J-A09034-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
S.K.P. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
K.M.P. :
:
Appellant : No. 1007 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Order May 17, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Civil Division at No(s): 2008-FC-000584-15
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and OTT, J.
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 20, 2017
Appellant, K.M.P. (“Husband”), appeals from the order entered in the
York County Court of Common Pleas, which granted the petition of Appellee,
S.K.P. (“Wife”), for special relief, contempt, and enforcement. We affirm in
part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
The parties were married in February 1992, and are the parents of three
children. Wife initiated divorce proceedings in 2008. On March 25, 2009,
the parties entered into an Agreement for Order of Support (“2009 Support
Agreement”). The 2009 Support Agreement provides in relevant part as
follows:
* * *
3. [Husband]’s Child Support Obligation. The parties
J-A09034-17
agree that [Husband] shall pay [Wife] child support in the
amount of $2,300.00 per month payable in biweekly
installments of $1,061.54. The parties further agree that
[Husband] shall continue to pay this sum to [Wife] until
the parties’ youngest child graduates from high school or
turns eighteen (18) years of age, whichever event shall
occur last except as otherwise set forth below.
4. Post-Secondary Education. As each child reaches
age eighteen (18) or graduates from high school,
whichever event occurs last for each child, the amount of
child support payable to [Wife] shall be reduced by 1/3
(one-third) or $767.00 per month. As each child reaches
age eighteen (18) or graduates from high school,
[Husband] shall deposit the amount of $767.00 into an
account with the appropriate child’s name on the account
for the child’s sole and exclusive use and benefit.
5. Termination. [Husband]’s obligation to pay child
support to [Wife] shall terminate in its entirety when the
youngest child turns eighteen (18) or graduates from high
school, whichever event shall occur last.
* * *
(Agreement for Order of Support, dated 3/25/09, at 2). The Domestic
Relations Office entered a Final Order of Support on June 18, 2009, based on
the terms of the 2009 Support Agreement, with certain conditions:
Other Conditions:
IT IS NOTED THAT THE PARTIES[’] AGREEMENT CONTAINS
PROVISIONS WHICH ARE NOT ENFORCEABLE THROUGH
THIS OFFICE. THESE PROVISIONS ARE REGARDING
PAYMENTS TO EMANCIPATED CHILDREN AND PAYMENT OF
30% OF [HUSBAND’S] GROSS BONUSES.
IT IS NOTED THAT [HUSBAND] SHALL CLAIM [B.P.] AS A
DEPENDENT FOR TAX PURPOSES.
(Id. at 3).
-2-
J-A09034-17
During the divorce proceedings, the parties also entered into a
Property Settlement Agreement (“PSA”) and executed an Addendum to the
PSA. The court entered a divorce decree on December 30, 2010, that
incorporated without merging the PSA and Addendum to the PSA.
Subsequently, the parties executed a Second Addendum to the PSA on June
1, 2011. The court entered an order on June 29, 2011, incorporating
without merging the Second Addendum to the PSA into the divorce decree.
The Second Addendum to the PSA provided, inter alia, Wife would receive a
portion of Husband’s distribution from his deferred compensation retirement
plan, upon termination of his employment. Under the Second Addendum to
the PSA, Wife was entitled to sixty-five (65%) of Husband’s marital
contributions to the plan, as of December 2011, in the amount of
$94,246.02. Wife would also be entitled to sixty-five percent (65%) of the
appreciation (or subject to depreciation) of Husband’s marital contributions
to the plan until termination of employment.
The parties’ oldest child, B.P., graduated from high school in June
2011. In the fall of 2011, B.P. matriculated as a full-time student at a
university for one school year. Wife made payments toward B.P.’s tuition.
Husband failed to make monthly payments to B.P., in violation of the 2009
Support Agreement, until July 2012. Subsequently, Husband made
payments to B.P. in amounts less than $767.00, until September 2014,
when Husband suffered a stroke. Husband’s stroke rendered him unable to
-3-
J-A09034-17
continue working.
On July 22, 2015, Wife filed a petition for special relief, contempt, and
enforcement. In her petition, Wife requested the court, inter alia, to: (1)
find Husband in contempt for failure to comply with the 2009 Support
Agreement; (2) direct Husband to reimburse Wife for her payment of B.P.’s
college tuition in the amount of $14,254.00 for 2011-2012; and (3) direct
Husband to distribute to Wife her share of Husband’s deferred compensation
plan per the Second Addendum to the PSA.
