Slip Op. 17-128
UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
IRWIN INDUSTRIAL TOOL COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
Before: Claire R. Kelly, Judge
v.
Court No. 14-00285
UNITED STATES,
Defendant.
OPINION
[Granting Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denying Defendant’s motion for
reconsideration.]
Dated: September 21, 2017
Frances Pierson Hadfield, Crowell & Moring LLP, of New York, NY, and Daniel J.
Cannistra, Crowell & Moring LLP, of Washington, DC, for plaintiff.
Guy R. Eddon, Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, International Trade Field
Office, of New York, NY, for defendant. With him on the brief were Chad A. Readler,
Acting Assistant Attorney General, and Amy M. Rubin, Assistant Director. Of counsel on
the brief was Michael W. Heydrich, Office of Assistant Chief Counsel, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection.
Kelly, Judge: Before the court are Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and
Defendant’s motion for reconsideration of the court’s prior opinion, Irwin Indus. Tool Co.
v. United States, 41 CIT __, 222 F. Supp. 3d 1210 (2017) (“Irwin Indus. Tool Co.”). See
Pl.’s Mot. Summary J., May 8, 2017, ECF No. 53; Def.’s Resp. Opp’n Pl.’s Mot. Summary
J. and Def.’s Mot. Reconsideration, Jun. 7, 2017, ECF No. 57. For the reasons that follow,
Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted and Defendant’s motion for
reconsideration is denied.
Court No. 14-00285 Page 2
BACKGROUND
The court assumes familiarity with the facts of this case as discussed in the
previous opinion, see Irwin Indus. Tool Co., 41 CIT at __, 222 F. Supp. 3d at 1213–15,
and here recounts the facts relevant to the court’s review of the pending motions for
summary judgment and reconsideration.
This case involves the classification of five styles of Plaintiff’s hand tools. 1 Plaintiff,
Irwin Industrial Tools, is the importer of record of the subject hand tools in the 46 subject
entries. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3, 7, May 4, 2015, ECF No. 13. United States Customs and
Border Protection (“CBP” or “Customs”) liquidated the subject entries under subheading
8204.12.00, Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (2013) (“HTSUS”), 2 a
category covering “hand-operated spanners and wrenches . . . : Adjustable, and parts
thereof.” Id. Plaintiff timely filed 14 administrative protests challenging CBP’s
classification of the subject merchandise. Id. at ¶ 9. CBP denied Plaintiff’s protests. Id.
1
The five styles of hand tools are “large jaw locking pliers,” “curved jaw locking pliers,” “long nose
locking pliers with wire cutter,” “curved jaw locking pliers with wire cutter,” and “straight jaw locking
pliers.” Pl.’s 56.3 Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶¶ 33, 42, 52, 57, 65, 79, May 8, 2017,
ECF No. 53 (“Pl.’s 56.3 Statement”); Def.’s Resp. Pl.’s Rule 56.3 Statements of Undisputed
Material Facts ¶¶ 33, 42, 52, 57, 65, 79, Jun. 7, 2017, ECF No. 57 (“Def.’s 56.3 Statement”).
Although the Amended Complaint indicated that only four styles of locking hand tools were at
issue in this case, not including “straight jaw locking pliers,” Am. Compl. ¶ 17, May 4, 2015, ECF
No. 13, the chart of the models of subject merchandise that Plaintiff provided in its motion for
summary judgment includes five styles of locking pliers, including straight jaw locking pliers. See
Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶¶ 33, 65. Defendant admitted the contents of this chart as undisputed fact.
Def.’s Resp. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶¶ 33, 65. Accordingly, it is evident to the court that five styles
of locking hand tools are at issue in this case, and that the subject merchandise includes certain
models of Plaintiff’s “straight jaw locking pliers.”
2
All references to the HTSUS refer to the 2013 edition, the most recent version of the HTSUS in
effect at the time of Plaintiff’s entries of subject merchandise, which entered between November
11, 2012 and June 11, 2013. See Am. Compl. ¶ 7. The 2012 edition of the HTSUS, in effect at
the beginning of the period during which Plaintiff entered the subject merchandise, is the same in
relevant part to the 2013 edition.
Court No. 14-00285 Page 3
Plaintiff commenced this action to challenge the classification of various hand
tools, referred to by Plaintiff collectively as “locking pliers.” See Am. Compl. Defendant
moved for summary judgment, requesting the court to hold that the subject hand tools are
properly classified as adjustable wrenches within subheading 8204.12.00, HTSUS. Def.’s
Mot. Summ. J., Jan. 6, 2017, ECF No. 43; Mem. Supp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. 10–27, Jan.
