J-S29030-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
DWIGHT RUTLEDGE
Appellant No. 2038 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence dated September 18, 2012
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0013043-2008
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., SOLANO, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY SOLANO, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 29, 2017
Appellant Dwight Rutledge appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed after the trial court revoked his probation on September 18, 2012.
We affirm.
We recount the facts and history as set forth in the trial court’s
opinion:
On June 22, 2008, Appellant and his girlfriend, Lashakeen
Spears-Garrison (“Spears”) began arguing about paying rent for
the apartment at which they were co-tenants. Spears called
911, prompting two Philadelphia Police Department (“PPD”)
officers to respond to the disturbance. The officers attempted to
defuse the situation by talking to both Appellant and Spears,
advised Spears to apply for a protection order if she wanted
Appellant to be removed from the apartment, and then left. This
intervention failed to have the intended effect, however, as
Spears and Appellant continued to quarrel, culminating with
Appellant menacing Spears with a loaded handgun and
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*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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threatening to kill her. Spears then fled the apartment, found
the aforementioned officers in the street outside, and told them
about what had just transpired. The officers reentered the
apartment and, following direction from Spears, discovered a
loaded, silver-and-black 9mm semiautomatic handgun in
Appellant’s dresser, as well as a small amount of marijuana in
one of Appellant’s shirts inside a closet. Consequently, Appellant
was arrested.
Appellant was then held in pre-sentence detention and, on
January 5, 2009, filed a Petition for Release on Nominal Bail,
which this Court granted on February 3, 2009. Trial was then
scheduled for May 5, 2009; however, Appellant failed to appear
on that date, prompting th[e trial c]ourt to issue a bench
warrant. This warrant was lifted on May 19, 2009, and trial was
rescheduled for July 13, 2009. The Commonwealth then
requested a continuance, which this Court granted on July 13,
2009. Appellant waived his right to a jury trial and, after a
bench trial on September 14, 2009, th[e trial c]ourt found him
guilty of Unlawful Possession of a Firearm,1 a second-degree
felony. Appellant was then released, pending sentencing on
November 19, 2009, but failed to appear on that date, causing
th[e trial c]ourt to issue another bench warrant. Appellant was
subsequently apprehended and, on January 7, 2010, th[e trial
c]ourt lifted the bench warrant and granted the Commonwealth’s
Motion to Revoke/Release and Forfeit Bail. On March 16, 2010,
[the trial c]ourt sentenced Appellant to a term of time served to
23 months, along with five years of probation, and ordered him
to be paroled immediately.
1
18 Pa. C.S. § 6105(a)(1).
Appellant quickly chose not to comply with the terms of his
release, failing drug tests on two occasions, being extremely
uncooperative, and going to great lengths to circumvent
mandatory reporting and drug testing. Another bench warrant
was issued on November 29, 2010, which was replaced by a
detainer order on December 7, 2010. On December 21, 2010,
th[e trial c]ourt lifted the detainer order and continued
Appellant’s parole.
Throughout all of this, Appellant and Spears had apparently
maintained their romance and continued to live together;
however, the passage of time had done nothing to diminish the
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volatility of their relationship as, on April 27, 2011, Appellant
was arrested after allegedly stabbing Spears multiple time[s] in
her thighs and arms with a kitchen knife. A bench warrant was
issued the following day, due to this technical violation of
Appellant’s probation, which was replaced by a detainer order on
May 6, 2011. On May 24, 2011, this Court ordered that
Appellant’s Violation of Probation (“VOP”) hearing would be
continued until further notice, so as to allow for disposition of the
criminal case stemming from the April 27, 2011 incident.
Ultimately, Spears failed to appear in court on April 27, 2012,
prompting the Commonwealth to nolle pros all of the stabbing-
related charges that had been lodged against Appellant. Th[e
trial c]ourt then revoked Appellant’s probation on May 25, 2012
and scheduled his VOP hearing for June 1, 2012. On that date,
th[e trial c]ourt sentenced Appellant to a term of Time Served to
23 months’ incarceration, plus three years of probation, ordered
that he be paroled immediately, and explicitly told him that he
was not allowed to live with Spears anymore.