The parties appeared before the court on November 19, 2015, and
resolved on the record some other issues Wife had presented in her petition.
On February 17, 2016, Wife filed a second petition for special relief,
contempt, and enforcement, noting several of her complaints from her July
2015 petition remained outstanding. The court held hearings on March 22,
2016, and April 25, 2016; Husband’s power of attorney testified and Wife
testified.
The court granted Wife some relief on May 17, 2016. Regarding the
post-separation growth of Husband’s deferred compensation plan, the court
found Wife was entitled to sixty-five percent (65%) of the post-separation
growth of the plan or $90,671.81; but Wife had to reimburse Husband for
ten percent (10%) of it, or $9,671.18, toward the federal taxes he paid on
it. As a result, the court ordered Husband to pay Wife $81,604.63, as Wife’s
net share of the post-separation growth of Husband’s marital contributions
-4-
J-A09034-17
to his deferred compensation plan. Regarding B.P.’s post-secondary
education expenses, the court directed Husband to reimburse Wife
$14,254.00 for the tuition she paid on behalf of B.P. for 2011-2012.
Husband filed a motion for reconsideration on May 27, 2016, which the
court denied. Husband timely filed a notice of appeal on June 16, 2016. On
July 12, 2016, the court ordered Husband to file a concise statement of
errors complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b); Husband timely
complied on August 1, 2016.
Husband raises three issues for our review:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW
AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ENFORCING THE
MARCH 25, 2009 AGREEMENT FOR ORDER OF SUPPORT
AS IT RELATES TO POST-SECONDARY EDUCATION, AS IT
WAS A SUPPORT AGREEMENT WHICH WAS CONVERTED
TO A SUPPORT ORDER AND AS SUCH IS NOT
ENFORCEABLE UNDER PENNSYLVANIA LAW[?]
WHETHER, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, IF SUCH AN AGREEMENT
IS ENFORCEABLE, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER
OF LAW AND COMMITTED AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
REACHING CONCLUSIONS THAT ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY
THE RECORD AND WHICH DO NOT SUPPORT THE RELIEF
GRANTED?
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN CALCULATING FAIR AND EQUITABLE TAX
CONSEQUENCES FOR WIFE FOR HER SHARE (65%) OF
THE DISTRIBUTION FROM THE DEFERRED COMPENSATION
PLAN WHERE THE SECOND [ADDENDUM TO THE
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT] FAILED TO
ADDRESS TAX CONSEQUENCES BETWEEN THE PARTIES
AND THE TRIAL COURT ESSENTIALLY AWARDED WIFE HER
SHARE FROM GROSS DISTRIBUTION WITH NO TAX
CONSEQUENCES?
-5-
J-A09034-17
(Husband’s Brief at 4).
In his first issue, Husband argues the parties’ 2009 Agreement for
Order of Support at issue is basically unenforceable. Specifically, Husband
claims the 2009 Support Agreement was a prelude to a Support Order and
destined to become the Support Order, which functionally supplanted the
2009 Support Agreement. Husband accedes that the June 2009 Final Order
of Support memorializes the 2009 Support Agreement. He complains,
however, that the Final Order, by its own conditions, cannot be used to
enforce those terms of the 2009 Support Agreement regarding payments to
his emancipated children. Husband contends he contracted only for the
entry of a Support Order and, once the order was entered consistent with
the terms of the 2009 Support Agreement, the 2009 Support Agreement
was complete and fulfilled. Husband further maintains the 2009 Support
Agreement cannot be enforced separately because it was not a “post-
nuptial” agreement that settled all of the parties’ property matters and
claims. Husband contends only a final agreement of that nature can bind a
party to pay for a child’s post-secondary education expenses, citing Reif v.
Reif, 626 A.2d 169 (Pa.Super. 1993), and the 2009 Support Agreement at
issue here is not a final “post-nuptial” agreement. Husband concludes this
Court should vacate the trial court’s order because the 2009 Support
Agreement is unenforceable and no longer binding. We disagree.