6, 2017, ECF No. 43. Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that the subject hand tools
are not classifiable as adjustable wrenches within subheading 8204.12, HTSUS, but
rather as pliers within subheading 8203.20, HTSUS, or as vises or clamps within
subheading 8205.70, HTSUS. See Pl.’s Resp. Opp’n Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., Feb. 6, 2017,
ECF No. 44.
The court denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Irwin Indus. Tool
Co., 41 CIT at __, 222 F. Supp. 3d at 1229. The court construed the relevant tariff terms
and determined as a matter of law that the term “wrench,” as it appears in subheading
8204.12.00, HTSUS, refers to “a hand tool that has a head with jaws or sockets having
surfaces adapted to snugly or exactly fit and engage the head of a fastener (such as a
bolt-head or nut) and a frame with a singular handle with which to leverage hand pressure
to turn the fastener without damaging the fastener’s head.” Id., 41 CIT at __, 222 F. Supp.
3d at 1221. The court further determined as a matter of law that the term “pliers,” as it
appears in subheading 8203.20.6030, HTSUS, refers to “a versatile hand tool with two
handles and two jaws that are flat or serrated and are on a pivot, which must be squeezed
together to enable the tool to grasp an object.” Id., 41 CIT at __, 222 F. Supp. 3d at 1221–
22, 1224. Finally, the court determined as a matter of law that the term “vises, clamps
Court No. 14-00285 Page 4
and the like,” as it appears in subheading 8205.70.0060, HTSUS, refers to “tools with a
frame and two opposing jaws, at least one of which is adjustable, which are tightened
together with a screw, lever, or thumbnut, to press firmly on an object and thereby hold
the object securely in place while the user is working.” Id., 41 CIT at __, 222 F. Supp. 3d
at 1225–26.
The court determined that Defendant had failed to establish as a matter of law that
the subject merchandise possesses the qualities of a wrench and does not possess the
qualities of pliers or vises or clamps. Id., 41 CIT at __, 222 F. Supp. 3d at 1213–15,
1226–29. The court further determined, upon inspecting the physical samples of the
subject merchandise entered into evidence by Plaintiff, that the subject hand tools may fit
within the relevant tariff subheadings for pliers or for vises or clamps, but noted that “[t]he
court need not reach that issue as all that is before the court is the Defendant’s motion,
which is denied.” Id., 41 CIT at __, 222 F. Supp. 3d at 1228–29 (internal citations omitted).
On May 8, 2017, Plaintiff moved for summary judgment, arguing that undisputed
facts support classification of the subject merchandise as a matter of law as pliers within
subheading 8203.20.6030, HTSUS. See Mem. L. Supp. Pl.’s Mot. Summary J. 14–27,
May 8, 2017, ECF No. 53 (“Pl.’s Br.”). Defendant opposed Plaintiff’s motion and moved
the court to reconsider the conclusions reached in Irwin Indus. Tool Co. See Mem. L.
Opp’n Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. and Supp. Def.’s Mot. Reconsideration, Jun. 7, 2017, ECF No.
57 (“Def.’s Br.”). Defendant argues that the court should reconsider the definitions of
pliers and wrenches established in Irwin Indus. Tool Co. Id. at 5–6. Although Defendant
“concedes that the tools at issue meet the Court’s definition” of pliers, it argues that the
Court No. 14-00285 Page 5
court’s definition of pliers is “overly inclusive,” contending that the court erred because
“the Court’s definition of ‘pliers’ explicitly includes locking pliers.” 3 Id. Defendant also
argues that the court’s definition of wrenches “necessarily excludes certain tools that are
known and marketed as wrenches.” Id. at 6. Additionally, Defendant requests the court
to reconsider the relevancy of “use” to the meaning of the tariff terms at issue. 4 Id. at 7.
3
The court stated that pliers’ “jaws may, or may not, lock together to hold the object while using
the tool.” Irwin Indus. Tool Co., 41 CIT at __, 222 F. Supp. 3d at 1224.
4
In Irwin Indus. Tool Co., the court relied upon the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
precedent to find that
[a]n eo nomine tariff term may implicate use in one of two ways: 1) a tariff term
written as an eo nomine provision may nonetheless be controlled by use and, if it
is, the court should declare it as such, [GRK Canada, Ltd. v. United States, 761
F.3d 1354, 1359, n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“GRK II”)]; see also StoreWALL, LLC, 644
F.3d at 1365–67 (Dyk, J., concurring); or 2) a tariff term may imply that the use of
the object is of “paramount importance” to its identity such that articles with the
requisite physical characteristics will nonetheless be excluded if they are in fact
designed and intended for another use. GRK II, 761 F.3d at 1358 (citing United
States v. Quon Quon Co., 46 CCPA 70, 73 (1959)).
