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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
KELVIN BRYANT
Appellant No. 1883 EDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order May 20, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0011173-2010
CP-51-CR-0014199-2010
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
JUDGMENT ORDER BY PANELLA, J. FILED SEPTEMBER 19, 2017
Appellant, Kelvin Bryant, appeals pro se from the order entered in the
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, denying his petition pursuant to the
Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
Following the shooting deaths of two young men, police arrested Appellant
and his two co-defendants. Following a consolidated jury trial, the jury
convicted Appellant of two counts of first-degree murder, and one count
each of conspiracy to commit murder and possession of an instrument of
crime. Prior to sentencing, Appellant agreed to waive his appellate rights in
exchange for a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. The court
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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administered both a written and oral colloquy, and accepted the agreement.
On February 6, 2013, the court sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment
without parole.
On February 26, 2013, Appellant attempted to withdraw the
sentencing deal in order to file a direct appeal. The court denied that motion.
Thereafter, Appellant filed a timely PCRA petition on April 16, 2013. The
PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed a Turner/Finley1 no-merit letter
and requested permission to withdraw. The court instead appointed
replacement counsel, who also filed a no-merit letter and a motion to
withdraw representation. The court then issued Rule 907 notice of its
intention to dismiss Appellant’s petition without a hearing, and granted
replacement counsel’s motion to withdraw. The PCRA court ultimately
dismissed the petition. Appellant’s timely pro se appeal is now before us.
On appeal, Appellant claims: he was coerced into “pleading guilty”
(waiving his appellate rights in exchange for a life sentence); trial and PCRA
counsel were ineffective; the PCRA court erred by allowing PCRA counsel to
withdraw despite meritorious issues; and the PCRA court erred by failing to
hold an evidentiary hearing.
“On appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard and scope of
review is limited to determining whether the PCRA court’s findings are
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1
Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1998); Commonwealth
v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc)
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supported by the record and without legal error.” Commonwealth v.
Edmiston, 65 A.3d 339, 345 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). On questions of
law, our scope of review is de novo. See id.
To establish ineffectiveness of counsel, a PCRA petitioner must plead
and prove: his underlying legal claim has arguable merit; counsel’s actions
lacked any reasonable basis; and counsel’s actions prejudiced the petitioner.
See Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 260 (Pa. 2011). Failure to
satisfy any prong of the ineffectiveness test requires dismissal of the claim.
See Commonwealth v. O’Bidos, 849 A.2d 243, 249 (Pa. Super. 2004).
Preliminarily, Appellant’s appellate brief does not contain any
argument regarding the ineffectiveness of either attorney appointed to
represent Appellant on collateral relief, and that argument is therefore
waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119.
Appellant’s waiver of his right to direct appellate and collateral review
in exchange for a life sentence was the functional equivalent of a guilty plea.
See Commonwealth v. Barnes, 687 A.2d 1163, 1167 (Pa. Super. 1996).
“A plea of guilt that is motivated by a fear that the prosecution may obtain
the death penalty is valid as long as the guilty plea is entered knowingly and
voluntarily.” Id. (citation omitted). “Allegations of ineffectiveness in
connection with the entry of a guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only
if the ineffectiveness caused the defendant to enter an involuntary or
unknowing plea.” Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 136, 141 (Pa.
Super. 2002) (citation omitted). “A person who elects to plead guilty is
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bound by the statements he makes in open court while under oath and he
may not later assert grounds for withdrawing the plea which contradict the
statements he made at his plea colloquy.” Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832
A.2d 517, 523 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted).
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable M. Theresa
Sarmina, we conclude that Appellant’s issues on appeal merit no relief. See
PCRA Court Opinion, filed October 14, 2016, at 7-24. Accordingly, we affirm
based on the PCRA court’s opinion.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/19/2017
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