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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
JAMES FRANKLIN SELLARD, : No. 2026 MDA 2016
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the PCRA Order, November 15, 2016,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Criminal Division at No. CP-36-CR-0004518-2013
BEFORE: OLSON, J., MOULTON, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 19, 2017
James Franklin Sellard appeals from the November 15, 2016 order
denying his petition filed pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”),
42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After careful review, we affirm.
The PCRA court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history
of this case as follows:
On April 4, 2013, Detective Bradley Ortenzi of
the Ephrata Borough Police Department and a
member of the Lancaster County Computer Crimes
Task Force was performing a search of peer-to-peer
(P2P) networks for individuals sharing child
pornography. He located a computer willing to share
files on the ARES network that contained suspected
child pornography. This computer had an IP
(Internet Protocol) address of 71.58.192.38 and an
ARES nickname of pops1228@ARES associated with
it. Detective Ortenzi learned that this IP address
was owned by Comcast Cable Communications.
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Detective Ortenzi presented the partially
downloaded file and the IP address to another
detective assigned to the Lancaster County
Computer Crimes Task Force, Detective Keith Neff.
Detective Neff requested a court order containing a
description of the partially downloaded file and
requested (1) that Comcast Cable Communications
disclose the subscriber information for the IP Address
71.58.192.38 and (2) that Comcast not disclose this
request to the subscriber.
The court order was granted on April 11, 2013,
based on the procedures set forth in Section 5743 of
Pennsylvania’s Stored Wire and Electronic
Communications and Transactional Records Access
Act (“Stored Wire Act”), 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5741-
5749.[1] Comcast disclosed to the Commonwealth
that the IP address in question belonged to
[appellant] at an address of 76 Roosevelt Boulevard,
Unit 101, Manheim Township, Lancaster County.
Using the information from Comcast, Detective
Keith R. Kreider of the Manheim Township Police
Department, and a member of the Computer Crimes
Task Force, obtained a search warrant for
[appellant’s] apartment on June 20, 2013. When the
warrant was executed on June 20, 2013, the
Commonwealth seized a Dell computer system, two
external hard drives, and three damaged laptops.
A forensic examination was conducted by
Detective John Duby, a Lancaster County Computer
Forensic expert, on [appellant’s] computer and the
external hard drives seized from his apartment. The
examination resulted in the identification of
14 suspected child pornography images depicting
children under the age of 18 engaging in prohibited
sexual acts, and 13 suspected child pornography
videos depicting children under the age of 18
engaging in prohibited sexual acts.
1
This Act is located in subchapter C of the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and
Electronic Surveillance Control statute (“Pennsylvania Wiretap Act”),
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5701-5782.
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As a result of this police investigation, on
September 12, 2013, [appellant] was charged with
two counts of sexual abuse of children, possession of
child pornography, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d)(1).
[Appellant] filed a suppression motion on April 23,
2014, and a hearing was held on July 18, 2014.
Thereafter, the parties filed briefs addressing the
issues of whether notice is required by the
government when the government obtains a court
order for a defendant’s IP subscriber name and
address and whether such subscriber information is
“content” under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5743(b), or excluded
under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5743(c)(3) as non-content
“records[.]”
By Order dated July 28, 2014, [appellant’s]
motion to suppress was denied, as [the trial court]
found that the IP subscriber name and address
obtained via a court order were not “content” for
purposes of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5743(b) and, therefore,
notice to [appellant] was not required. As such
information constituted non-content “records,” [the
trial court] held that Section 5743(c) controlled, and
that the procedural protections provided for in that
Section were followed in this case.
After a waiver of his right to a jury trial,
[appellant] proceeded to a bench trial on August 1,
2014. At the conclusion, [appellant] was found
guilty of two counts of sexual abuse of children, child
pornography. Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9718.2,
the Commonwealth gave notice of its intent to seek
a sentence of life imprisonment on the charges as
[appellant] had three prior convictions for indecent
assault.
Sentencing was deferred pending completion of
a pre-sentence investigation report. Moreover,
having been found guilty of two counts of sexual
abuse of children, [appellant] was ordered to
undergo an assessment by the Pennsylvania Sexual
Offender Assessment Board (SOAB). A hearing was
held on October 27, 2014, to determine if [appellant]
qualified as a sexually violent predator (SVP) under
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the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act
(SORNA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-9799.41.
Robert M. Stein, Ph.D., testified on behalf of the
SOAB and expressed his expert opinion that
[appellant] met the criteria to be classified as an SVP
under the Act. At the conclusion of the hearing, [the
trial court] found [appellant] to be an SVP and
immediately sentenced him to two concurrent
sentences of life in prison pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9718.2.
