FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
SEP 26 2017
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JAMES ALLEN HYDRICK; et al., No. 16-55830
Plaintiffs-Appellants, D.C. No. 2:98-cv-07167-TJH-AS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
PETER WILSON; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Terry J. Hatter, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 1, 2017**
Pasadena, California
Before: W. FLETCHER and IKUTA, Circuit Judges, and BARKER,*** District
Judge.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Sarah Evans Barker, United States District Judge for
the District of Southern Indiana, sitting by designation.
Plaintiffs, a class of sexually violent predators (“SVPs”) challenging their
conditions of confinement at California state hospitals, appeal from a district court
order dismissing their complaint. On appeal, plaintiffs argue that their claims are
not moot and that the district court abused its discretion in denying their motions to
amend and to transfer venue. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we
affirm.
An order dismissing a complaint as moot is reviewed de novo. Native Vill. of
Noatak v. Blatchford, 38 F.3d 1505, 1509 (9th Cir. 1994). Orders denying motions
to amend complaints, to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), and to extend
the period for effecting service of process are all reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 603 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2010); Mann v. Am.
Airlines, 324 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003); Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211
F.3d 495, 498 (9th Cir. 2000).
Plaintiffs’ claims are moot. A claim for injunctive relief is moot if plaintiffs
“cannot reasonably be expected to benefit from prospective relief ordered against
the defendant.” Bayer v. Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc., 861 F.3d 853, 864 (9th Cir.
2017). Where plaintiffs seek to enjoin unlawful practices at a facility in which they
are confined, transfer to a different facility typically moots their claims. See Nelson
v. Heiss, 271 F.3d 891, 897 (9th Cir. 2001); Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368
2
(9th Cir. 1995). Here, plaintiffs’ transfer from the Atascadero facility to the
Coalinga facility mooted their claims against the defendants who were engaged in
prison operations at Atascadero.
Transfer does not moot challenges to system-wide practices, but plaintiffs
can only bring system-wide claims if a defendant in the action can provide the
relief sought. See Walker v. Beard, 789 F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th Cir. 2015). Assuming
arguendo that plaintiffs raised system-wide claims, the district court lacked
personal jurisdiction over the defendants who could provide system-wide relief due
to plaintiffs’ failure to timely serve those defendants. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). The
district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant an extension of time
for service, since plaintiffs sought the extension fourteen years after filing their
Second Amendment Complaint and did not show good cause. See Efaw v.
Williams, 473 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007).
Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ motion to
amend their complaint. District courts must consider any evidence of bad faith,
undue delay, prejudice, or futility when deciding a motion to amend. Royal Ins. Co.
of Am. v. Sw. Marine, 194 F.3d 1009, 1016-17 (9th Cir. 1999). The district court
correctly determined that the proposed amendment would be futile. The complaint
as amended would not revive plaintiffs’ system-wide claims, since the second and
3
third complaints listed the same system-wide policymakers, neither of whom had
been timely served. The facility-specific claims, brought against officials at
Coalinga State Hospital and based on conduct alleged to have occurred there,
would be dismissed for improper venue even if the complaint were amended. See
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). The prejudice to defendants–who would suddenly find
themselves faced, in effect, with an entirely new lawsuit following the proposed
amendment–further supports the district court’s denial, as does the lengthy and
unexplained delay in seeking amendment. The district court did not err in denying
the motion to amend.
Nor did the district court err in denying plaintiffs’ motion to transfer venue.
Judges considering 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) motions make individualized, case-by-case
determinations as to whether transfer is appropriate. Jones v. GNC Franchising,
Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 498 (9th Cir. 2000). Here, the claims set forth in plaintiffs’
Second Amended Complaint would remain moot even if the motion were granted.
Under these circumstances, the denial was not erroneous.
AFFIRMED.
4
FILED
Hydrick v. Wilson, 16-55830
SEP 26 2017
Ikuta, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment:
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
I agree with the majority but on different grounds. Even if read in the light
most favorable to the appellants, the Second Amended Complaint (SAC) does not
raise systemwide claims; rather, the SAC focuses on defendants, facts, and
administrative directives pertaining specifically to Atascadero. Accordingly, I
would hold that the appellants’ facility-specific claims became moot when the
appellants were transferred to another facility. See Nelson v. Heiss, 271 F.3d 891,
897 (9th Cir. 2001). Appellants argue two exceptions to the mootness doctrine
apply, but these claims were not raised below and are waived on appeal. See Cold
Mountain v. Garber, 375 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 2004), as amended (Aug. 9,
2004).
I would also hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying appellants’ leave to amend the SAC. The proposed Third Amended
Complaint is effectively a new complaint against a new group of defendants,
brought eleven years after the SAC and nine years after the State began relocating
sexually violent predators to Coalinga. Leave to amend may be denied when, as
here, there is evidence of undue delay and undue prejudice to the defendants. See
Acri v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 781 F.2d 1393, 1398 (9th
Cir. 1986); Jackson v. Bank of Haw., 902 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1990).