Unfortunately, this did not dissuade Appellant from continuing to
violently lash out at Spears. Less than two weeks later, on
June 12, 2012, Philadelphia Police Officers Brison and DiGenio
responded to a domestic incident at Spears’ residence. They
entered Spears’ apartment building and, hearing a woman
screaming for help, rushed up the building’s stairs to Spears’
third-floor apartment. The door was locked, so the officers
began banging on it and calling for the apartment’s occupants to
allow them entry. Spears then yelled for help from inside the
apartment, and made clear that she was being prevented from
opening the door, whereupon the officers started banging harder
and told whoever was inside that they were going to kick in the
door. At that point, they heard a lot of furniture moving and
Appellant finally opened the door. Officers Brison and DiGenio
then subdued Appellant, while Spears was [“completely
hysterical crying,” “disarrayed,” and] screaming that he had put
a knife to her. Spears’ clothes were a mess and the furniture in
the apartment was completely destroyed. [N.T., 7/17/12, at 13-
15.] As recounted to the officers by Spears, Appellant had
forced his way into her apartment and turned violent when she
asked him to leave, striking her a number of times, attempting
to stab her, and holding both Spears and one of her
grandchildren at knifepoint. Consequently, the officers arrested
Appellant, after which he was charged with Aggravated Assault,
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Simple Assault, Reckless Endangerment of Another Person, and
Endangering the Welfare of a Child.
Appellant was then brought before th[e trial c]ourt on July 17,
2012 for yet another VOP hearing. After listening to testimony
from Officer [Mark] DiGenio, [whose testimony that Spears’
screams for help and communication to him that Appellant had
held a knife to her were admitted over Appellant’s objection,
N.T., 7/17/12, at 12-14, the trial c]ourt terminated Appellant’s
parole and revoked his probation, expressing disbelief at the
situation and telling Appellant:
I couldn’t have been more clear that you should contact
Spears under no circumstances – you’ve been telling me
that Spears is crazy. And yet you were there at her
apartment. You have told me repeatedly that you keep
being put in jail by her lies and manipulations and mental
health issues, that’s what you’ve been telling me for years
and I said to you, “Then you stay away from her.”
Th[e trial c]ourt then ordered a pre-sentence investigation, and
informed the parties that Appellant would be sentenced after a
hearing on September 18, 2012.
At that hearing, Appellant vigorously declared his innocence,
telling th[e trial c]ourt that Spears was a mentally ill drug addict
whom he cared for and considered to be his wife, but who, in
spite of this bond, had nevertheless fabricated all of her
allegations over the years about his violent behavior. Coupling
this claim with ones about his poor health, as well as the harm
caused by these “false accusations” to his family and his
livelihood, Appellant asked th[e trial c]ourt not to give him a
sentence necessitating time in state prison. . . . [The trial c]ourt
sentenced Appellant to a term of 5-to-10 years’ incarceration
due to his technical violation of the probation terms for his
Unlawful Possession of a Firearm conviction, with credit for time
served, and ordered him to stay away from Spears upon his
release from prison. [The sentencing hearing transcript contains
no objection from Appellant challenging the discretionary aspects
of his sentence. N.T., 9/18/12, at 18-19.]
Thereafter, Appellant did not appeal this decision; however, he
did submit a Post-Conviction Relief Act Petition (“PCRA Petition”)
on April 18, 2013, followed by an Amended PCRA Petition on
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February 3, 2015, in which Appellant claimed that his VOP
hearing counsel had provided ineffective assistance by failing to
act on Appellant’s timely request that he file such an appeal.
Accordingly, Appellant requested that he be granted permission
to both submit post-sentence motions and appeal th[e trial
c]ourt’s judgment of sentence nunc pro tunc.
Trial Ct. Op. at 1-5 (internal brackets, citations to the record, ellipses, and
some quotation marks omitted).
On December 14, 2015, the trial court entered an order scheduling a
hearing on the PCRA petition for April 25, 2016. On April 25, 2016, the trial
court granted a motion for continuance and rescheduled the PCRA hearing
for June 27, 2016. Then --
On June 14, 2016, th[e trial c]ourt granted Appellant’s Amended
PCRA Petition in part, thereby denying him the chance to file
untimely post-sentence motions, while reinstating his direct
appeal rights and giving him 30 days within which to file such an
appeal.[1] Appellant subsequently filed the instant appeal on
June 22, 2016[.]
Trial Ct. Op. at 5 (citations to the record omitted). Appellant raises the
following issues:
[I.] Did the trial court at the VOP hearing err in accepting into
evidence statements made to a police officer by [A]ppellant’s
alleged wife/girlfriend because these statements were not
excited utterances but hearsay?
