Supreme Court of Florida
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No. SC17-349
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NOEL DOORBAL,
Petitioner,
vs.
JULIE L. JONES, etc.,
Respondent.
[September 20, 2017]
PER CURIAM.
This case is before the Court on the petition of Noel Doorbal for a writ of
habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(9), Fla. Const.
FACTS
We previously detailed the gruesome and intricate facts surrounding
Doorbal’s crimes on his direct appeal. Doorbal v. State, 837 So. 2d 940, 944-52
(Fla. 2003). Relevant here, Doorbal was convicted and sentenced to death for the
first-degree murders of Frank Griga and Krisztina Furton. Id. at 951. A jury
recommended a sentence of death by a vote of eight to four, and the trial court
sentenced Doorbal to death for both murders. Id.
In his sentencing order, the trial judge found a total of six aggravators:
that Doorbal had been convicted of a prior violent felony; that the
murders were committed to avoid arrest, for pecuniary gain, and in the
course of a kidnapping; and that they were cold, calculated, and
premeditated (CCP), and heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC). All but
HAC applied to both murders. The court found that the HAC
aggravating factor applied to the Furton murder only. Each
aggravator was accorded great weight. The trial judge did not find
any statutory mitigators, but did find six nonstatutory mitigators: that
Doorbal had a difficult childhood, was a hard-working and loyal
employee, was a loyal friend and positive influence on others, had
religious devotion and the ability to help others with religious beliefs,
exhibited appropriate courtroom behavior, and that life imprisonment
would remove the menace to society. Each nonstatutory mitigator
was accorded little weight.
Id. at 951-52.
On direct appeal, we affirmed Doorbal’s convictions and sentences. Id. at
963. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review on June 27, 2003.
Doorbal v. Florida, 539 U.S. 962 (2003).
ANALYSIS
We conclude that the appropriate action is to grant Doorbal’s petition, vacate
his sentence, and remand for a new penalty phase. Here, the jury recommended
death by a vote of eight to four. Thus, Doorbal’s death sentence violated the
central holding in Hurst v. State: all critical findings for the imposition of death
must be found unanimously by the jury. Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40, 44 (Fla.
2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2161 (2017).
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In Mosley v. State, we held that Hurst applies retroactively to those
postconviction defendants whose sentences became final after the United States
Supreme Court’s June 24, 2002, decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
Mosley v. State, 209 So. 3d 1248, 1283 (Fla. 2016). Doorbal’s convictions became
final on June 27, 2003. Doorbal, 539 U.S. 962. Thus, Doorbal falls within the
category of defendants to whom Hurst is applicable. See Hertz v. Jones, 218 So.
3d 428 (Fla. 2017); Hernandez v. Jones, 217 So. 3d 1032 (Fla. 2017); Card v.
Jones, 219 So. 3d 47 (Fla. 2017).
Accordingly, the issue is then whether any error that occurred during the
penalty phase was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Although three
aggravating factors were necessarily found by a unanimous vote of the jury—(1)
conviction of a prior violent felony; (2) the capital felony was committed while
Doorbal was engaged in the commission of a kidnapping; and (3) the capital felony
was committed for pecuniary gain—whether these aggravating circumstances were
“sufficient” to qualify Doorbal for the death penalty would also be a jury
determination. Because the jury vote was eight to four, there is no way of knowing
if such a finding was unanimous. Moreover, there is no way of knowing if the jury
found any of the other aggravating circumstances unanimously, 1 or if any
1. Two of the non-automatic aggravators—HAC and CCP—are among the
weightiest in Florida. Jackson v. State, 18 So. 3d 1016, 1035 (Fla. 2009).
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aggravators that were unanimously found were also unanimously found to
outweigh the mitigation, which is necessary for imposing the death penalty. Hurst,
202 So. 3d at 68; Deviney v. State, 213 So. 3d 794, 800 (Fla. 2017).
In sum, any attempt to determine what findings were made by the jurors who
voted for life and the jurors who voted for death would amount to speculation and
cannot rise to the level of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the error
in this case cannot be considered harmless. Thus, we grant the petition for a writ
of habeas corpus, vacate Doorbal’s death sentence, and remand for a new penalty
phase proceeding. See Hertz, 218 So. 3d 428; Hernandez, 217 So. 3d 1032; Card,
219 So. 3d 47.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we grant the petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
vacate Doorbal’s sentence, and remand for a new penalty phase proceeding
consistent with Hurst.
It is so ordered.
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
LAWSON, J., concurs specially with an opinion.
CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., dissent.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
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LAWSON, J., specially concurring.
See Okafor v. State, 42 Fla. L. Weekly S639, S641, 2017 WL 2481266, at
*6 (Fla. June 8, 2017) (Lawson, J., concurring specially).
Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus
Maria del Carmen Calzon of Offices of Maria del Carmen Calzon, P.A., Coral
Gables, Florida,
for Petitioner
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Melissa Roca,
Assistant Attorney General, Miami, Florida,
for Respondent
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