-6-
J-A09034-17
“Pennsylvania law permits support orders and private agreements for
support to coexist and be enforced separately. Private support agreements
are subject to contract principles and enforceable in an action at law for
damages or in equity for specific performance.” Nicholson v. Combs, 550
Pa. 23, 42, 703 A.2d 407, 417 (1997); Sams v. Sams, 808 A.2d 206, 211
(Pa.Super. 2002). The action at law for damages might include the unpaid
amount of support plus interest, whereas relief in equity for specific
performance seeks an order directing the payor to comply with his support
obligations under the agreement. Id. A civil contempt complaint is an
appropriate mechanism to enforce a child support agreement. 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 3105 (stating: “A party to an agreement regarding matters within the
jurisdiction of the court under this part, whether or not the agreement has
been merged or incorporated into the decree, may utilize a remedy or
sanction set forth in this part to enforce the agreement to the same extent
as though the agreement had been an order of the court except as provided
to the contrary in the agreement”); Love v. Love, 33 A.3d 1268 (Pa.Super.
2011). “The powers of a domestic relations judge are plenary and the
function is that of a law judge or equity chancellor as the case demands.”
Horowitz v. Horowitz, 600 A.2d 982, 984 n.1 (Pa.Super. 1991).
Nothing in Pennsylvania law requires parents to support their children
beyond the age of majority. Blue v. Blue, 532 Pa. 521, 529, 616 A.2d 628,
633 (1992) (stating: “[N]otwithstanding a child reaching majority at age 18,
-7-
J-A09034-17
a parental duty of support is owed until a child reaches 18 or graduates from
high school, whichever event occurs later”). Likewise, nothing in
Pennsylvania law prohibits parents from agreeing to pay the educational
expenses of their non-minor children; in that context, the obligation is
contractual. W.A.M. v. S.P.C., 95 A.3d 349, 352-53 (Pa.Super. 2014)
(providing party can contractually assume duty to support child’s post-
secondary education).
[A] party may contractually assume a duty to support
his…child’s post-secondary education. This is so, despite
Blue’s holding that there is no legal duty to provide post-
secondary educational support. Since Father’s support
obligation in this case is defined in the post-nuptial
agreement, his duty is contractual, not legal. We must
apply the law of contracts to interpret father’s duty and, of
course, the intent of the parties will control.
Reif, supra at 173 (internal citations omitted).
The language of a contract “should be interpreted in the light of the
subject matter, the apparent object or purpose of the parties and the
conditions existing when it was executed.” Hart v. Arnold, 884 A.2d 316,
333 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal denied, 587 Pa. 695, 897 A.2d 458 (2006).
“When the words of a contract are clear and unambiguous, the meaning of
the contract is ascertained from the contents alone.” Chen v. Chen, 586
Pa. 297, 307, 893 A.2d 87, 93 (2006). “If left undefined, the words of a
contract are to be given their ordinary meaning.” Kripp v. Kripp, 578 Pa.
82, 90, 849 A.2d 1159, 1163 (2004). “In the absence of an ambiguity, the
plain meaning of the agreement will be enforced.” Murphy v. Duquesne
-8-
J-A09034-17
University Of The Holy Ghost, 565 Pa. 571, 591, 777 A.2d 418, 430
(2001). “The meaning of an unambiguous written instrument presents a
question of law for resolution by the court.” Id. In that context,
Because contract interpretation is a question of law, this
Court is not bound by the trial court’s interpretation. Our
standard of review over questions of law is de novo and to
the extent necessary, the scope of our review is plenary as
the appellate court may review the entire record in making
its decision. However, we are bound by the trial court’s
credibility determinations.
Kraisinger v. Kraisinger, 928 A.2d 333, 339 (Pa.Super. 2007) (quoting
Stamerro v. Stamerro, 889 A.2d 1251, 1257-58 (Pa.Super. 2005) (some
internal citations omitted).
Instantly, the parties executed the 2009 Support Agreement at issue
on March 25, 2009. The Domestic Relations Office entered a Final Order on
June 18, 2009, based on the terms of the parties’ 2009 Support Agreement.
