2016, at 10:49
a.m., the Divorce Master emailed Wife’s counsel with an email
copy of the Exceptions since she had not been copied on the
email sent by Husband to the Divorce Master.
The Divorce Master also indicated to Husband in that same email
that “I assume you filed these in the Prothonotary’s office as
required, I do not require a paper copy of them. I do not
address the Exceptions, the Court will address them.” On
October 21, 2016, at 11:25 a.m. that same morning, Husband
hand delivered a paper copy to the Divorce Master, but not to
the Prothonotary.
On October 26, 2016, the court issued an Order indicating that,
while Husband had emailed Exceptions to the Divorce Master, no
paper filing of Exceptions were [sic] filed with the Prothonotary.
On October 27, 2016, the court filed an Amended Order to clarify
that a paper copy of Exceptions were [sic] delivered to the
Divorce Master, but again that no paper copy of Exceptions had
been filed with the Prothonotary; therefore none were [sic]
docketed with the court.
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Wife’s counsel filed a Praecipe to Transmit the Record on October
27, 2016. On October 31, 2016, thirty-one (31) days after the
Divorce Master’s Report and Recommendation was filed,
Husband delivered by certified mail a copy of his Exceptions filed
October 31, 2016, to [the lower] court’s Chambers. On
November 15, 2016, Plaintiff filed and [the lower] court received
Plaintiff’s Petition to Strike Defendant’s Exceptions to the
Master’s Report and Recommendation filed on September 30,
2016.[]
Lower Court Opinion, filed 11/17/2016, at 1-2.
On November 17, 2016, the lower court entered an order approving
the Report and Recommendation of the Divorce Master. As for Appellant’s
exceptions to the Report, the court determined that Appellant filed them
beyond the 20-day filing period established by Pa.R.C.P. 1920.55-2(b), infra,
even though the Report contained a proper notice advising him of the
deadline. The court further rejected the position that Appellant was unaware
of where to file exceptions, as the docket, dating back to 2012,
demonstrated that numerous filings, including the Master’s Report and
Recommendation itself, had been made in the Prothonotary’s office. Having
determined that Appellant filed no exceptions within 20 days of the filing of
the Master’s Report as required by law, the court entered an order approving
the Report and Recommendation of the Master. This timely appeal follows.
Appellant presents the following questions for our review:
DID THE LOWER COURT ERR AS A MATTER OF LAW OR
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN CONCLUDING THAT NO
EXCEPTIONS WERE FILED OR IN DECLINING TO
DISREGARD APPELLANT’S FAILURE TO FILE HIS
EXCEPTIONS WITH THE PROTHONOTARY BY THE DUE
DATE (OCTOBER 20, 2016) PURSUANT TO PA.R.C.P. 126
WHERE THE EXCEPTIONS WERE FILED WITH THE
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PROTHONOTARY ON OCTOBER 31, 2016 AND HAD BEEN
EMAILED TO THE DIVORCE MASTER ON OCTOBER 20, 2016
WITHIN THE TIME PERIOD FOR THE FILING OF
EXCEPTIONS?
Appellant’s brief at 4.
In order to preserve an issue for appeal, a party must file a timely
exception to the Master’s Report pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1920.55-2(b). The
rule provides:
Within twenty days of the date of receipt or the date of mailing
of the master's report and recommendation, whichever occurs
first, any party may file exceptions to the report or any part
thereof, to rulings on objections to evidence, to statements or
findings of fact, to conclusions of law, or to any other matters
occurring during the hearing. Each exception shall set forth a
separate objection precisely and without discussion. Matters not
covered by exceptions are deemed waived unless, prior to entry
of the final decree, leave is granted to file exceptions raising
those matters.
Pa.R.C.P. 1920.55-2(b).
Here, Appellant acknowledges that he did not adhere strictly to Rule
1920.55-2(b)’s filing requirements, but he argues that he “substantially
compl[ied]” with the spirit of the rule when he emailed his exceptions
directly to the Master just one hour after the expiration of the twenty-day
filing period expressed in Rule 1920.55-2(b).1 Appellant also attributes his
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1
In this respect, it is noteworthy that Appellant did not seek the court’s
permission to file exceptions belatedly, which he accomplished on October
31, 2016, 31 days after the Master filed his Report. See Sipowicz v.