PCRA court opinion, 11/15/16 at 1-4 (some citations and footnotes omitted).
On November 26, 2014, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On
August 28, 2015, a panel of this court quashed appellant’s appeal and
appellant did not file a petition for allowance of appeal with our supreme
court. See Commonwealth v. Sellard, 131 A.3d 106 (Pa.Super. 2015)
(unpublished memorandum). On September 17, 2015, appellant filed a
timely pro se PCRA petition2 and Dennis C. Dougherty, Esq.
(“PCRA counsel”), was appointed to represent him on September 24, 2015.
On January 28, 2016, PCRA counsel filed an amended petition on appellant’s
behalf. On May 3, 2016, the PCRA court conducted an evidentiary hearing
on the issues raised in appellant’s amended PCRA petition. Appellant’s trial
counsel, Jeffrey A. Conrad, Esq. (hereinafter, “trial counsel”), and direct
2
The record reflects that appellant’s pro se PCRA petition was docketed on
September 22, 2015. Under the prisoner mailbox rule, however, appellant’s
petition is deemed filed on the date of mailing, September 17, 2015. See
Commonwealth v. Crawford, 17 A.3d 1279, 1281 (Pa.Super. 2011)
(stating, “[u]nder the prisoner mailbox rule, we deem a pro se document
filed on the date it is placed in the hands of prison authorities for
mailing[]”(citation omitted)).
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appeal counsel, James J. Karl, Esq. (hereinafter, “appellate counsel”),
testified at this hearing. On November 15, 2016, the PCRA court entered an
order denying appellant’s amended PCRA petition. This timely appeal
followed.3
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
1. DID THE PCRA COURT ERR WHEN IT DENIED
[APPELLANT’S] PETITION FOR POST
CONVICTION RELIEF WHEN IT FOUND THAT
TRIAL COUNSEL PROVIDED EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE WHEN COUNSEL FAILED TO
RAISE AND PRESERVE THE ISSUE OF
OVERBREADTH OF THE COURT ORDER
LANGUAGE AT [APPELLANT’S] SUPPRESSION
HEARING AND IN HIS BRIEF TO THE TRIAL
COURT?
II. DID THE PCRA COURT ERR WHEN IT FOUND
THAT [APPELLANT] FAILED TO PROVE THAT AN
ALTERNATIVE NOT CHOSEN, “THE
OVERBREADTH ISSUE,” OFFERED A
POTENTIAL FOR SUCCESS SUBSTANTIALLY
GREATER THAN THE COURSE PURSUED, THE
“CONTENT” ISSUE?
III. DID THE PCRA COURT ERR WHEN IT FOUND
THAT APPELLATE COUNSEL WAS EFFECTIVE
WHEN COUNSEL FAILED TO RAISE THE
INEFFECTIVENESS OF TRIAL COUNSEL WHO
FAILED TO RAISE AND PRESERVE THE
“OVERBREADTH” ISSUE?
3
On December 12, 2016, the PCRA court entered an order directing
appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, in
accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant filed a timely Rule 1925(b)
statement on December 29, 2016, and the PCRA court filed a one-page
Rule 1925(a) opinion on January 3, 2017 wherein it indicates that it is
relying on its prior November 15, 2016 opinion dismissing appellant’s PCRA
petition.
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Appellant’s brief at 4-5.
Proper appellate review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a PCRA petition
is limited to the examination of “whether the PCRA court’s determination is
supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Miller,
102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation omitted). “This Court grants
great deference to the findings of the PCRA court, and we will not disturb
those findings merely because the record could support a contrary holding.”
Commonwealth v. Patterson, 143 A.3d 394, 397 (Pa.Super. 2016)
(citation omitted). In order to be eligible for PCRA relief, a defendant must
plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or
sentence arose from one or more of the errors listed at 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9543(a)(2). Further, these issues must be neither previously litigated nor
waived. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3).
Appellant first contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to
argue at the July 18, 2014 suppression hearing that the language set forth
in the trial court’s April 11, 2013 order and application for court order was
overbroad. (Appellant’s brief at 15.) Appellant maintains that trial counsel’s
argument “that [appellant’s] address, name and other subscriber
information was ‘content’ under [Section 5743(b)] . . . had almost no hope
of succeeding[,]” and that the PCRA court erred in concluding that the
“overbreadth” issue was devoid of merit. (Id. at 18-19.) For the following
reasons, we disagree.
