Order Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
September 27, 2017 Stephen J. Markman,
Chief Justice
Brian K. Zahra
Bridget M. McCormack
155541 David F. Viviano
Richard H. Bernstein
Joan L. Larsen
Kurtis T. Wilder,
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Justices
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v SC: 155541
COA: 329298
Wayne CC: 15-004873-FH
ORONDE GRAHAM,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________________/
On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the February 16, 2017
judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not
persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
MARKMAN, C.J. (concurring).
I concur in this Court’s order denying leave to appeal, given that the Court of
Appeals correctly held that the 180-day period in MCL 780.131(1) does not begin to run
until the prosecutor has received formal notice from the Michigan Department of
Corrections (MDOC) regarding a pending warrant against an inmate. People v Williams,
475 Mich 245, 259 (2006). I write separately only to note that the statute neither places
any time limitation on when the MDOC must communicate formal notice regarding a
pending warrant against an inmate, nor provides a defendant a remedy if the MDOC fails
to communicate such notice. The lack of such provisions arguably undermines the
apparent purpose of the statute.
Here, the MDOC did not communicate formal notice to the prosecutor that a
warrant was pending against defendant-- who was incarcerated at the time the complaint
was filed-- until approximately 16 months after the complaint against defendant was
filed, by which time defendant was no longer incarcerated. This Court has recognized
that the potential benefits of the 180-day period in MCL 780.131(1) include “protecting
concurrent sentences, minimizing obstructions to prison rehabilitation, aiding in
preventing untried charges from affecting early release, and clearing court dockets and
2
prosecutors’ offices of stale charges.” People v Woodruff, 414 Mich 130, 137 (1982),
overruled on other grounds by People v Smith, 438 Mich 715 (1991). Each of these
purposes is arguably undermined when, as in this case, the MDOC does not timely
communicate notice to the prosecutor after a complaint against an inmate has been filed,
because communication of such notice is a precondition to the running of the 180-day
notification period. I write only to call this matter to the Legislature’s attention so that it
might, if it so chooses, take action to address this concern.
MCCORMACK and BERNSTEIN, JJ., join the statement of MARKMAN, C.J.
WILDER, J., did not participate because he was on the Court of Appeals panel.
I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the
foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.
September 27, 2017
s0920
Clerk