J-S50035-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: R.I.L., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF J.B., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 732 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered January 20, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0001289-2016,
CP-51-DP-0002627-2014
IN THE INTEREST OF: R.J.G.-L., JR., : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
A MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF J.B., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 736 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered January 20, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0001291-2016,
CP-51-DP-0002628-2014
J-S50035-17
IN THE INTEREST OF: Q.R.B., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: J.B., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 737 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered January 20, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0001294-2016,
CP-51-DP-0002626-2014
IN THE INTEREST OF: Z.L., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF J.B., MOTHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 738 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered January 20, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0001295-2016,
CP-51-DP-0002630-2014
IN THE INTEREST OF: Z.J.L, A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: J.B., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 739 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered January 20, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0001305-2016,
CP-51-DP-0002629-2014
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BEFORE: PANELLA, MOULTON, and RANSOM, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY RANSOM, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 27, 2017
J.B. (“Mother”) appeals from the decrees and orders dated and
entered on January 20, 2017, granting the petitions filed by the Philadelphia
Department of Human Services (“DHS” or the “Agency”), seeking to
involuntarily terminate her parental rights to her six children, R.I.L. (“Child
1”), a female born in December of 20091; R.J.G.-L., Jr. (“Child 3”), a male
born in April of 2011; Q.R.B. (“Child 4”), a female born in January of 2009;
Z.L. (“Child 5”), a female born in October of 2012; and Z.J.L. (“Child 6”),
Child 5’s twin brother,2 (collectively, the “Children”), pursuant to the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), and change
the Children’s permanency goals to adoption.3 We affirm.
____________________________________________
1
DHS also sought the termination Mother’s parental rights to Q.J.B.-L.
(“Child 2”) a female born in June of 2006, and a goal change to adoption for
Child 2. Child 2 was reunified with her father, G.G., on October 20, 2016,
however, so DHS withdrew its petitions at the evidentiary hearing on
January 20, 2017. N.T., 1/20/17, at 4-11. Mother inadvertently filed an
appeal from the termination of Mother’s parental rights to Child 2 and the
goal change for that child, which was assigned our Docket No. 735 EDA
2017. On April 3, 2017, Mother filed a praecipe to discontinue the appeal,
and this Court discontinued the appeal on that same date. A c c o r d i n g l y ,
t his Memorandum will discuss Mother’s appeals with regard to her other five
children.
2
See N.T., 1/20/17, at 93-94.
3
On January 20, 2017, the trial court terminated the parental rights of the
father of Child 4, A.F.B. At the hearing on January 20, 2017, R.J.G.-L., III
a/k/a R.L., Sr. a/k/a R.L., consented to the voluntary termination of his
parental rights to his children, Child 1, 3, 5, and 6. N.T., 1/20/17, at 105.
In separate decrees entered on January 20, 2017, the trial court terminated
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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The trial court set forth the factual background and procedural history
of this appeal as follows.
The family in this case became known to DHS on October 21,
2014, when DHS received a General Protective Services (“GPS”)
report alleging that Mother was not appropriately supervising
Children. The report alleged that Mother left Children
unattended home alone for over an hour; the [m]other admitted
to leaving' the children home alone at 3 pm that day while she
went to pick up paperwork; and that [C]hildren were seen
banging on a window in the home, so Philadelphia police were
called. The report also alleged that the police arrested Mother
upon her return home, and Children were taken to home of
Paternal Grandmother (“PGM”). On October 22, 2014, Mother
was arrested and charged with five counts of endangering the
welfare of children where a parent, guardian, or other
custodian commits the offense and recklessly endangers
another person. Mother pleaded guilty. The Honorable Patrick
Stack issued a stay-away order against Mother as to Child 1,
Child 3, Child 4, Child 5, and Child 6. Also on October 22,
2014, DHS visited PGM’s home and learned of her grandparent
status to Child 1, Child 3, Child 5, and Child 6. DHS
implemented a Safety Plan to ensure that Children were safe,
with their needs being met; and PGM agreed to notify DHS if
Mother attempted to remove Children from the home. PGM
indicated that Children were unkempt when they came to her;
that Child 4 had been wearing underwear belonging to maternal
grandmother; that Child 3 had not been wearing any
underwear; and that Child 5 and Child 6 were not wearing
diapers. PGM expressed interest in kinship care services[,]
and DHS completed clearances for her and her daughter,
paternal aunt. DHS also learned that Child 2 had been residing
with maternal great-aunt (“MGA”') at the time of the incident.
