RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2568-15T1
M.P.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
E.S.,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________________
Submitted September 12, 2017 – Decided September 21, 2017
Before Judges Fisher and Sumners.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Bergen
County, Docket No. FD-02-1125-10.
E.S., appellant pro se.
M.P., respondent pro se.
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff M.P. (Margaret, a fictitious name) filed this
family court action to resolve custody, visitation, and child-
support disputes concerning the parties' only child, who is now
seven years old. Eventually, the proceedings resulted in an order
that called for defendant E.S. (Edward, also a fictitious name)
and the child to engage in reunification therapy. The propriety
of that order, however, is not before us.
Instead, Edward's appeal concerns a later ruling – the denial
of his family court motion which sought relief from an earlier
protective order that limited the use and dissemination of Bergen
Family Center's custody-parenting-time report. Edward requested
that the protective order's limitations on the report's use and
dissemination be expanded so he might consider whether to pursue
his grievances with the Bergen Family Center and some of its
representatives in another forum.1 In urging the motion's denial,
Margaret asserted the child's and her right to keep confidential
those things they expressed to the evaluators.
The motion judge denied relief for reasons expressed in a
cogent written opinion appended to the December 22, 2015 order
under review. The judge correctly observed and relied upon the
fact that the report's purpose was limited and that the parties
openly engaged in the evaluation process with the understanding
that the report would remain confidential and be used or
1
In his trial court motion, Edward only identified his intention
to bring the matter to the attention of "the appropriate governing
agency, including the New Jersey State Board of Social Workers and
the New Jersey State Board of Psychological Examiners." In his
brief here, Edward evinces an intent "to sue the psychologist who
wrote a negative report against [him] and committed unethical
behavior, and to sue the Director of Bergen Family Center."
2 A-2568-15T1
disseminated only insofar as it aided the court's disposition of
the parties' custody and parenting-time disputes. Consequently,
the judge found unwarranted Edward's request for relief from the
protective order.
In appealing the December 22, 2015 order, Edward argues:
I. TRIAL COURT EGREGIOUSLY ABUSED DISCRETION
BY DENYING [HIS] APPLICATION TO LIFT
PROTECTIVE ORDER ON BERGEN FAMILY CENTER WHICH
VIOLATED [HIS] RIGHTS, AND IN WHICH [HE] WANTS
TO PURSUE CLAIMS AGAINST BERGEN FAMILY CENTER
FOR UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR, SINCE THERE IS NO
COMPELLING STATE INTEREST, THERE IS NO
INVASION OF PRIVACY, NO HARASSMENT, TO IMPOSE
SUCH PROTECTIVE ORDER IN THIS MATTER FOR GOOD
CAUSE. R. 5:3-2(b) & R. 5:3-3(g).
II. TRIAL JUDGE ABUSED DISCRETION BY NOT
INCLUDING RELEVANT FINDINGS OF FACT SUPPORTED
BY RELEVANT CONCLUSIONS OF LAW PURSUANT TO R.
1:7-4 IN DENYING [EDWARD'S] APPLICATION TO
LIFT PROTECTIVE ORDER.
III. TRIAL JUDGE ABUSED DISCRETION ON GROUNDS
THAT COURT ISSUED PROTECTIVE ORDER ON AN
EVALUATION BASED ON A FALSE ALLEGATION OF
ABUSE MADE BY [MARGARET] AND/OR [HER]
ATTORNEY, AND SAID FALSE ALLEGATION IS A "BAD
FAITH" ACT, ENTITLING [MARGARET] TO NO RELIEF.
We find insufficient merit in Edward's Points II and III to warrant
further discussion in a written opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E),
adding only as to Point II that, despite its brevity, the motion
judge's written decision more than adequately complied with Rule
1:7-4(a).
3 A-2568-15T1
We also reject Edward's Point I because we view his request
for relief from the protective order to be premature. Only until
the commencement of an administrative proceeding or civil lawsuit
will it be appropriate to entertain such a request; the present
controversy hasn't yet ripened into something justiciable.
If, at some future time, Edward should timely commence a
lawsuit or an administrative proceeding that addresses the alleged
wrongful or unethical conduct, he may seek relief from the
protective order in that particular forum. Only in the context of
such a proceeding will the relationship between the alleged
misconduct or wrongdoing and the report itself become sufficiently
crystalized to allow that forum to consider whether it would be
appropriate to permit some additional use or dissemination of the
report. Whatever forum is called upon to resolve an application
for relief from the protective order should, of course, give full
consideration to the reasons for confidentiality in the first
place, as well as Margaret's and the child's competing interests.
In summary, we conclude that Edward prematurely sought relief
from the protective order and, for that reason alone, we affirm
the order under review without opining on the other reasons
asserted by Margaret in seeking a rejection of Edward's arguments.
Affirmed.
4 A-2568-15T1