Here, although a wrench may indeed be designed for a use, nothing about
the tariff term for “wrenches” suggests a type of use such that the court should
declare the tariff term one controlled by use. GRK II, 761 F.3d at 1358–59 (quoting
Carl Zeiss, Inc., 195 F.3d at 1379). The word “use” or similar words such as “for”
or “of a kind” do not appear in the tariff term. See Clarendon Mktg., Inc. v. United
States, 144 F.3d 1464, 1467 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Furthermore nothing in the term
itself, including the Section and Chapter Notes or the Explanatory Notes, indicates
that, as a matter of law, the use of articles classified under the provision would
outweigh the importance of the physical characteristics of the item. See Primal
Lite, Inc. v. United States, 182 F.3d 1362, 1363–64 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see GRK II,
761 F.3d at 1359, n.2 (citing StoreWALL, 644 F.3d at 1365–67 (Dyk, J.,
concurring)). Nothing indicates that an object must be considered a wrench if it
can be used to wrench or turn a fastener. Therefore, as a matter of law, the tariff
term for “wrenches” is an eo nomine term, not one controlled by use.
This court must also consider whether use is of “paramount importance.”
See GRK II, 761 F.3d at 1358–59 (quoting Quon Quon Co., 46 CCPA at 73). To
say that use is of paramount importance is not to say that a product has a use. All
products have uses. . . . Although design and intended use is implicated in all tariff
terms, it will only be of paramount importance when, as a factual matter, a product
(footnote continued)
Court No. 14-00285 Page 6
JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The court has “exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced to contest the
denial of a protest, in whole or in part, under [Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1515 (2012)],” 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (2012), and reviews such actions de novo. 28
U.S.C. § 2640(a)(1) (2012).
The court will grant summary judgment when “the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” USCIT R. 56(a). In order to raise a genuine issue of material fact, it is insufficient
for a party to rest upon mere allegations or denials, but rather that party must point to
sufficient supporting evidence for the claimed factual dispute to require resolution of the
differing versions of the truth at trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–
49 (1986); Processed Plastic Co. v. United States, 473 F.3d 1164, 1170 (Fed. Cir. 2006);
Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Machinery, Ltd., 731 F.2d 831, 835–36
(Fed. Cir. 1984).
UNDISPUTED FACTS
Plaintiff is the importer of record of the subject merchandise in the 46 entries at
issue in this case, which entered between November 11, 2012 and June 11, 2013. Pl.’s
that satisfies the physical requirements of a tariff term is in fact designed and
intended for another use. See id. A wrench is designed for turning fasteners
without damaging the fastener’s head. A wrench must possess certain physical
characteristics (a frame with a singular handle; a head with jaws or sockets having
surfaces that snugly or exactly fit and engage the head of a fastener) that are a
function of the intended use of a wrench to exert pressure on the fastener to turn
it without damaging the fastener’s head.
Id.
Court No. 14-00285 Page 7
56.3 Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶¶ 2, 5, May 8, 2017, ECF No. 53 (“Pl.’s
56.3 Statement”); Def.’s Resp. Pl.’s Rule 56.3 Statements of Undisputed Material Facts
¶¶ 2, 5, Jun. 7, 2017, ECF No. 57 (“Def.’s Resp. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement”). CBP liquidated
all subject entries under subheading 8204.12.00, HTSUS. 5 Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶ 6;
Def.’s Resp. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶ 6. Plaintiff timely filed 14 protests challenging the
classification of the subject merchandise. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶ 7; Def.’s Resp. Pl.’s 56.3
Statement ¶ 7. Plaintiff paid all liquidated duties, charges, exactions, and fees on the
entries at issue prior to the commencement of this action. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶ 8; Def.’s
Resp. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶ 8.
The subject merchandise consists of the following styles of locking hand tools:
“large jaw locking pliers,” “curved jaw locking pliers,” “long nose locking pliers with wire
cutter,” “curved jaw locking pliers with wire cutter,” and “straight jaw locking pliers.” Pl.’s
56.3 Statement ¶ 33; Def.’s Resp. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶ 33. The tools at issue are hand
tools referred to, inter alia, as “locking pliers.” 6 Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶ 3; Def.’s Resp. Pl.’s
56.3 Statement ¶ 3. Each of the styles of hand tools at issue have two handles and two
serrated jaws on a fulcrum. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶ 13; Def.’s Resp. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement
¶ 13. The subject hand tools possess “compound leverage systems that lock jaws and
hold various shapes and sizes of work.” Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶ 34; Def.’s Resp. Pl.’s 56.3
5
Subheading 8204.12.00, HTSUS, covers “hand-operated spanners and wrenches . . . :
Adjustable, and parts thereof.” Subheading 8204.12.00, HTSUS.