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To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the
PCRA, a petitioner must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that counsel’s ineffectiveness “so undermined the truth-determining process
that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.”
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). Specifically, a petitioner must establish the
following three factors: “first[,] the underlying claim has arguable merit;
second, that counsel had no reasonable basis for his action or inaction; and
third, that Appellant was prejudiced.” Commonwealth v. Charleston, 94
A.3d 1012, 1020 (Pa.Super. 2014), appeal denied, 104 A.3d 523 (Pa.
2014) (citation omitted). “A petitioner establishes prejudice when he
demonstrates that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 533 (Pa. 2009)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
“[C]ounsel is presumed to be effective and the burden of
demonstrating ineffectiveness rests on appellant.” Commonwealth v.
Ousley, 21 A.3d 1238, 1242 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 30 A.3d
487 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted). Additionally, we note that counsel cannot
be found ineffective for failing to raise a claim that is devoid of merit. See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Ligons, 971 A.2d 1125, 1146 (Pa. 2009).
Instantly, our review of the record reveals that trial counsel testified at
great length at the May 13, 2016 hearing with regard to the decision to limit
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his argument at the suppression hearing to whether appellant’s IP subscriber
name and address were “content” under Section 5743(b), or excluded under
Section 5743(c)(3) as non-content “records.”4
4
Section 5743(b) provides as follows:
(b) Contents of communications in a remote
computing service.--
(1) Investigative or law enforcement
officers may require a provider of remote
computing service to disclose the
contents of any communication to which
this paragraph is made applicable by
paragraph (2):
(i) without required notice to the
subscriber or customer if the
investigative or law enforcement
officer obtains a warrant issued
under the Pennsylvania Rules of
Criminal Procedure; or
(ii) with prior notice from the
investigative or law enforcement
officer to the subscriber or
customer if the investigative or
law enforcement officer:
(A) uses an administrative
subpoena authorized by a
statute or a grand jury
subpoena; or
(B) obtains a court order
for the disclosure under
subsection (d);
except that delayed notice may be given
pursuant to section 5745 (relating to
delayed notice).
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Specifically, trial counsel testified as follows:
Q. Okay. So that was essentially the argument
that was presented or focused down to at the
suppression hearing?
A. Correct, yes.
Q. Did you have a strategic reason for limiting
your argument to that?
(2) Paragraph (1) is applicable with
respect to a communication which is held
or maintained on that service:
(i) On behalf of and received by
means of electronic transmission
from, or created by means of
computer processing of
communications received by
means of electronic transmission
from, a subscriber or customer of
the remote computing service.
(ii) Solely for the purpose of
providing storage or computer
processing services to the
subscriber or customer, if the
provider is not authorized to
access the contents of any such
communication for the purpose of
providing any services other than
storage or computer processing.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5743(b).
Section 5743(c)(3), in turn, provides that “[a]n investigative or law
enforcement officer receiving records or information under paragraph (2) is
not required to provide notice to the customer or subscriber.” 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 5743(c)(3).
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A. The warrant itself, I -- both as a prosecutor
and as a defense attorney, I had worked with
Sergeant Kreider. When I was in the DA’s
Office, we called him Catfish because we did a
lot of undercover work together. So I knew
Sergeant Kreider very well. The quality of his
work, it’s a very high quality.
Detective Ortenzi also has a very good
reputation. Again, his work is high quality.
So I was trying to find an argument that I
thought I might have a chance with in this
case. And so I went very specific at that -- at
those provisions in the Wiretap Act because I
thought, given the nature of this case, the
[trial c]ourt wasn’t going to go for just
anything.
I was going to have to find something that had
teeth. And so I thought that particular
argument had the best chance in this particular
case of getting the [trial c]ourt to listen and to
go with.
So I made it very specific as to the provisions
that they had failed to do in the order.
Notes of testimony, 5/13/16 at 13-15.
Trial counsel further testified that he did not believe the “overbreadth”
argument by itself presented appellant with his best chance of success at the
suppression hearing and it was in appellant’s best interest to focus his
argument:
Q. Okay. Is there any specific reason you didn’t
argue that the Court Order was too vague at
the suppression hearing?
A. Well, I think what we then argued in the
memorandum of law flows out of it. So I can’t
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say there was any reason why just in -- I can
only say that I have known Judge Ashworth for
16 years, and I knew how to focus my
argument.
So at the suppression hearing, that’s where I
thought I had the best chance of getting the
[trial c]ourt to go.
So I argued and we narrowed it down to the
content, which is what the argument
essentially was. The vagueness flowed out of
it. I did argue that in the memorandum
because it flows out of that argument, but I
don’t think we brought it up during the
hearing.