[II.] Did the trial/PCRA court err in denying [A]ppellant the
right to file post sentence motions from the VOP/judgment of
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1
The certified record is therefore unclear as to whether a hearing was ever
held on the PCRA petition, including on Appellant’s request to reinstate his
post-sentence rights nunc pro tunc. However, the Commonwealth states in
its brief to this Court that no evidentiary hearing was held. Commonwealth’s
Brief at 18.
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sentence nunc pro tunc because this denied [A]ppellant his right
to contest the excessiveness of his sentence on appeal?
[III.] Was the sentence imposed by the trial court, which was 5
to 10 years in state prison, the maximum allowable
punishment[,] unjust, improper, manifestly unreasonable, and
an abuse of discretion because the sentence imposed was
contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the
sentencing process?
Appellant’s Brief at 2 (issues reordered).
Admission of Evidence
Appellant contends that “the trial court erred in considering the
statements made [by Spears] to the police officer.” Appellant’s Brief at 6, 9.
In particular, Appellant objects to consideration of Spears’ cries for help and
her assertion that Appellant held a knife to her throat during Appellant’s
confrontation with her. In Commonwealth v. McFadden, 156 A.3d 299
(Pa. Super. 2017), we stated:
The admission of evidence is committed to the sound discretion
of the trial court and an appellate court may reverse only upon a
showing that the trial court clearly abused its discretion.
Admissibility depends on relevance and probative value.
Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a
material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue
more or less probable, or supports a reasonable inference
or presumption regarding a material fact. Once evidence
is found to be relevant, it will be inadmissible only if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice or confusion.
“Unfair prejudice” is “a tendency to suggest a decision on an
improper basis or to divert the jury’s attention away from its
duty of weighing the evidence impartially.” Pa.R.Evid. 403 cmt.
...
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A trial court acting as the fact-finder is presumed to know the
law, ignore prejudicial statements, and disregard inadmissible
evidence.
156 A.3d at 309 (brackets and most quotation marks and citations omitted).
Preliminarily, we note that the trial court found this issue waived “due
to insufficient specificity” in a “manifestly deficient Statement of Errors.”
Trial Ct. Op. at 6. Paragraph 7 of Appellant’s Statements of Errors provided:
“The trial court erred at the VOP hearing in allowing the hearsay testimony
of an alleged female know[n] as Karatin Spears (ph) NT 7-17-12 @ 9-17.”
We disagree with the trial court and find that this challenge sufficiently
articulates what Appellant alleges to be the trial court’s error, i.e., that the
testimony that appears at pages 9 to 17 of the notes of testimony for July
17, 2012, includes alleged hearsay that the trial court erroneously admitted.
We thus conclude that Appellant has properly preserved this issue for our
review. See generally Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4).
According to Appellant:
[T]he statement[s] made to the Police Officer were hearsay and
not excited utterances because the declarant had time to reflect
when she made these statements and was not under the stress
of excitement caused by the event. [Appellant is] entitled to a
new VOP hearing because improper hearsay was admitted at the
VOP hearing.
Appellant’s Brief at 9. The trial court held that Spears’ statements were
admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule “which enables a trial
court to admit ‘excited utterances,’ which are statements relating to a
startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress
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of excitement that it caused.’” Trial Ct. Op. at 7 (citing Pa.R.E. 801(c), 802,
803(2); Commonwealth v. Stokes, 615 A.2d 704, 712 (Pa. 1992) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Green, 409 A.2d 371, 373-74 (Pa. 1979))). The trial
court declared that Ms. Spears’ statements “clearly constituted excited
utterances, meaning they were admissible and that th[e trial c]ourt properly
overruled Appellant’s objection.” Id.
Under the Rules of Evidence, “Hearsay is not admissible except as
provided by these rules, by other rules prescribed by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, or by statute.” Pa.R.E. 802. However, “[c]ommunications
that are not assertions are not hearsay. These would include questions,
greetings, expressions of gratitude, exclamations, offers, instructions,
warnings, etc.” Comment to Pa.R.E. 801 (emphasis added). “The following
are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless of whether the
declarant is available as a witness: . . . A statement relating to a startling
event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of
excitement that it caused.” Pa.R.E. 803(2). “[T]his declaration must be
made so near the occurrence both in time and place as to exclude the
likelihood of its having emanated in whole or in part from his reflective
faculties.” Commonwealth v. Murray, 83 A.3d 137, 157 (Pa. 2013).
Viewed under these standards, this issue merits no relief. The first
statements in question – Spears’ screams for help – were merely
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exclamations and thus are excluded from the definition of hearsay. See
Trial Ct. Op. at 3 (citing N.T., 7/17/12, at 10-11); Pa.R.E. 801 cmt.