Sipowicz, 517 A.2d 960 (Pa.Super. 1986) (Finding waiver for late filing of
exceptions where the record reflected “that permission for the late filing was
neither requested [of] or granted by the lower court.”).
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belated and misdirected email “filing” to the Master’s failure to inform him
where to file exceptions. Appellant’s arguments afford him no relief.
Our rules of civil procedure set forth a scheme contemplating that
filings in divorce or annulment proceedings shall be made with the
prothonotary of the court of common pleas having jurisdiction over the
action. This requirement is evident from the outset of the scheme, where
Pa.R.C.P. 1920.3, Commencement of Action, provides that “[a]n action shall
be commenced by filing a complaint with the prothonotary.” Pa.R.C.P.
1920.3. Consonant with Rule 1920.3, subsequent rules provide that the
court may thereafter appoint a master, who shall conduct a hearing and
“file” the record and a Report (Rules 1920.51, 1920.53, and 1920.55-2(a)),
that the Master’s Report shall be subject to the parties’ respective right to
“file” exceptions (Rule 1920.55-2(b), (c)), and that the court shall review
the Report and any filed exceptions prior to entering a final decree on the
matter (Rule 1920.55-2(c), (d)).
The rules, therefore, require that the complaint, the contents of the
record, the Master’s Report, and any party exceptions to the Master’s Report
shall be filed with the court to allow the court to review the matter and enter
a final decree. As expressed in Rule 1920.3, the court’s filing office for
matters of this kind is the prothonotary’s office. An email addressed to the
Master, therefore, does not amount to a “filing” with the court as that term
is contemplated under our rules. Consequently, we reject Appellant’s claim
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that he “substantially complied” with the filing requirements of Rule
1920.55-2.
Likewise, we discern no merit to Appellant’s argument in the
alternative that his October 31, 2016, filing was fatally belated only because
the Master’s Report failed to specify where to file exceptions, thus providing
inadequate notice.2 Rule 1920.55-2(2) requires only that a Master’s Report
provide written notice of the right to file exceptions; it does not require
notice of where to file. The Master’s Report, here, set forth proper notice of
Appellant’s right to file exceptions, which, when read in light of pertinent
state rules of civil procedure discussed above, offered clear direction that
such a filing shall be made with the court, through the prothonotary.
In the case sub judice, moreover, the direction supplied by our state
rules was amplified in applicable local rules. Specifically, Dauphin County
Local Rule 1920.51(14) specifies “[a]n original and a copy of Exceptions to
the Divorce Master’s Report and Recommendation shall be filed with the
Prothonotary’s Office….” See D.C.C.R. No. 1920.51(14). Also, docket
entries in this matter indicate that Appellant, himself, made previous filings
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2
Appellant does not dispute that the Master’s Report provided notice that it
had been filed with the Office of the Prothonotary of Dauphin County and
that the parties had twenty days in which to file exceptions.
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with the Prothonotary. Accordingly, Appellant’s argument in this regard
fails. 3
Finally, Appellant baldly argues that, to the extent the prescribed filing
period set forth in Rule 1920.55-2(b)’s is designed to avoid unduly
prejudicing the other party, his delay in filing exceptions must be considered
inconsequential compared to the several months taken by the Master to file
his Report and Recommendation. However, Appellant fails to explain how
the time taken for the Master to prepare and file his 52-page Report and
Recommendation relates in any way to a party’s responsibility under our
rules of civil procedure to file timely exceptions to the Report. As such, this
claim, too, is without merit.
With nothing in the record evincing that the Master committed an error
of law or misled Appellant in any way with respect to his rights to file
exceptions to the Master’s Report, we reject Appellant’s present claim.
Accordingly, we affirm the order entered below.
Order is AFFIRMED.
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3
That Appellant chose to proceed pro se does not diminish the significance
of Rule 1920.55-2(b) or relieve Appellant of his obligation under the rule to
file timely exceptions. See Blatz v. Blatz, 603 A.2d 666 (Pa.Super. 1992)
(holding appellant’s decision to self-represent did not excuse his failure to
file timely exceptions).
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/18/2017
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