A stay-away order had been issued against Mother as to
Children. On November 6, 2014, DHS visited Child 2 in MGA’s
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
the parental rights of any unknown father of the Children. On March 10,
2017, the trial court confirmed the consent of R.J.G.-L. to the termination of
his parental rights. Neither A.F.B. nor R.J.G.-L., nor any unknown father has
filed an appeal, nor is any such individual a party to the present appeal.
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home[,] .and Child 2 appeared well and her needs were being
met. MGA requested temporary legal custody (“TLC”), after
which DHS conducted clearances of MGA and approved her as
caregiver for Child [2]. On November 6, 2014, DHS also
obtained an Order for Protective Custody (“OPC”) for Children.
On November 7, 2014, a shelter care hearing was held during
which the OPC was lifted and the temporary commitment to
DHS was ordered to stand. Mother was referred to the
Clinical Evaluation Unit (“CEU”) for forthwith drug and alcohol
screens and dual diagnosis assessment. On November 25,
2014, Children were adjudicated dependent and fully
committed to DHS. The [c]ourt ordered that a Single Case Plan
(“SCP”) meeting be held within twenty days and Mother was
referred to the Achieving Reunification Center (“ARC”) program
for all appropriate services. Mother was also referred to the
CEU for assessment, a forthwith drug screen, and dual
diagnosis to include alcohol. The [ c ] ourt also ordered a Parent
Locator Search (“PLS”) to be conducted as to fathers for Child 2
and Child 4. Mother tested positive at the CEU for
tetrahydrocannabinol (“THC”). On February 17, 2015, this
matter was continued. On March 5, 2015, the Community
Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) Asociación Puertorriqueños en Marcha
([“]APM[”]) created an SCP for the family. Mother’s objectives
were to attend ARC, to attend visitation with Children, and to
comply with [ c ] ourt orders and attend the CEU. On April 14,
2015, a permanency review hearing was held[,] at which the
[ c ] ourt ordered that Children remain committed to DHS. The
[ c ] ourt noted that Mother was substantially compliant with
the permanency plan. Mother was again referred to the CEU
for a forthwith drug screen, three random screens, and dual
diagnosis assessment and monitoring. Mother tested positive
for barbiturates at the CEU. On July 8, 2015, this matter was
continued. At the permanency hearing on September 30, 2015,
the Master noted that Mother was fully compliant with the
permanency plan. Mother was ordered to comply with scheduled
CEU assessments and to comply with all SCP objectives and
recommendations. At a permanency hearing on November 24,
2015, the [ c ] ourt found that Mother was moderately
compliant with the permanency plan and ordered that[,] if
Mother’s drug screens are negative, she may have weekly
unsupervised visits at the agency. The [ c ] ourt also ordered
that if Mother had any trace of illegal substances, she would
only be allowed supervised weekly visits in the community. In
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addition, if Mother did not comply with her intake at Guadenzia,
visits would also change from unsupervised to supervised. At a
different permanency review hearing on February 23, 2016, the
[c]ourt found that Mother was substantially compliant with the
permanency plan and Mother was referred to the CEU for an
assessment, dual diagnosis, and a forthwith drug screen to
include five random drug screens and to ARC for job training.
On May 27, 2016, this matter was continued. Mother was
referred to the CEU for a forthwith drug screen, dual diagnosis
and three random drug screens before the next court date. On
June 6, 2016, APM revised Mother’s SCP to add appropriate
housing. At a permanency hearing on August 30, 2016, Mother
was referred to the CEU for a dual diagnosis and forthwith screen
with three random drug screens and Mother was ordered to
engage in a domestic violence program and to be referred to
ARC for services. Mother was also to have weekly supervised
visits with Children in the community. On October 27, 2016,
APM revised Mother’s SCP objectives which added that Mother
was to attend weekly supervised visits with Children; to
continue to comply with mental health, behavioral health, and
medical needs; to locate appropriate housing; to comply with
CEU orders; to make her whereabouts known to DHS; to
comply with CUA services and interventions, to attend ARC; and
to comply with alcohol treatment at Guadenzia. At different
permanency hearings, the trial court always found reasonable
efforts on the part of DHS. Mother has been moderately
compliant with the permanency plan and has not successfully
completed her parental objectives.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/24/17, at 2-4 (citations omitted).
