RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4417-16T6
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
Plaintiff-Appellant,
September 29, 2017
v.
APPELLATE DIVISION
IMANI WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Respondent.
_____________________________
Argued September 14, 2017 - Decided September 29, 2017
Before Judges Alvarez, Currier, and Geiger.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County,
Warrant No. W-2017-000508-317.
Jennifer B. Paszkiewicz, Assistant
Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant
(Scott A. Coffina, Burlington County
Prosecutor, attorney; Ms. Paszkiewicz, of
counsel and on the brief).
Philip G. Pagano, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, argued the cause for respondent
(Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender,
attorney; Jared Dorfman, Assistant Deputy
Public Defender, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CURRIER, J.A.D.
In this appeal, we address whether, in a pretrial detention
hearing, defendant's pregnancy should be given greater
consideration than any other pretrial detention factor in a
judge's assessment under the Criminal Justice Reform Act (Act),
N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 to -26. Because we conclude that the trial
judge abused his discretion in giving defendant's pregnancy
greater weight than all other pertinent factors in his
determination to release her, we reverse. Pregnancy, like any
other medical condition, is only considered for its impact on
the risk of a defendant posing a danger to the community,
obstructing justice or failing to appear in court. N.J.S.A.
2A:162-20.
In June 2017, defendant was charged with second-degree
robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1); second-degree aggravated
assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1); and disorderly persons theft by
unlawful taking, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a). The victim of the crimes
told police that defendant and another person had "jumped" her
from behind and thrown her to the ground. She was punched and
kicked in the head, face, and body while on the ground,
resulting in several shattered teeth as well as swelling and
bruising to her eyes and face. Money was stolen from her purse.
On the Public Safety Assessment (PSA), N.J.S.A. 2A:162-25,
the Pretrial Services Program rated defendant a six for new
criminal activity and a five for failure to appear. It also
flagged defendant for an elevated risk of violence. The
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recommendation was that defendant remain in custody pending
trial.
The State filed a notice for pretrial detention, N.J.S.A.
2A:162-19(a), and a hearing was conducted on June 13, 2017. In
support of its request that defendant be detained pending trial,
the State noted defendant's extensive juvenile history,
including several violations of probation, two pending
disorderly persons charges, and a 2016 disorderly persons
conviction for assault by auto resulting in a sixty-day period
of incarceration. Defendant failed to appear for court six
times within the previous two years.
Defense counsel informed the court that defendant had a
full-time job and had recently learned that she was eight weeks
pregnant. He requested she be released under condition of in-
person reporting. Counsel argued that defendant's "employment
as well as her pregnancy would assure both her appearance in
court as well as the safety of the community."
After the judge found the State had established probable
cause, he turned to the request for detention pending trial.
The judge explained that he had reviewed the PSA and its
recommendation, and acknowledged the serious second-degree
charges and defendant's multiple prior failures to appear. The
judge further stated that he was familiar with defendant's
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extensive juvenile history,1 having served as the county's
juvenile judge during the pertinent timeframe. Nevertheless,
the judge determined that the State's proofs fell "just slightly
below clear and convincing evidence" because the PSA did not
take into account that defendant was eight weeks pregnant or
that her pregnancy "present[ed] issues with regard to care in a
correctional facility." The judge concluded that defendant's
pregnancy required the denial of the State's motion for pretrial
detention.
The judge explained that he would
impose some very strict pretrial release
provisions in light of the fact that the
State was just a tad short of clear and
convincing evidence and [that his decision]
was impacted by [defendant's] pregnancy
. . . and the issues that would pose to the
correctional facility and correctional staff
in terms of . . . prenatal care.
He warned defendant that pregnancy was "a card that [she could]
play once" and if she committed a new offense or violated a
condition of her release, whether she was "eight weeks pregnant,
six months pregnant, eight months pregnant, it [would] not make
any difference whatsoever and the [c]ourt [would] evaluate the
facts independent[ly] at that time."
1
Defendant was twenty years old at the time of the detention
hearing.
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As conditions of release, the judge required defendant to
report in-person weekly to pretrial services. The judge also
imposed a curfew from 5:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. daily, permitting
defendant to leave her residence only to go to work and prenatal
appointments.2
The court granted the State's request for a stay of
defendant's release pending appeal. In discussing the
application for a stay, the judge commented:
in light of the [PSA] and the history of
[defendant] who is only 20 but who had an
extensive juvenile history, that . . . the
State was very close to establishing by
clear and convincing evidence . . . that
[defendant] should be detained, but . . .
the court believes that . . . [defendant's
pregnancy] justified her release on
conditions . . . .
The judge further remarked:
but for the pregnancy, . . . the [c]ourt
would have detained [defendant]. Her scores
were . . . extremely high on the [PSA]. She
has a significant history for a person who
is 20 years old. . . . [A]ll of the
necessary indicia were there which the
[c]ourt felt were . . . mitigated by . . .
the fact that [defendant] is . . . eight
weeks pregnant.