The parties entered into the 2009 Support Agreement with the intent that
the court would subsequently enter a support order, but the entry of the
support order did not automatically render the 2009 Support Agreement
unenforceable. See Sams, supra. Husband’s reliance on Reif, supra is
misplaced. Nothing in Reif holds that a parent’s obligation to pay for post-
secondary education expenses is enforceable only if that obligation arises
from a “post-nuptial” agreement which settles all of the parties’ claims. See
id. Instead, Reif stands only for the general proposition that a parent’s
duty to support post-secondary education expenses can arise from a
-9-
J-A09034-17
contract, even if it does not arise under law. Id. at 173 (stating: “Since
Father’s support obligation in this case is defined in the post-nuptial
agreement, his duty is contractual, not legal”). Therefore, even if the
parties’ 2009 Support Agreement is not a “post-nuptial” agreement, as
defined by Husband, which settled all of the parties’ claims, it is nonetheless
a contract obligation sufficient to require Husband to provide B.P. with post-
secondary education support. Id. Similarly, we reject Husband’s suggestion
that the 2009 Support Agreement was just a prologue to a support order,
where neither the law nor the record validates that interpretation. Thus, the
post-secondary education support provision in the parties’ 2009 Support
Agreement prevails, and Husband’s first issue merits no relief.
In his second issue, Husband avers that even if the 2009 Support
Agreement is enforceable, it did not require Husband to pay post-secondary
education tuition for B.P. Husband maintains the 2009 Support Agreement
only obligated him to deposit into B.P.’s account funds for B.P.’s exclusive
use and benefit, not necessarily for B.P.’s tuition. Husband posits the 2009
Support Agreement required him to pay post-secondary education expenses
of $767.00 per month, or $9,204.00 for the year B.P. attended college.
Husband concludes the trial court erred when it directed Husband to
reimburse Wife for missed tuition payments in the amount of $14,254.00.
We agree in part.
Instantly, regarding Husband’s obligation to pay for B.P.’s post-
- 10 -
J-A09034-17
secondary education expenses, the trial court reasoned as follows:
[Husband] entered into [the 2009 Support Agreement]
with Wife to pay post-secondary education expenses for
[B.P.]. The [Support] Agreement is clear and
unambiguous, and therefore, the [c]ourt need not look
beyond the written agreement. [Husband] has breached
his obligation to pay the support for post-secondary
education to [B.P.], as bargained for by [Husband] and
[Wife]. [Wife] has the ability to enforce the obligation,
and recover the monies she paid for [B.P.]’s post-
secondary education….
(Trial Court Opinion, filed August 19, 2016, at 3-4) (internal citations
omitted). As to the amount Husband must reimburse Wife, the court
determined Husband owed Wife $14,254.00, the amount Wife paid toward
B.P.’s tuition. The record supports the court’s rationale concerning:
Husband’s obligation to provide B.P. support for post-secondary education
expenses; Husband’s breach of that obligation; and Wife’s right to enforce
the 2009 Support Agreement and recover from Husband some of what she
paid toward B.P.’s tuition. The record, however, does not support the
court’s determination of the amount Husband must reimburse Wife under
the 2009 Support Agreement.
The 2009 Support Agreement provides in part:
4. Post-Secondary Education. As each child reaches
age eighteen (18) or graduates from high school,
whichever event occurs last for each child, the amount of
child support payable to [Wife] shall be reduced by 1/3
(one-third) or $767.00 per month. As each child reaches
age eighteen (18) or graduates from high school,
[Husband] shall deposit the amount of $767.00 into an
account with the appropriate child’s name on the account
for the child’s sole and exclusive use and benefit.
- 11 -
J-A09034-17
(Agreement for Order of Support, dated 3/25/09, at 2). The record indicates
B.P. incurred college tuition expenses for the 2011-2012 academic year,
beginning in July 2011. The 2009 Support Agreement obligated Husband to
contribute $767.00 per month for each month B.P. was engaged in post-
secondary education. Thus, the maximum amount Husband had to
contribute toward B.P.’s college expenses was $9,204.00 ($767.00 per
month for 12 months). Therefore, the trial court erred when it ordered
Husband to reimburse Wife in the amount of $14,254.00. See Kraisinger,
supra.
Additionally, Wife alleged in her enforcement petition that Husband
failed to make any payments to B.P. until June 2012, but Wife’s testimony
indicated Husband might have made some payments to B.P. during the
2011-2012 academic year. (See N.T. Hearing, 4/25/16, at 20.) The record,
however, does not disclose what amount, if any, Husband paid toward B.P.’s
post-secondary expenses in 2011-2012. Accordingly, we vacate the trial
court’s order to the extent it directs Husband to reimburse Wife in the
amount of $14,254.00 for B.P.’s tuition, and remand for the court to fix the
amount Husband actually failed to contribute to B.P.’s post-secondary
education expenses in 2011-2012, not to exceed $9,204.00.
