RENDERED: SEPTEM~ER·28, 2017
TO BE PUBLISHED
~uprttttt visions and we think t.hat it means only that the provision of
such suit does not revoke other remedies. It most assuredly
cannot be read to mean that the Act as a whole does not supplant
formerly available federal common-law actions but only that the
particular section authorizing citizen suits does ·not do so.
451 U.S. 304, 328-29 (1981) (footnote omitted). We acknowledge· that, in that
case, the Supreme Court was int~rpreting the citizen-suit provi'sion of the
. ..
Clean Water Act,_not the Cleari AitAct. In doing so, however, the Court
specifically cited the "virtually identical" citizen-suit provision appearing in the
Clean Air Act.
. .
We adopt the Supreme Court's reasoning interpreting the Clean Water'
. Act as applying with equal force to the Clean Air Act.. First, Congress's creation
of the citizep. suit as a statutory remedy.does not lirnit rem~dies otherwis~
available. Nothing in the section authorizing cit~zen suits, 42_ U.S.C. § 7604,
revokes other available remedie~, including injunctive relief linked to state tort
law. In other words, Congress did hot intend cjtizen suits to be an exclusive·
remedy. Therefore, the Clean Air_ Act does not preempt state injunctive relief.
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Howeve~, ev~n though injunctive re~ief is not preempted by the A~t, it is
still unavailable in this case. The Act and Kentucky regulations provide for
citizen input in the permitting process. The permit is issued only after careful
balancing of the economic and environmental ii:npact. So long as compani':!s ·
operate within the bounds of their permits conGerning air pollutants (which is
.not contested in the case at bar), injunctive relief for an alleged. nuisance is not
an appropriate remedy.3 Here, by seeking an injunction demanding a ·
particular pollution-control technology, Miller asked the trial court to second-
guess the reasonableness of a decision the Act undeniably entrusted to Metro.
District and the
. .
EPA. As. previously noted, the
. Act directs the EPA
Administrator to "consider all of the economic~ public l).ealth, and
environmental benefits of efforts to comply with such standard," 42 U.S.C. §
7612(b), as well as. "the effects of such standard on employment, productivity,
.
cost of living, economic growth, and the overall economy," 42 U.S.C. § 7612(c).
Jn making the decision to issue the permits, dtizens have the opporhinity for
input.. The agency made a specific determination which balanced the risks to ·
the environment with the economic impact of any pollution-control measures.
For th~ trial court to issue the injunction Miller seeks ~ould impose. higher
standards than the Clean Air Act requires~
Furthermore; while the Act's states' rights savings clause, 42 U.S.C. §
7416, specifically reserves to·the states the power to adopt and enforce more
a Our holding is limited to injunctive relief in nuisance cases where the
regulatory authority (in this case, both federal and state) has issued a permit after
·carefully balancing environmental and economic fac.tors. Issuing an injunction to .
a
require different technology to prevent nuisance is markedly different from issuing
a.ii injunction for other purposes, such as when public health or the ertv.i.ronment are
endangered or there is a violation of law. ·
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stringent standards than those established by the Act, the Kentucky General
. Assembly has restricted the Energy .and Environment Cabinet from exercising·
that saved power. Specifically, ·the Gen,eral Assembly has charged the Energy
and Environment Cabinet with adopting clean air regulations that are "no more.
stringent than federal requirements." KRS 224.10-100(26). Even though the·
Act would allow Kentucky to enact more stringt'.nt standards under this savings
. clause, Kentucky statute~ expressly prohibit the Cabinet. from issuing more
stringent regulations. Id. We find the fact that Kentucky has explicitly chosen
. ' .
not to. allow its regulatory body to utilize more stringent regulations persuasive
as to the Legislature's intent. ·
We hold that the requested injunction, which would require
implementation of a particular type of pollution-control technology not required
under Brown-Forman's and Heaven Hill's permits, conflicts with the Act by
invading EPA and Metro District's "regulatory turf," id., iri a manner tl'lat the
Kentucky General Assembly has spoken against. Therefore, an injunction to
control an alleged nuisance when the state has already specifically balanced
those factors is inappropriate;· To conclude otherwise would produce the
untenable situation· identified in American Electric Power where ·courts act on
limited records on an ad-hoc basis in an arena where they do not possess the
necessary scientific, economic and technological expertise. We cannot have the
circuit courts of this· Commonwealth imposing. pollution control technqlogies on
distillers that might differ from circuit to cfr~uit. The impact on the bourbon
industry would be far too dire.
Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals insofar as it would allow this
type of. injunctive relief. While the trial court's reasoning was incorrect, the
17
result remains the same. The trial court properly dismissed the plea for
injunctive relief as it i.ndeed failed to state a claim. upon which relief could be
granted.
IV. CONCLUSION ·
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Court o~ Appeals as to Miller's
state-law damages claims; however,. we reverse the Court ·of Appeals insofar as
it held that Miller's claim for injunctive relief could go forward. Therefore, we
remand this case to Jefferson Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent
\
with this opinion~
. All sitting. All concur.
. COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT BROWN-FORMAN CORPORATION:
Charles J. Cronan, IV
Mark Richard Overstreet .
Bethany A. Breetz -
Marjorie Ann Farris
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT HEAVEN HILL DISTILLERIES,. INC~:
Virginia Hamilton Snell
Donald Joseph Kelly
Lisa Catherine D~Jaco
,.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE GEORGE MILLER:
None /Withdrawn
COUNSEL FOR AMICI CURIAE
· David -!ames Treacy
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