2
Neither defendant nor her counsel made any representation that
she had seen a doctor for her pregnancy or was receiving
prenatal care.
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We granted the State leave to appeal the trial court's
order on an emergent basis to review the question: whether
defendant's pregnancy is a medical condition sufficient to
override all other applicable factors, thus requiring pretrial
release. The State argues that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying pretrial detention by according undue
weight to defendant's pregnancy, and speculating that
defendant's medical needs could not be met while in jail. We
agree.
The Act took effect on January 1, 2017. It is premised on
"pretrial release by non-monetary means to
reasonably assure" that a defendant will
"appear[] in court when required," will not
endanger "the safety of any other person or
the community," and "will not obstruct or
attempt to obstruct the criminal justice
process." If a court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that "no condition or
combination of conditions" would achieve
those goals, the court, upon motion by the
prosecutor, may order that a defendant be
held pending trial.
[State v. Robinson, 229 N.J. 44, 55 (2017)
(quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15)].
Under Section 18 of the Act, the trial court is authorized
to order pretrial detention if it finds by clear and convincing
evidence that no conditions of release would reasonably assure a
defendant's appearance in court, the safety of the community,
and the integrity of the criminal justice process. N.J.S.A.
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2A:162-18(a). At the hearing itself, "the court may take into
account" the following:
a. The nature and circumstances of the
offense charged;
b. The weight of the evidence against the
eligible defendant, except that the court
may consider the admissibility of any
evidence sought to be excluded;
c. The history and characteristics of the
eligible defendant, including:
(1) the eligible defendant's
character, physical and mental
condition, family ties,
employment, financial resources,
length of residence in the
community, community ties, past
conduct, history relating to drug
or alcohol abuse, criminal
history, and record concerning
appearance at court proceedings;
and
(2) whether, at the time of the
current offense or arrest, the
eligible defendant was on
probation, parole, or on other
release pending trial, sentencing,
appeal, or completion of sentence
for an offense under federal law,
or the law of this or any other
state;
d. The nature and seriousness of the danger
to any other person or the community that
would be posed by the eligible defendant's
release, if applicable;
e. The nature and seriousness of the risk of
obstructing or attempting to obstruct the
criminal justice process that would be posed
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by the eligible defendant's release, if
applicable; and
f. The release recommendation of the
pretrial services program obtained using a
risk assessment instrument under [N.J.S.A.
2A:162-25].
[N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20].
Although the trial judge here properly considered several
of the listed applicable factors, he elevated defendant's
medical condition of pregnancy above all of the other pertinent
factors, based on his unfounded speculation that her pregnancy
might cause "issues" to the correctional facility.3 The judge
determined that defendant's pregnancy compelled her release. We
disagree. In determining whether pretrial detention is
appropriate, the trial court should consider all of the
applicable factors noted in the statute, giving appropriate
weight to each.
We do not suggest that there will never be circumstances
under which a defendant's pregnancy could be a determining
factor in a judicial decision regarding pretrial detention. A
trial court could conclude that pregnancy, like any other
medical condition, may require a defendant's release as the
3
We note that N.J.A.C. 10A:31-13.10 requires county correctional
facilities to promptly provide pregnant inmates with medical
services, including prenatal evaluation and care, obstetrical
services, and postpartum and follow-up medical care.
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condition itself might affect the risk of the defendant posing a
danger to the community, obstructing justice or failing to
appear in court. See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20. Here, however, there
is no indication that defendant's pregnancy was classified as
high risk or presented any unusual medical complications
requiring specialized treatment. Nor is there any indication
that the jail was unable to provide appropriate prenatal medical
care to defendant. The reasons given by the trial judge for
defendant's pregnancy warranting her release were speculative,
unsupported by any facts in the record, and, therefore,
irrelevant to a pretrial detention determination.
In its orders denying the State's motion for pretrial
detention, the trial court did not explain in writing its
reasons for deviating from the recommendation in the PSA. In
State v. C.W., 449 N.J. Super. 231, 263 (App. Div. 2017), we
stated that N.J.S.A. 2A:162-23(a)(2) requires a court to
"explain in writing specifically why it deviated from the [PSA]
recommendation advising against [a] defendant's release." While
ordinarily we would remand the matter to the trial court for
compliance with the statute, we sufficiently understand the
reasons for the denial of detention. The trial judge was
thorough and candid in stating his reasoning for ordering
defendant's release contrary to the PSA recommendation, and,
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thus, a remand would be an unnecessary use of stretched
resources.
In giving undue weight to defendant's pregnancy over all
other applicable factors, and failing to consider what import
the pregnancy might have on her risk of posing a danger to the
community, obstructing justice or failing to appear in court,
the judge abused his discretion. See C.W., supra, 449 N.J.
Super. at 255. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's decision
and remand for entry of an order of pretrial detention.
Reversed.
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