Spears’s second statement – that Appellant had held a knife to her
throat – was made while police were arresting Appellant. Trial Ct. Op. at 3
(citing N.T., 7/17/12, at 13). Spears was described as “completely
hysterical,” “crying, screaming,” and “disarrayed” at the time she made the
statement. N.T., 7/17/12, at 16. There is no indication in the record that
Spears’ statement was made in response to a police officer’s question or that
it “emanated in whole or in part from [her] reflective faculties.” Murray, 83
A.3d at 157. The trial court was therefore well within its discretion to admit
Officer DiGenio’s testimony about Spears’ second statement pursuant to the
excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. Pa.R.E. 803(2).
Sentencing
Appellant’s remaining issues relate to his sentencing, and we address
them together. “A challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence is
not appealable as of right. Therefore, before we may exercise jurisdiction to
reach the merits of Appellant’s claim, we must verify that Appellant’s appeal
is properly before this Court[.]” Commonwealth v. Luketic, 162 A.3d
1149, 1159 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quotation marks, citations, and internal
brackets omitted).
We will exercise our discretion to consider such a petition only if (1)
the appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal; (2) he has preserved the
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sentencing issue at the time of sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and
modify his sentence; (3) he presents the issue in a properly framed
statement in his brief under Rule 2119(f) of the Rules of Appellate
Procedure, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, 522 A.2d 17 (Pa.
1987); and (4) in the words of Section 9781(b) of the Sentencing Code, 42
Pa.C.S. § 9781(b), “it appears that there is a substantial question that the
sentence imposed is not appropriate under this chapter.” See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Flowers, 149 A.3d 867, 870 (Pa. Super. 2016);
Commonwealth v. Haynes, 125 A.3d 800, 807 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal
denied, 140 A.3d 12 (Pa. 2016); Commonwealth v. Zelinski, 573 A.2d
569, 574-75 (Pa. Super.), appeal denied, 593 A.2d 419 (Pa. 1990).
Here, Appellant filed a timely appeal and included a Rule 2119(f)
statement in his brief. Thus, he has clearly satisfied the first and third
requirements. He also has satisfied the fourth requirement by raising a
“substantial question” regarding his sentence. We have explained:
A defendant presents a substantial question when he sets forth a
plausible argument that the sentence violates a provision of the
sentencing code or is contrary to the fundamental norms of the
sentencing process. . . . Thus, a sentencing court abuses its
discretion when it considers the criminal act, but not the criminal
himself. The Sentencing Code prescribes individualized
sentencing by requiring the sentencing court to consider the
protection of the public, the gravity of the offense in relation to
its impact on the victim and the community, and the
rehabilitative needs of the defendant, and prohibiting a sentence
of total confinement without consideration of the nature and
circumstances of the crime, and the history, character, and
condition of the defendant.
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Luketic, 162 A.3d at 1160 (quotation marks, brackets, and citations
omitted). “[A] substantial question that the sentence was not appropriate
under the Sentencing Code may occur even where a sentence is within the
statutory limits.” Commonwealth v. Crump, 995 A.2d 1280, 1282 (Pa.
Super.) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 13 A.3d 475 (Pa. 2010).
According to Appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement, “the sentence imposed was
contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process”
and was “not appropriate.” Appellant’s Brief at 3. Appellant has thus raised
a substantial question. See Luketic, 162 A.3d at 1160; Crump, 995 A.2d
at 1282.
With respect to the second requirement, the sentencing hearing
transcript contains no objection from Appellant challenging the discretionary
aspects of his sentence. N.T., 9/18/12, at 18-19. The docket sheet
accompanying the certified record does not indicate that any post-sentence
motion was filed. In his amended PCRA petition, Appellant claimed trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to file this requested post-sentence motion
and requested reinstatement of his post-sentence rights. Am. PCRA Pet.,
2/3/15, at 2 ¶ 4.a. & ad damnum clause; Mem. in Supp. of Am. PCRA Pet.,
2/3/15, at 1; Trial Ct. Op. at 5; see Commonwealth v. Fransen, 986 A.2d
154 (Pa. Super. 2009) (PCRA petitioner-appellant must plead in PCRA
petition that he was deprived of right to file post-sentence motion in order to
be entitled to relief on that issue). The record clearly reflects that Appellant
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was granted permission to file a direct appeal nunc pro tunc and has done so
in a timely manner, but the PCRA court did not reinstate Appellant’s right to
file a post-sentence motion nunc pro tunc. Appellant contends that it was
error for the trial court to not reinstate his right to file a post-sentence
motion.2
We conclude that we need not reach this reinstatement issue because
even if Appellant had been permitted to file a post-sentence motion nunc pro
tunc, he would not be entitled to relief. Cf. Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65
A.3d 932, 936 (Pa. Super. 2013) (remanding to allow the record to be
supplemented to include post-sentence motion was unnecessary, because
appellant’s allegation that his sentence failed to take into account his
rehabilitative needs under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b) and thus was manifestly
excessive entitled him to no relief, even if properly preserved via post-
sentence motion), appeal denied, 76 A.3d 538 (Pa. 2013). We reach that
conclusion because a trial court has broad discretion when imposing a
sentence. We find no abuse of that discretion here.
