NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 3 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TUGRUL GULEC, No. 15-56700
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:13-cv-07144-DSF-AJW
v.
MEMORANDUM*
THE BOEING COMPANY; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 26, 2017**
Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Tugrul Gulec appeals pro se the district court’s judgment dismissing his
action alleging national origin discrimination under Title VII and other causes of
action, and related orders. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo. Zadrozny v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 720 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
2013) (dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim); Lyon v.
Chase Bank USA, N.A., 656 F.3d 877, 883 (9th Cir. 2011) (order granting motion
for judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c)). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Gulec’s Title VII employment
discrimination claim because Gulec failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he
was qualified for the positions for which he applied, and that after he was rejected
the positions remained available and defendants continued to review applicants
with comparable qualifications. See Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1112 (9th
Cir. 2002) (setting forth requirements for prima facie case of discrimination under
Title VII).
The district court properly dismissed Gulec’s invasion of privacy claim
under California law because Gulec failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in light of his consent to the phone
interviews. See Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal. 4th 1, 26, 35-37
(1994) (setting forth requirements for invasion of privacy claim and stating that
plaintiff “must not have manifested by his or her conduct a voluntary consent to
the invasive actions of the defendant”).
The district court properly dismissed Gulec’s torture, antitrust, and
international law claims because Gulec failed to allege facts sufficient to state
plausible claims that defendants’ alleged conduct amounted to torture, antitrust
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violations, or violations of international law. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338,
341-42 (9th Cir. 2010).
The district court properly dismissed Gulec’s claim to “cancel” the statute of
limitations because there is no such independent cause of action under state or
federal law.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Gulec leave to
amend because amendment would be futile. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202,
1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (district court may dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to
amend if “it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be
cured by amendment” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by granting severance due to
misjoinder because Gulec’s claims against defendants do not arise “out of the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
20; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 (court may drop parties and sever claims in case of
misjoinder); Visendi v. Bank of Am., N.A., 733 F.3d 863, 870 (9th Cir. 2013)
(holding that plaintiffs’ interactions with the defendants were not uniform and the
factual disparities alleged were too great to support permissive joinder).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Gulec’s motion to
vacate the settlement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) because
Gulec failed to establish that Boeing misled or coerced him into signing the
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settlement agreement. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3) (court may relieve party from
judgment or order due to fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing
party). The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to consider
Gulec’s contentions, raised for the first time in his reply brief, that the settlement
agreement is unconscionable and violates California Business and Professions
Code § 16600. See Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The
district court need not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply
brief.”).
AFFIRMED.
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