On December 28, 2016, DHS filed petitions to involuntarily terminate
Mother’s parental rights to the Children and to change their permanency
goal to adoption. On January 20, 2017, the trial court held an evidentiary
hearing on the petitions for termination of parental rights and goal change.
Following argument, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to
Children, except Child 2, under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8),
and (b), and changed the goal to adoption.
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On January 23, 2017, the trial court granted Attorney Hayburn’s
motion to vacate his appointment as counsel for Mother, and appointed
Attorney James Martin to represent Mother. On February 17, 2017, Mother
filed a notice of appeal from the decrees entered on January 20, 2017
terminating her parental rights to the Children, and the permanency review
orders entered on January 20, 2017, changing the permanency goal for the
Children to adoption, along with concise statements of errors complained of
on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). This Court, acting
sua sponte, consolidated Mother’s appeals on April 11, 2017.
In her brief on appeal, Mother raises two issues, as follows:
1. Whether the Trial Court erred by terminating the parental
rights of Appellant, Mother, under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511
subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5) and § 2511(a)(8)?
2. Whether the Trial Court erred by finding, under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
2511(b), that termination of Appellant's parental rights best
serves the Children’s developmental, physical and emotional
needs and welfare?
Mother’s Brief, at 5.4
____________________________________________
4
Mother has waived any challenge to the change in the Children’s
permanency goal to adoption under 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351 by failing to raise the
issue in her concise statement and Statement of Questions Involved in her
brief. See Krebs v. United Refining Company of Pennsylvania, 893
A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super. 2006) (holding that an appellant waives issues
that are not raised in both his concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal and the Statement of Questions Involved in his brief on appeal).
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Mother argues that DHS presented insufficient evidence for the trial
court to terminate her parental rights under section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5),
(8), and (b). Mother’s Brief, at 8.
In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we
adhere to the following standard:
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion
standard when considering a trial court’s determination of a
petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency
cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to
accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the
trial court if they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T.,
608 Pa. 9, [19], 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual
findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if
the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion.
Id.; R.I.S., [614 Pa. 275, 284,] 36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011)
(plurality opinion)]. As has been often stated, an abuse of
discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court
might have reached a different conclusion. Id.; see also
Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc., 613 Pa. 371[,
455], 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011); Christianson v. Ely, [575 Pa.
647, 654-655], 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a
decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon
demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality,
prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.
As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for
applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these
cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are
not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold
record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during
the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other
hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., [608 Pa. at
28-30], 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts could
support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency
and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to
second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility
determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial
judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the
record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an
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error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of
Atencio, [539 Pa. 161, 165,] 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-827 (Pa. 2012).
The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental
rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).
Moreover, we have explained, “[t]he standard of clear and convincing
evidence is defined as testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and
convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction,
without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id. (quoting In
re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)).
This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the
termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section
2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en
banc). We will focus on section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide, in
relevant part, as follows:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
***
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be
without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the
conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
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***
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511.
The Supreme Court set forth our inquiry under section 2511(a)(2) as
follows.
As stated above, § 2511(a)(2) provides statutory grounds
for termination of parental rights where it is demonstrated by
clear and convincing evidence that “[t]he repeated and
continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has
caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and
the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.” . . .
This Court has addressed incapacity sufficient for
termination under § 2511(a)(2):
A decision to terminate parental rights, never to be made
lightly or without a sense of compassion for the parent,
can seldom be more difficult than when termination is
based upon parental incapacity. The legislature,
however, in enacting the 1970 Adoption Act, concluded
that a parent who is incapable of performing parental
duties is just as parentally unfit as one who refuses to
perform the duties.
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In re Adoption of J.J., [511 Pa. 599, 605,] 515 A.2d 883, 891
(Pa. 1986) (quoting In re: William L., [477 Pa. 322, 345,] 383
A.2d 1228, 1239 (Pa. 1978).
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 827.
This Court has long recognized that a parent is required to make
diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental
responsibilities. In re A.L.D. 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002). A
parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness
regarding the necessity or availability of services, may properly be rejected
as untimely or disingenuous. Id. at 340.