We have frequently noted that we review only to determine whether
there was an abuse of discretion:
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2
The Commonwealth argues Appellant waived the sentencing issue by
failing to raise it at his VOP sentencing hearing or by not filing a post-
sentence motion; it does not argue that Appellant waived the issue because
the PCRA court denied him permission to file a post-sentence motion nunc
pro tunc. Commonwealth’s Brief at 7.
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The imposition of sentence following the revocation of probation
is vested within the sound discretion of the trial court, which,
absent an abuse of that discretion, will not be disturbed on
appeal. An abuse of discretion is more than an error in
judgment – a sentencing court has not abused its discretion
unless the record discloses that the judgment exercised was
manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice,
bias or ill-will.
Commonwealth v. Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 913 (Pa. Super. 2000) (quotation
marks and citations omitted). When probation is revoked, the Sentencing
Code states that “the sentencing alternatives available to the court shall be
the same as were available at the time of initial sentencing, due
consideration being given to the time spent serving the order of probation.”
42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(b). Total confinement may be imposed only if:
(1) the defendant has been convicted of another crime; or
(2) the conduct of the defendant indicates that it is likely that he
will commit another crime if he is not imprisoned; or
(3) such a sentence is essential to vindicate the authority of the
court.
Id. § 9771(c).
[A] trial court does not necessarily abuse its discretion in
imposing a seemingly harsher post-revocation sentence where
the defendant received a lenient sentence and then failed to
adhere to the conditions imposed on him. In point of fact, where
the revocation sentence was adequately considered and
sufficiently explained on the record by the revocation judge, in
light of the judge’s experience with the defendant and awareness
of the circumstances of the probation violation, under the
appropriate deferential standard of review, the sentence, if
within the statutory bounds, is peculiarly within the judge’s
discretion.
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Commonwealth v. Pasture, 107 A.3d 21, 28-29 (Pa. 2014) (citation
omitted).
Appellant asserts:
The sentence imposed by the trial court, which was 5 to 10 years
in state prison, the maximum allowable sentence, was unjust,
improper, manifestly unreasonable, and an abuse of discretion
because the trial court failed to consider [Appellant’s] age,
rehabilitative needs and family history[.] The trial court in
imposing sentence considered only [Appellant]’s criminal history
including, improperly, arrests that did not lead to convictions . . .
[T]here was no reason stated on the record to impose the
maximum state sentence especially in light of [Appellant]’s
medical conditions which include congestive heart failure,
hypertension, diabetes and anxiety. . . . The [trial] court[] not
only violated, 42 Pa.[C.S. §] 9771(b)[-](c) in imposing its
sentence of total confinement, [but it] did not consider any of
the factors required by 42 Pa.[C.S. §] 9721(b).
Appellant’s Brief at 7-8 (emphasis omitted).
In response to this argument in the trial court, the court stated:
Th[e trial c]ourt found [Appellant’s] excuses and arguments to
be utterly lacking, responding:
You know, family members will try to stand by and support
loved ones in relationships that have addictions and mental
health problems, but that support doesn’t always end up in
the police arriving at the scene with the victim stabbed and
barricades and arrests. So, the kind of support that,
whatever is happening, it always ends up with the police
there, at least the cases that you and I have had over and
over again, with Spears being stabbed and guns and
knives being involved, and her in a state of utter, complete
panic, and you know, she’s crying and she’s a mess. It’s
absolutely not normal.
Every time we’ve been together, you’ve told me this same
story. I’ve known about your medical conditions. I’m
trying to take your word for it about Spears manipulating
you. Over and over again, I’ve -- the guidelines way back
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when for Unlawful Possession of a Firearm were 48 to 60
months. You know what I’ve been doing. And at that last
listing, on June 1, 2012, we had a very, very clear
discussion that you were not to have any contact with
Spears, and the police reports indicate that it was a very
chaotic and violent scene at her house 11 days later.