6
Defendant “admits that ‘locking pliers’ is one of numerous descriptions applied to the subject
merchandise but denies any inference that the merchandise is classifiable as pliers under
subheading 8203.20.60.” Def.’s Resp. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶ 3.
Court No. 14-00285 Page 8
Statement ¶ 34. The subject merchandise is capable of gripping, holding, clamping,
and/or pulling. 7 Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶ 35; Def.’s Resp. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶ 35.
DISCUSSION
I. Motion to Reconsider
Defendant moves the court to reconsider its opinion. 8 See Def.’s Br. 3–7, 14–15.
Specifically, Defendant requests that the court reconsider its definition of “pliers,” which
7
In its response to Plaintiff’s 56.3 Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, Defendant:
Admits that Lucus Aff. ¶ 27 supports the contention that plaintiff’s locking pliers
may accomplish one or more of the following operations or uses – gripping,
holding, clamping, pulling or cutting. Admits that Lucus Aff. ¶ 28 supports that
contention that plaintiff’s long nose locking pliers may accomplish one or more of
the following operations or uses – gripping, holding, and clamping. Otherwise
denies that the cited evidence supports this statement.
Def.’s Resp. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶ 35. Defendant does not put the facts of the statement in
dispute. In order to raise a genuine issue of material fact, it is insufficient for a party to rest upon
mere allegations or denials, but rather that party must point to sufficient supporting evidence for
the claimed factual dispute to require resolution of the differing versions of the truth at trial.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248–49; Processed Plastic Co., 473 at 1170; Barmag Barmer
Maschinenfabrik AG, 731 F.2d at 835–36; see also Int'l Cargo & Sur. Ins. Co. v. United States,
15 CIT 541, 542–43, 779 F. Supp. 174, 176 (1991) (the party opposing summary judgment must
“designate ‘specific facts’” to indicate the existence of a genuine issue for trial, quoting Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986), quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). Each statement in an
opponent’s response controverting any statement of material fact in the movant’s 56.3 statement
must be followed by citation to evidence which would be admissible. USCIT R. 56.3(c).
Defendant has not provided any support for its partial denial of Plaintiff’s statement, and thus has
not put the facts of the statement in dispute to raise a genuine issue of material fact.
8
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s motion is improper because Rule 54(b) requires finality and
there has not been a final judgment in this case. See Pl.’s Reply Mot. Summary J. 9–10, July 12,
2017, ECF No. 59 (“Pl.’s Reply”). It appears that Plaintiff makes this argument focusing on the
first part of Rule 54(b), which discusses final judgments. See USCIT R. 54(b). However, the
second part of Rule 54(b) provides that “any order or other decision, however designated, that
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties . . .
may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the
parties’ rights and liabilities.” USCIT R. 54(b). A court retains the power to revisit and revise
interlocutory orders pursuant to Rule 54(b). See Cobell v. Norton, 355 F. Supp. 2d 531, 539
(footnote continued)
Court No. 14-00285 Page 9
Defendant alleges is “overly inclusive,” its definition of “wrenches,” which Defendant
argues is exclusive of certain products marketed as wrenches, and its determination that
the tariff term covering wrenches is an eo nomine provision. See id. at 6. Defendant
argues that the court possesses the authority to reconsider the opinion, as USCIT Rule
54(b) authorizes the court to “reconsider any of its interlocutory opinions and orders
issued in advance of a final judgment.” Id. at 4; see USCIT R. 54(b). For the reasons
that follow, the motion to reconsider is denied.
Pursuant to USCIT Rule 54(b), “any order or other decision . . . that adjudicates
fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties . . . may
be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all
the parties’ rights and liabilities.” USCIT R. 54(b). USCIT Rule 54(b) mirrors Rule 54(b)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 54(b). Generally, a court
has the discretion to grant a motion to reconsider brought under Rule 54(b) “as justice
requires,” meaning when the court determines that “reconsideration is necessary under
the relevant circumstances.” Cobell v. Norton, 355 F. Supp. 2d 531, 539 (D.D.C. 2005).