Id. at 15.
On cross-examination, trial counsel reiterated that he has worked on
at least 50 sex crime and child pornography cases in his capacity as both a
former assistant district attorney and defense attorney, and that in his
opinion, “we advanced the strongest arguments that [appellant] had in the
suppression motion, at the motion [hearing], and then following up with the
memorandum of law.” (Id. at 17, 20-21.)
“[G]enerally, where matters of strategy and tactics are concerned,
counsel’s assistance is deemed constitutionally effective if he chose a
particular course that had some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his
client’s interests.” Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121, 132 (Pa.
2012). “If counsel’s chosen course had some reasonable basis, the inquiry
ends and counsel’s assistance is deemed effective.” Commonwealth v.
Williams, 899 A.2d 1060, 1064 (Pa. 2006). Based on the foregoing, we
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find that trial counsel had a reasonable strategic basis for electing to focus
his argument on the “content” issue rather than arguing that the language in
the trial court’s April 11, 2013 order was overbroad. Accordingly, appellant
has failed to satisfy the second prong of the ineffectiveness test and his
claim must fail. See Charleston, 94 A.3d at 1020.
Moreover, our review indicates that even if trial counsel had elected to
pursue the “overbreadth” argument, appellant has failed to prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that but for trial counsel’s ineffectiveness,
“the result of the proceeding would have been different.” See Johnson,
966 A.2d at 533. The PCRA court authored a comprehensive, 18-page
opinion wherein it found that appellant’s assertion that the “overbreadth”
argument constituted “a legitimate and viable issue was not supported by
the case law or the facts in this case.” (PCRA court opinion, 11/15/16 at 11
(internal quotation marks omitted).) The PCRA court further concluded that
the April 11, 2013 court order in question comported with the requirements
set forth in Section 5743(d) of the Pennsylvania Stored Wire Act and was
neither vague nor overbroad. (Id. at 11.) Contrary to appellant’s claim, we
discern no error on the part of the PCRA court in reaching these conclusions
and adopt that portion of its opinion addressing this issue. (See id. at
11-15; see also appellant’s brief at 17-21.)
In his final claim, appellant contends that appellate counsel was
ineffective in failing to argue on direct appeal that trial counsel was
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ineffective for not preserving the “overbreadth” issue. (Appellant’s brief at
22-25.)
Upon review, we find that appellant’s claim of appellate counsel’s
ineffectiveness warrants no relief. It is well established that ineffectiveness
claims cannot be raised on direct appeal and must be deferred until
collateral review. See Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562, 576 (Pa.
2013) (reaffirming the general rule first set forth in Commonwealth v.
Grant, 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002), that “claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel are to be deferred to PCRA review[.]”).5 Notably, appellate counsel
acknowledged as much at the May 13, 2016 PCRA hearing, stating as
follows:
Q. Okay. And you also asserted or you also
testified that you did not assert that [trial
counsel] was ineffective for failing to preserve
issues because, based on your review of the
record, you, in fact, believe that he had raised
those issues?
A. Correct. And well, you really can’t assert
ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal in
Pennsylvania.
5
We note that our supreme court recognized two exceptions to this general
rule in Holmes, but neither is applicable in this case. Specifically, the
Holmes court limited those exceptions to the following: (1) where the trial
court determines that a claim of ineffectiveness is “both meritorious and
apparent from the record so that immediate consideration and relief is
warranted[;]” or (2) where the trial court finds “good cause” for unitary
review, and the defendant makes a “knowing and express waiver of his
entitlement to seek PCRA review from his conviction and sentence, including
an express recognition that the waiver subjects further collateral review to
the time and serial petition restrictions of the PCRA.” Holmes, 79 A.3d at
577 (footnote omitted).
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Notes of testimony, 5/13/16 at 28.
Furthermore, as discussed, appellant has failed to demonstrate that
the underlying claim of trial counsel’s purported ineffectiveness was
of arguable merit. Thus, appellate counsel cannot be found ineffective in
failing to pursue this claim on direct appeal. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1270 (Pa.Super. 2010) (a determination that trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance is a prerequisite to finding that any
subsequent counsel was himself ineffective); see also Commonwealth v.
Hall, 867 A.2d 619, 632 (Pa.Super. 2005) (holding that counsel cannot be
found ineffective for failing to raise a claim that is devoid of merit), appeal
denied, 895 A.2d 549 (Pa. 2006). Accordingly, for all the foregoing
reasons, we conclude that appellant’s claim that appellate counsel was
ineffective must also fail.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/19/2017
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