With regard to section 2511(a)(2), Mother argues that the trial court
erred when it concluded that DHS presented clear and convincing evidence
that she is presently incapable of providing proper care for the Children.
Mother’s Brief, at 12. Mother asserts that she has remedied the conditions
that brought the Children into care and that she is capable of parenting them
at this time. Id. at 13.
The trial court provided the following analysis:
The trial court also terminated Mother’s parental rights under 23
Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(2). This section of the Adoption Act
includes, as a ground for involuntary termination of parental
rights, the repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or
refusal of the parent that causes the child to be without essential
parental care, control, or subsistence necessary for his physical
or mental well-being; and the conditions and causes of the
incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent. This ground is not limited to affirmative
misconduct. It may include acts of refusal to perform parental
duties, but focuses more specifically on the needs of the child.
Adoption of C.A.W., 683 A.2d 911, 914 (Pa. Super. 1996).
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The five Children were taken into DHS custody because Mother
was unable to provide essential parental care: she was not
properly supervising the Children and admitted to leaving them
home alone for over an hour; she was then arrested and charged
with endangering the welfare of children, to which she pleaded
guilty; she had substance abuse problems; she did not have
adequate housing for her and the Children; she was
unemployed; and the Children were unkempt, Child 4 was
wearing maternal grandmother’s underwear and Children 5 and
6 were not wearing diapers when removed from Mother’s home.
Mother did not successfully complete her SCP objectives. Mother
has not completed a drug and alcohol program and only re-
enrolled with Gaudenzia in October 2016 after having been
discharged for noncompliance during the summer of 2016. (N.T.
1/20/17, pgs. 17, 19-20, 36, 42). Mother relapsed twice during
the life of the case, testing positive for benzos, opiates, and
more recently cocaine. (N.T. 1/20/17, pgs. 17-18, 20, 92-93).
Mother admitted that she suffers from depression, and also
testified that she was not engaged in mental health treatment
even though she was ordered to do so multiple times by the
court. (N.T. 1/20/17, pgs. 54, 86-87). Mother did obtain
employment. (N.T. 1/20/17, pgs. 39-40). Mother, however,
testified that her new employment prevented her from appearing
at recent court ordered CEU drug screens. (N.T. 1/20/17, pgs.
36-37, 51). Mother completed housing at ARC. Mother does not
have appropriate housing, and has not made any efforts to
obtain appropriate housing at any point during the life of the
case. (N.T. 1/20/17, pg. 22, 36). Mother resides in a bedroom
within a family friend’s house. (N.T. 1/20/17, pgs. 22). Mother
also completed parenting classes in March 2016. (N.T. 1/20/17,
pgs. 38-40). However, the case manager testified that Mother
cannot protect or properly care for the Children at this time.
(N.T. 1/20/17, pg. 68). Mother’s visits with the Children have
been sporadic; Mother attends approximately two out of four
visits in a month. (N.T. 1/20/17, pgs. 23, [42]). Mother had
unsupervised visits at one time, but visits were changed to
supervised when she tested positive on a CEU drug screen.
(N.T. 1/20/17, pg. 22). Mother has failed to take affirmative
steps to place herself in a position to parent the five Children.
The five Children need permanency, which Mother cannot
provide. Therefore, DHS met its burden under 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§2511(a)(2)[,] and termination of Mother’s parental rights under
this section was proper.
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Trial Court Opinion, 3/24/17, at 10-11.
After a careful review of the record, we find that termination of
Mother’s parental rights to the Children was warranted pursuant to section
2511(a)(2), as Mother clearly lacks parental capacity, and the evidence
showed that she will be unable to remedy that situation within a reasonable
period of time, if ever. As there is competent evidence in the record that
supports the trial court’s findings and credibility determinations, we would
find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in terminating Mother’s parental
rights to the Children under section 2511(a)(2). In re Adoption of S.P., 47
A.3d at 826-27.
Next, this Court has stated that the focus in terminating parental
rights under section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the child pursuant
to section 2511(b). See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008
(Pa. Super 2008) (en banc). In reviewing the evidence in support of
termination under section 2511(b), our Supreme Court recently stated as
follows.