Factors a court may weigh when contemplating reconsideration include whether there
has been a controlling or significant change in the law or whether the court previously
“patently” misunderstood the parties, decided issues beyond those presented, or failed to
consider controlling decisions or data. See, e.g., In re Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG
(D.D.C. 2005). Further, Plaintiff argues that Defendant is not entitled to reconsideration pursuant
to Rule 59(e) because the motion was filed more than 30 days after the order was issued. Pl.’s
Reply 11; see USCIT R. 59(e). However, Defendant does not move for reconsideration pursuant
to USCIT Rule 59(e), and there is no time limit for a motion pursuant to USCIT Rule 54(b). See
USCIT R. 54(b).
Court No. 14-00285 Page 10
Litigation, 791 F. Supp. 2d 175, 182–83 (D.D.C. 2011); Singh v. George Washington
Univ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 99, 101 (D.D.C. 2005). The movant carries the burden of proving
that “some harm, legal or at least tangible,” would accompany a denial of the motion.
Cobell, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 540.
Under this standard, Defendant’s motion must be denied. Defendant has not
demonstrated circumstances requiring reconsideration, offering no reasons for
reconsideration beyond its disagreement with the court’s opinion. See Def.’s Br. 6.
Defendant has not asserted that there has been a controlling or significant change in the
law or that the court previously misunderstood the parties, decided issues beyond those
presented, or failed to consider controlling decisions or data. See Singh, 383 F. Supp.
2d at 101. Instead, Defendant seeks to remake the same arguments already made and
considered by the court, on the basis of the same record and under the same law. See
In re Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG Litigation, 791 F. Supp. 2d at 182–83.
Disagreement with the court’s determinations, without more, is not sufficient cause for
reconsideration. See Singh, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 101. Defendant also has not asserted
or proven that some harm or injustice would result if the order is not reconsidered. See
Cobell, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 540. Accordingly, Defendant has not demonstrated that justice
requires reconsideration under these circumstances. Therefore, Defendant’s motion for
reconsideration is denied.
II. Summary Judgment Motion
Plaintiff argues that undisputed facts demonstrate that the subject merchandise
meets the definition of pliers and requests the court to find that the subject merchandise
Court No. 14-00285 Page 11
is, as a matter of law, properly classifiable within 8203.20.6030, HTSUS. 9 See Pl.’s Br.
14–27. The court agrees with the Plaintiff.
Tariff classification is determined according to the General Rules of Interpretation
(“GRI”), and, if applicable, the Additional U.S. Rules of Interpretation, of the HTSUS.
BenQ Am. Corp. v. United States, 646 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The court must
determine the correct classification of subject merchandise, notwithstanding the
classifications proffered by the parties. Jarvis Clark Co. v. United States, 733 F.2d 873,
878 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Determining the correct classification of merchandise involves two
steps. First, the court determines the proper meaning of any applicable tariff provisions,
which is a question of law. See Link Snacks, Inc. v. United States, 742 F.3d 962, 965
(Fed. Cir. 2014). Second, the court determines whether the subject merchandise properly
falls within the scope of the tariff provisions, which is a question of fact. Id. Where no
genuine “dispute as to the nature of the merchandise [exists], then the two-step
classification analysis collapses entirely into a question of law.” Id. at 965–66 (citation
omitted).
To determine the proper meaning of applicable tariff provisions, the court first
construes the language of the headings in question “and any relative section or chapter
9
Subheading 8203.20.6030, HTSUS, covers:
Files, rasps, pliers (including cutting pliers), pincers, tweezers, metal cutting
shears, pipe cutters, bolt cutters, perforating punches and similar hand tools, and
base metal parts thereof: Pliers (including cutting pliers), pincers, tweezers and
similar tools, and parts thereof: Other: Other (except parts): Pliers.
Subheading 8203.20.6030, HTSUS.
Court No. 14-00285 Page 12
notes.” GRI 1. The terms of the HTSUS “are construed according to their common and
commercial meanings, which are presumed to be the same.” Carl Zeiss, Inc. v. United
States, 195 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing Simod Am. Corp. v. United States,
872 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1989)); see BenQ Am. Corp., 646 F.3d at 1376. The court
defines HTSUS tariff terms relying upon its own understanding of the terms and may
“consult lexicographic and scientific authorities, dictionaries, and other reliable
information sources.” Carl Zeiss, Inc., 195 F.3d at 1379. The court may also be aided
by the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System's Explanatory Notes. 10
StoreWALL, LLC v. United States, 644 F.3d 1358, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2011). In determining
the common and commercial meaning of an eo nomine tariff term, the court should also
consider if the tariff term nonetheless implicates the use of the article. See GRK Canada,
Ltd. v. United States, 761 F.3d 1354, 1358–59 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
In Irwin Indus. Tool Co., the court discerned the common and commercial meaning
of the tariff terms at issue, aided by dictionary definitions and industry standards. See
Irwin Indus. Tool Co., 41 CIT at __, 222 F. Supp. 3d at 1216–26. The court discerned
that the common and commercial meaning of the term “wrench” as it appears in
subheading 8204.12.00, HTSUS, refers to “a hand tool that has a head with jaws or
sockets having surfaces adapted to snugly or exactly fit and engage the head of a fastener
(such as a bolt-head or nut) and a frame with a singular handle with which to leverage
10
The Explanatory Notes, while not controlling, provide interpretive guidance. E.T. Horn Co. v.