In his third issue, Husband argues that, when the parties executed the
Second Addendum to their PSA, they mistakenly believed they could
separate the deferred compensation plan into two distinct funds. Husband
- 12 -
J-A09034-17
avers the parties’ interests could be divided instead only upon distribution to
Husband. Husband insists the parties suffered a mutual mistake as to how
the deferred compensation funds could be allocated and distributed. Under
contract principles, Husband contends the court could rescind or reform the
Second Addendum to the PSA. Husband points out that the Second
Addendum to the PSA did not expressly state how the parties would bear the
tax consequences which arose upon distribution of Husband’s deferred
compensation plan. Husband claims he paid all of the taxes on the entire
distribution, including Wife’s share. Husband complains the court erred in
attributing Wife’s share of the taxes at the lowest tax rate of 10%, for a
single person under the IRS tax tables of 2015, when her actual tax rate
should be higher and could be as high as 28%. Husband submits the parties
presented no evidence regarding Wife’s federal income tax rate. Instead,
Husband avers the court allowed Wife to take 65% of Husband’s deferred
compensation distribution with only a limited tax liability of 10%, which is
inequitable, erroneous, and represents a windfall to Wife. Husband
concludes we should vacate and remand for further proceedings to calculate
the proper tax liability for each party. For the following reasons, we cannot
agree.
As a preliminary matter, we must decide if Husband properly
preserved his third issue for appellate review. See Tucker v. R.M. Tours,
939 A.2d 343, 346 (Pa.Super. 2007), aff’d, 602 Pa. 147, 977 A.2d 1170
- 13 -
J-A09034-17
(2009) (stating appellate court may raise issue of waiver sua sponte). The
appellant has the responsibility to provide a complete record for review.
Conner v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 820 A.2d 1266, 1273 (Pa.Super. 2003).
This Court is limited to considering only those materials which have been
certified in the record on appeal. Pa.R.A.P. 1921. See also Everett Cash
Mut. Ins. Co. v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 804 A.2d 31, 34 (Pa.Super. 2002)
(stating: “[T]hose documents which are not part of the ‘official record’
forwarded to this Court are considered to be non-existent”). In other words,
if a claim depends on materials which are not in the certified record, the
claim is waived. Stewart v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas, 806 A.2d 34, 37
n.3 (Pa.Super. 2002) (stating: “The failure of the appellant to ensure that
the original record certified for appeal contains sufficient information to
conduct a proper review may constitute a waiver of the issues sought to be
examined”). “When the appellant has failed to preserve issues for appeal,
the issues are waived, and the…court’s order is more properly ‘affirmed.’”
In re K.L.S., 594 Pa. 194, 197 n.3, 934 A.2d 1244, 1246 n.3 (2007) (noting
when appellant has waived issues on appeal, appellate court should affirm
trial court’s decision, not quash appeal).
Instantly, Husband failed to ensure we had a complete record
necessary for appellate review. To begin, the certified record does not
contain the following: the PSA; the Addendum to the PSA; the divorce
decree; the Second Addendum to the PSA; the order incorporating the
- 14 -
J-A09034-17
Second Addendum to the PSA into the divorce decree; statements reflecting
Husband’s contributions to the deferred compensation plan; Husband’s 2015
tax returns; and Wife’s 2015 tax returns. Absent these documents, we
cannot conduct meaningful appellate review of Husband’s tax issue which, as
presented, remains theoretical and speculative.1 If these documents were
not even offered to the trial court, (which would explain why they are also
missing from the record), how can we fault the court’s discretionary decision
to assess Wife with a tax liability of 10%, applied only to the growth portion
of the deferred compensation plan? Therefore, we deem Husband’s third
issue waived. See Conner, supra; Stewart, supra.
Order affirmed in part and reversed in part; case remanded with
specific instructions. Jurisdiction is relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/20/2017
____________________________________________
1
See, e.g., Simeone v. Simeone, 525 Pa. 392, 400, 581 A.2d 162, 165
(1990) (stating: “Contracting parties are normally bound by their
agreements, without regard to whether the terms thereof were read and
fully understood and irrespective of whether the agreements embodied
reasonable or good bargains”).
- 15 -