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are
met, a court “shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare
of the child have been properly interpreted to include
“[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability.” In
re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M.,
[533 Pa. 115, 121, 620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court
held that the determination of the child’s “needs and welfare”
requires consideration of the emotional bonds between the
parent and child. The “utmost attention” should be paid to
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discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing the
parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791.
In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).
With regard to its analysis of the Children’s best interests and the
effect of severing any bond between the Children and Mother, the trial court
stated the following:
The court heard testimony that none of the Children would suffer
permanent or irreparable harm if Mother’s parental rights were
terminated. (N.T. 1/20/17, pgs. 29-30, 66-67). The Children
have been in care for twenty-six months and need permanency.
Child 4 is currently placed with MGA, who has cared for Child 4
since coming into care. Child 4 is bonded with MGA and sees her
as the primary parental figure. (N.T. 1/20/17, pgs. 28-29). The
court heard testimony that adoption of Child 4 by MGA is in Child
4’s best interests. (N.T. 1/20/17, pg. 29). Children 1, 3, 5, and
6 are currently placed with the paternal aunt who has cared for
them for the last two years. (N.T. 1/20/17, pg. 64). These
Children consider the paternal aunt as their mother and
caregiver. (N.T. 1/20/17, pg. 64). The court heard testimony
that adoption would be in the best interests of these Children.
(N.T. 1/20/17, pgs. 67-68). The conditions that led to all five
Children’s removal from Mother’s care continue to exist as
Mother failed to complete all her SCP objectives. The testimony
of the DHS witness was unwavering and credible. Mother is not
ready or able, as of the date of the termination trial, to parent
the Children. (N.T. 1/20/17, pg. 68). The record contains clear
and convincing evidence that termination was in the best
interests of the Children[.]
Trial Court Opinion, 3/24/17, at 14-15.
After a careful review of the record, we find that termination of
Mother’s parental rights to the Children was warranted pursuant to section
2511(b), as the evidence showed that the Children’s developmental, physical
and emotional needs and welfare will best be met by the termination of
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Mother’s parental rights. Further, the evidence showed that there is no bond
between Mother and the Children that is worth preserving.
When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use
expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as
well. Additionally, section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal
citations omitted). Although it is often wise to have a bonding evaluation
and make it part of the certified record, “[t]here are some instances . . .
where direct observation of the interaction between the parent and the child
is not necessary and may even be detrimental to the child.” In re K.Z.S.,
946 A.2d 753, 762 (Pa. Super. 2008).
A parent’s abuse and neglect are likewise a relevant part of this
analysis:
concluding a child has a beneficial bond with a parent simply
because the child harbors affection for the parent is not only
dangerous, it is logically unsound. If a child’s feelings were the
dispositive factor in the bonding analysis, the analysis would be
reduced to an exercise in semantics as it is the rare child who,
after being subject to neglect and abuse, is able to sift through
the emotional wreckage and completely disavow a parent . . .
Nor are we of the opinion that the biological connection between
[the parent] and the children is sufficient in of itself, or when
considered in connection with a child’s feeling toward a parent,
to establish a de facto beneficial bond exists. The psychological
aspect of parenthood is more important in terms of the
development of the child and [his or her] mental and emotional
health than the coincidence of biological or natural parenthood.
In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). Thus, the court may emphasize the safety needs
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of the child. See In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 763 (affirming involuntary
termination of parental rights, despite existence of some bond, where
placement with mother would be contrary to child’s best interests). “[A]
parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of . . . her child
is converted, upon the failure to fulfill . . . her parental duties, to the child’s
right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential in a
permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856
(Pa. Super. 2004) (internal citations omitted). It is well-settled that “we will
not toll the well-being and permanency of [a child] indefinitely.” In re
Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1007 (citing In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726,
732 (Pa. Super. 2008) (noting that a child’s life “simply cannot be put on
hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the
responsibilities of parenting.”)).
As there is competent evidence in the record that supports the trial
court’s findings and credibility determinations, we would find no abuse of the
trial court’s discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children
under section 2511(b). In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27. We,
therefore, affirm the trial court’s decrees terminating Mother’s parental
rights to the Children, and the orders changing the Children’s permanency
goal to adoption.
Decrees and orders affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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J-S50035-17
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/27/2017
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In the Interest of: R.I.L., a Minor
Combined Opinion