United States, 367 F.3d 1326, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2004). All citations to the Explanatory Notes are
to the 2013 version, the most recently promulgated edition at the time of the entries of the subject
merchandise. The 2012 version of the Explanatory Notes is the same in relevant part.
Court No. 14-00285 Page 13
hand pressure to turn the fastener without damaging the fastener’s head.” Id., 41 CIT at
__, 222 F. Supp. 3d at 1221. The court further found that the common and commercial
meaning of the term “pliers” as it appears in subheading 8203.20.6030, HTSUS, refers to
“a versatile hand tool with two handles and two jaws that are flat or serrated and are on
a pivot, which must be squeezed together to enable the tool to grasp an object.” Id., 41
CIT at __, 222 F. Supp. 3d at 1221–22, 1224. The court discerned that the common and
commercial meaning of the term “vises, clamps and the like” refers to “tools with a frame
and two opposing jaws, at least one of which is adjustable, which are tightened together
with a screw, lever, or thumbnut, to press firmly on an object and thereby hold the object
securely in place while the user is working.” Id., 41 CIT at __, 222 F. Supp. 3d at 1225–
26.
Undisputed facts demonstrate that each of Plaintiff’s hand tools at issue in this
case are classifiable as a matter of law as pliers within subheading 8203.20.6030,
HTSUS. Specifically, undisputed facts demonstrate that the products: 1) are versatile
hand tools, 2) have two handles, and 3) have two jaws, that are flat or serrated and are
on a pivot, which can be squeezed together to enable the tools to grasp an object.
Curved jaw locking pliers
Undisputed facts demonstrate that Plaintiff’s curved jaw locking pliers meet the
requirements of the definition of pliers. The curved jaw locking pliers is a versatile hand
tool, capable of gripping, holding, clamping, pulling or cutting. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶ 35;
Def.’s Resp. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶ 35. Curved jaw locking pliers have two handles and
two serrated jaws on a fulcrum. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶ 13; Def.’s Resp. Pl.’s 56.3
Court No. 14-00285 Page 14
Statement ¶ 13. The jaws close, and may or may not be locked, together to enable the
tool to grasp an object. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶¶ 34, 39; Def.’s Resp. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement
¶¶ 34, 39.
Curved jaw locking pliers with wire cutter
Undisputed facts demonstrate that Plaintiff’s curved jaw locking pliers with wire
cutter meet the requirements of the definition of pliers. The curved jaw locking pliers with
wire cutter is a versatile hand tool, capable of gripping, holding, clamping, pulling or
cutting. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶ 35; Def.’s Resp. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶ 35. Curved jaw
locking pliers with wire cutter have two handles and two serrated jaws on a fulcrum. Pl.’s
56.3 Statement ¶ 13; Def.’s Resp. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶ 13. The jaws close, and may
or may not be locked, together to enable the tool to grasp an object. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement
¶¶ 34, 39; Def.’s Resp. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶¶ 34, 39.
Long nose locking pliers with wire cutter
Undisputed facts demonstrate that Plaintiff’s long nose locking pliers with wire
cutter meet the requirements of the definition of pliers. The long nose locking pliers is a
versatile hand tool, capable of gripping, holding, clamping, pulling or cutting. Pl.’s 56.3
Statement ¶ 35; Def.’s Resp. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶ 35. Long nose locking pliers have
two handles and two serrated jaws on a fulcrum. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶¶ 48–49; Def.’s
Resp. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶¶ 48–49. The jaws close, and may or may not be locked,
together to enable the tool to grasp an object. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶¶ 34, 39; Def.’s
Resp. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶¶ 34, 39.
Court No. 14-00285 Page 15
Large jaw locking pliers
Undisputed facts demonstrate that Plaintiff’s large jaw locking pliers meet the
requirements of the definition of pliers. The large jaw locking pliers is a versatile hand
tool, capable of gripping, holding, clamping, or pulling. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶ 35; Def.’s
Resp. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶ 35. Large jaw locking pliers have two handles and two
serrated jaws on a fulcrum. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶ 13; Def.’s Resp. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement
¶ 13. The jaws close, and may or may not be locked, together to enable the tool to grasp
an object. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶¶ 34, 39; Def.’s Resp. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶¶ 34, 39.
