NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 3 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PAUL ANDREW SHIELDS, No. 15-16372
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:11-cv-03185-JAM-AC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
SCOTT JONES; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 26, 2017**
Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Paul Andrew Shields appeals pro se from the
district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs arising from his pretrial
detention. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Shields’ claim
against defendant Padilla in his individual capacity because, under any potentially
applicable standard, Shields failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether Padilla was deliberately indifferent in the treatment of Shields’ Hepatitis
C. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (in considering the conditions of
pretrial detention, courts consider whether the conditions amount to punishment);
Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057-58 (prison officials act with deliberate indifference only
if they know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health; a difference of
opinion between a prisoner and medical authorities regarding the appropriate
course of treatment, negligence, or medical malpractice do not amount to
deliberate indifference); cf. Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1067-
71 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (setting forth elements of Fourteenth Amendment
failure-to-protect claim by pretrial detainee).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Shields’ claims
against defendants Padilla and Jones in their official capacities because Shields
failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether a policy or custom
resulted in a constitutional violation. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 690 n.55 (1978) (official capacity suits “generally represent only another way
of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent”); Dougherty
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v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth elements for
municipal liability under Monell).
The district court properly dismissed Shields’ claims against defendants
Cannon and Maness because, under any potentially applicable standard, Shields
failed to allege facts sufficient to establish that Cannon or Maness was deliberately
indifferent to Shields’ Hepatitis C. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 535; Toguchi, 391 F.3d at
1057-58; cf. Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071; see also Cervantes v. Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Shields leave to
amend because the proposed second amended complaint would not have cured the
defects of the first amended complaint. See Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1041 (setting
forth standard of review and stating that “a district court may dismiss without leave
where a plaintiff’s proposed amendments would fail to cure the pleading
deficiencies”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Shields’ motion for
appointment of counsel because Shields failed to demonstrate exceptional
circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting
forth standard of review and exceptional circumstances requirement for
appointment of counsel).
We reject as without merit Shields’ contentions that the district court failed
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to review the evidence favorably to him or apply correctly the relevant legal
standards.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
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