Independent witnesses came in about a week and a half
after it. I am very concerned for the safety of this victim.
You have a history now of 10 arrests, three convictions,
four commitments, five violations, three revocations, and
you were arrested for a major felony, with I guess the
same victim as before, a week and a half after I sentenced
you. For all these reasons, I can no longer take any
chances keeping you in county.
Appellant’s allegation that th[e trial c]ourt committed an abuse
of discretion regarding his revocation sentence simply has no
basis in reality, given Appellant’s disturbingly consistent
brutality, volatile relationship with Spears, and utter disregard
for the probationary requirements that had been imposed upon
him by th[e trial c]ourt. . . . [The trial court] gave Appellant
multiple chances to avoid significant terms of incarceration,
sentencing him to time served on two separate occasions and
instructing him to stay away from the victim Ms. Spears. It was
th[e trial c]ourt’s hope that Appellant would heed the call of
reason after being shown such leniency, especially given its
coupling with the threat of serious consequences for
noncompliance. Instead, Appellant’s actions proved to th[e trial
c]ourt that he posed a serious, clear-and-present danger to
Spears and her family members. Consequently, in order to both
punish Appellant for his violent intransigence and to protect
Spears, as well as the public at-large, th[e trial c]ourt
appropriately exercised its discretionary authority by sentencing
Appellant to the statutory maximum for a second-degree felony.
Trial Ct. Op. at 4, 9-10 (footnote omitted; some formatting added) (quoting
N.T., 9/18/12, at 10-11, 17-18).
There was no abuse of discretion. Appellant’s argument that “[t]he
trial court in imposing sentence considered only [Appellant]’s criminal
history,” Appellant’s Brief at 7, is belied by the record, which demonstrates
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that the trial court considered a myriad of factors in imposing sentence. For
example, contrary to Appellant’s claim, the court did consider Appellant’s
medical conditions. Compare Trial Ct. Op. at 4 (quoting N.T., 9/18/12, at
17), with Appellant’s Brief at 7. Appellant does not explain his contention
that his age should have been a factor in imposing sentence, and we can
discern no reason why Appellant’s age should have required imposition of a
different sentence here. Likewise, Appellant provides no explanation why his
“family history” should be considered a mitigating factor. The trial court
based its sentence on Appellant’s lack of success on probation and failure to
rehabilitate when given the opportunity, see Trial Ct. Op. at 4, thereby
refuting Appellant’s argument that the trial court did not consider his
rehabilitative needs, Appellant’s Brief at 7.
As for Appellant’s claim that the trial court “improperly [considered]
arrests that did not lead to convictions,” Appellant’s Brief at 7, “[a] judge
may consider unadjudicated arrests in sentencing a defendant, so long as
the arrests are not regarded as establishing criminal conduct, and even
arrests that result in acquittals, if the judge is aware of the acquittal.”
Commonwealth v. Bowers, 25 A.3d 349, 356 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal
denied, 51 A.3d 837 (Pa. 2012).3 Here, the trial court recognized that
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3
See also, e.g., Commonwealth v. P.L.S., 894 A.2d 120, 131 (Pa. Super.
2006); Commonwealth v. Vernille, 418 A.2d 713, 719 (Pa. Super. 1980))
(“It was not improper for the sentencing judge to consider the defendant’s
alleged involvement in other unlawful activity for which he was not charged,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Appellant had not been convicted of some of the charges. See N.T.,
9/18/12, at 17; Trial Ct. Op. at 4.
Finally, in conflict with Appellant’s assertion that the trial court “did not
consider any of the factors required by” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), Appellant’s
Brief at 8, is the fact that the trial court explicitly stated that Appellant’s
sentence was based on the court’s concern over the safety of the victim, her
family, and the independent witnesses at the “very chaotic and violent
scene” at Spears’ home; the trial court thus considered “the protection of
the public” and “impact on the life of the victim and the community.” Trial
Ct. Op. at 4 (quoting N.T., 9/18/12, at 17), 9; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). Thus,
based upon our review of the record, we hold that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant and that Appellant’s sentencing
issues are without merit.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/29/2017
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
tried, or convicted” (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted)),
appeal denied, 906 A.2d 542 (Pa. 2006).
- 17 -
Com. v. Rutledge, D.
Combined Opinion