Straight jaw locking pliers
Undisputed facts demonstrate that Plaintiff’s straight jaw locking pliers meet the
requirements of the definition of pliers. The straight jaw locking pliers is a versatile hand
tool, capable of gripping, holding, clamping, or pulling. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶ 35; Def.’s
Resp. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶ 35. Straight jaw locking pliers have two handles and two
serrated jaws on a fulcrum. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶ 13; Def.’s Resp. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement
¶ 13. The jaws close, and may or may not be locked, together to enable the tool to grasp
an object. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶¶ 34, 39; Def.’s Resp. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶¶ 34, 39.
Finally, none of the models at issue is classifiable as “vises, clamps and the like.”
In Irwin Indus. Tool Co., the court discerned that the common and commercial meaning
of the tariff term “vises, clamps and the like” refers to tools with a frame and two opposing
jaws, at least one of which is adjustable, which are tightened together with a screw, lever,
or thumbnut, to press firmly on an object and thereby hold the object securely in place
while the user is working. See Irwin Indus. Tool Co., 41 CIT at __, 222 F. Supp. 3d at
Court No. 14-00285 Page 16
1224–26. To support a determination that the subject merchandise is classifiable within
the subheading for “vises, clamps and the like,” undisputed facts would have to establish
that: 1) the subject tools have a frame and two opposing jaws, at least one of which is
adjustable, 2) the tools’ jaws are tightened together with a screw, lever, or thumbnut, and
3) the tools’ jaws press firmly on an object and thereby hold the object securely in place
while the user is working. Facts have not been established to support a determination
that the subject merchandise meets the requirements of this definition; to the contrary,
undisputed facts demonstrate that the subject merchandise does not possess the
characteristics required to meet this definition. At a minimum, although the subject
merchandise has two jaws, Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶ 13; Def.’s Resp. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement
¶ 13, it has not been established that the jaws are opposing or that at least one of the
jaws is adjustable. To the contrary, it has been established that the hand tools are
composed of “two metal levers joined at a fulcrum or pivot that result in two handles on
one side of the fulcrum and two shorter toothed jaws on the other side of the fulcrum,”
Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶ 13; Def.’s Resp. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶ 13; this connection at the
center of the lever suggests that the jaws at the end of the lever are not directly opposed.
Additionally, it has not been established that the jaws are tightened together using a
screw, lever, or thumbnut. Instead, it has been established that the jaws are connected
by a pivot at the center, Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶ 13; Def.’s Resp. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶ 13,
and that the tools function by gripping the handles together to open the jaws and locking
the jaws on the object using the tools’ “compound leverage system.” Pl.’s 56.3 Statement
¶ 34; Def.’s Resp. Pl.’s 56.3 Statement ¶ 34. Therefore, the tools at issue in this case do
Court No. 14-00285 Page 17
not possess the characteristics required to meet the definition of vises or clamps. The
subject merchandise is properly classifiable as “pliers” within subheading 8203.20.6030,
HTSUS. See Jarvis Clark Co., 733 F.2d at 878.
In opposing summary judgment with respect to each of these models, Defendant
concedes the subject merchandise possesses the physical characteristics of “pliers,”
pursuant to the court’s definition, Def.’s Br. 5, but attempts to resurrect arguments the
court has already considered and rejected. Defendant argues that the court erred by not
excluding from the definition of “pliers” tools that lock. 11 Id. at 5–6. Defendant again
invokes Assoc. Consumers v. United States, 5 CIT 148, 565 F. Supp. 1044 (1983), to
argue that the subject hand tools should be classified as wrenches. 12 Id. at 8–12.
11
Although Defendant argues that the court’s definition for wrenches is too narrow, and the court’s
definition for pliers is too broad, Defendant provides just one dictionary definition for each tool,
defining a wrench as “a hand tool that usu[ally] consists of a bar or lever with adapted or adjustable
jaws, lugs, or sockets either at the ends or between the ends and is used for holding, twisting, or
turning a bolt, nut, screwhead, pipe or other object,” id. at 6 (quoting Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary 2639 (Philip Babcock Gove, Ph.D. and Merriam-Webster Editorial Staff
eds., 1981)), and defining pliers as “small pincers [usually] with long roughened jaws for holding
small objects or for bending and cutting wire.” Id. at 5–6 (quoting Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary 1741 (Philip Babcock Gove, Ph.D. and Merriam-Webster Editorial Staff
eds., 1981)). Neither of these definitions undercut the court’s holding in Irwin Indus. Tool Co.
Further, Defendant fails to address any of the multiple sources relied upon in the court’s prior
opinion Irwin Indus. Tool Co., 41 CIT at __, 222 F. Supp. 3d at 1217–24. Defendant also invokes
one of the colloquial names of several products not before the court (“locking wrenches,” “Swedish
pattern pipe wrenches,” and “oil filter wrenches”) to support its claim that the court’s definition of
wrenches is too narrow. Def.’s Br. 6–7, 12–13. The classification of these products is not before
the court. Moreover, to the extent that Defendant references these products as anecdotal support
for its desired definition, it appears that Defendant has selected just one of several names for
these products, as Plaintiff points out that Swedish pattern pipe wrenches and oil filter wrenches
are also sold as pliers. See Pl.’s Reply Mot. Summary J. 38–39, July 12, 2017, ECF No. 59.
12
As the court explained in Irwin Indus. Tool Co., Assoc. Consumers interprets the prior statute,
the TSUS, which was replaced by the HTSUS and “the Court’s prior determination of a common
meaning of a term, based on an interpretation of a tariff provision under the TSUS, is not
(footnote continued)
Court No. 14-00285 Page 18
Defendant also once again argues that the use of the subject merchandise supports its
classification as wrenches. 13 Id. at 6–8. The court’s prior opinion properly considered
whether use was implicated in the meaning of the tariff term at issue as well as in the
meaning of the other tariff terms raised by the Plaintiff. See Irwin Indus. Tool Co., 41 CIT
at __, 222 F. Supp. 3d at 1219–21, 1223–1224, 1225–26 (discussing GRK Canada, Ltd.,
761 F.3d at 1358–59), 1221–24 (discerning the meaning of the tariff term “pliers”), 1227
(discussing Assoc. Consumers v. United States, 5 CIT 148, 565 F. Supp. 1044). As
discussed above, absent sufficient cause, which Defendant has not shown, the court will
not revisit arguments made on the basis of the same law and facts that it has already
controlling as to a determination under the HTSUS.” Irwin Indus. Tool Co., 41 CIT at __, 222 F.
Supp. 3d at 1227. Although Defendant argues that the court’s definitions in Irwin Indus. Tool Co.
will “create an apparent conflict with the Federal Circuit” because Associated Consumers, 5 CIT
148, 565 F. Supp. 1044, was affirmed by the Federal Circuit, Def.’s Br. 12, Associated Consumers
is non-precedential and non-binding, as it was affirmed without opinion and interpreted a different
statute. See Associated Consumers, 727 F.2d 1120 (Fed. Cir. 1983). CBP is not being asked to
deviate from Associated Consumers; the case does not apply here.
13
Defendant states that
[i]n Quon Quon, the court found that the “woven rattan imports were not baskets
because they were designed for use as patio furniture.” Similarly, here, while the
locking hand tools at issue may superficially resemble pliers in that they have jaws
and two handles, they were designed and intended for use as wrenches.
Def.’s Br. 7 (citing Irwin Indus. Tool Co., 41 CIT at __, 222 F. Supp. 3d at 1220). However, if a
product does not possess the physical characteristics of a wrench, it does not become a wrench
under Quon Quon simply because someone might use it as a wrench. As stated in the court’s
prior opinion,
[a] wrench is designed for turning fasteners without damaging the fastener's head.
A wrench must possess certain physical characteristics (a frame with a singular
handle; a head with jaws or sockets having surfaces that snugly or exactly fit and
engage the head of a fastener) that are a function of the intended use of a wrench
to exert pressure on the fastener to turn it without damaging the fastener's head.
Irwin Indus. Tool Co., 41 CIT at __, 222 F. Supp. 3d at 1221. Moreover, Defendant has not raised
any facts to support its assertion that the subject tools, which possess the physical characteristics
of pliers, are not in fact used as pliers. See Def.’s Resp. 7.
Court No. 14-00285 Page 19
considered. See In re Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG Litigation, 791 F. Supp. 2d at
182–83.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the subject merchandise at issue in this case is properly
classifiable as “pliers” within subheading 8203.20.6030, HTSUS. Therefore, Plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment is granted and Defendant’s motion for reconsideration is
denied. Judgment will enter accordingly.
/s/ Claire R. Kelly
Claire R. Kelly, Judge
Dated:September 21, 2017
New York, New York
Irwin Industrial Tool Co. v. United States
Court: United States Court of International Trade
Date filed: 2017-09-21
Citations: 2017 CIT 128, 269 F. Supp. 3d 1294
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