[Cite as State v. Lane, 2017-Ohio-8050.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 28438
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
JAMES EDWARD LANE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. CR 2016 02 0363
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: October 4, 2017
HENSAL, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} James Lane appeals his conviction for rape in the Summit County Court of
Common Pleas. For the following reasons, this Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} B.M.A., who was 12, told police that she had sex with Mr. Lane, who was 18.
The Grand Jury subsequently indicted Mr. Lane for one count of rape under Revised Code
Section 2907.02(A)(1)(b). At trial, the court allowed a detective to testify over objection that,
when Mr. Lane was 16, he admitted digitally penetrating a girl who was 11. A jury found Mr.
Lane guilty of the offense against B.M.A., and the trial court sentenced him to 10 years to life in
prison. Mr. Lane has appealed, assigning two errors.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL AND REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN ALLOWING OTHER ACTS EVIDENCE AT TRIAL OF
2
APPELLANT LANE’S PRIOR JUVENILE ADJUDICATION AS A SEX
OFFENDER.
{¶3} Mr. Lane argues that the trial court incorrectly allowed the State to admit “other
acts” evidence, specifically, the conduct he engaged in with an 11-year-old girl while he was a
juvenile. According to Mr. Lane, the trial court should not have allowed the detective to testify
about those events because his identity, motive, intent, opportunity, plan, or scheme were not at
issue in this case, only whether he engaged in sexual conduct with a person under 13 years of
age. “[D]ecisions regarding the admissibility of other-acts evidence under Evid.R. 404(B) are
evidentiary determinations that rest within the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v.
Morris, 132 Ohio St.3d 337, 2012-Ohio-2407, syllabus. “Appeals of such decisions are
considered by an appellate court under an abuse-of-discretion standard of review.” Id.
{¶4} In support of his argument, Mr. Lane cites State v. Morris, 9th Dist. Medina No.
09CA0022-M, 2012-Ohio-6151, and State v. Powell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99386, 2014-Ohio-
2048. With respect to Morris, he notes that this Court determined in Morris that three separate
instances of “other acts” evidence were inadmissible. He specifically directs us to language in
Morris that “[e]vidence of a defendant’s scheme, plan, or system in doing an act can be relevant
for two reasons: (1) the other acts are part of one criminal transaction such that they are
inextricably related to the charged crime, and (2) a common scheme or plan tends to prove the
identity of the perpetrator.” Morris at ¶ 18, quoting State v. Schaim, 65 Ohio St.3d 51, 63
(1992), fn. 11. According to Mr. Lane, the other acts evidence in this case did not serve either
of those purposes so its admission was reversible error. Regarding Powell, he contends that it
stands for the proposition that juvenile adjudications may not be used to impeach a witness.
{¶5} Mr. Lane takes the language from paragraph 18 of Morris out of context. The
sentence begins: “According to the Ohio Supreme Court, as proof of identity, evidence * * *.”
3
Although the language in paragraph 18 pertains to the submission of other acts evidence to prove
the identity of a perpetrator, that is not the only permissible use of other acts evidence. Later in
Morris, this Court recognized that the Ohio Supreme Court has “explained that, under Evidence
Rule 404(B), ‘evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of an accused may be admissible to
prove intent or plan, even if the identity of an accused or the immediate background of a crime is
not at issue.’” Id. at ¶ 27, quoting State v. Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 521, 2012-Ohio-5695, ¶ 2.
Thus, the detective’s testimony about Mr. Lane’s prior acts was not inadmissible merely because
it did not serve to establish Mr. Lane’s identity.
{¶6} The Eighth District’s decision in Powell is also not applicable to this case. In
Powell, the court noted that Evidence Rule 609(D) and Revised Code Section 2151.357(H)
prohibit the impeachment of a witness with their juvenile adjudications. Powell at ¶ 43. It
found that there was no error in that case, however, because Mr. Powell had voluntarily indicated
that he might have a juvenile adjudication and because the State had moved onto a different line
of questioning before Mr. Powell provided any details about his juvenile record. Id. at ¶ 46.
{¶7} In Williams, the Ohio Supreme Court held that Evidence Rule 404(B) “precludes
the admission of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts offered to prove the character of an
accused in order to show that the accused acted in conformity therewith, but it does not preclude
admission of that evidence for other purposes.” Williams at syllabus. It explained that, when
“considering other acts evidence, trial courts should conduct a three-step analysis.” Id. at ¶ 19.
The first step is to consider whether the other acts evidence is relevant to making
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence. The next step is to consider
whether evidence of the other crimes, wrongs, or acts is presented to prove the
character of the accused in order to show activity in conformity therewith or
whether the other acts evidence is presented for a legitimate purpose, such as
those stated in Evid.R. 404(B). The third step is to consider whether the probative
4
value of the other acts evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice.
(Internal citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 20. Mr. Lane has not alleged that the detective’s testimony
about his conduct as a juvenile was inadmissible under Williams’ three-step analysis, nor has he
developed an argument to support such an allegation.
{¶8} We also note that, before the detective testified, Mr. Lane’s trial counsel
“renew[ed] [his] objection” to the other acts evidence, referring to a “brief hearing” that had
occurred on the State’s motion to use other acts evidence. Mr. Lane, however, did not have the
court reporter prepare that part of the trial transcript. See App.R. 9(B)(1). “In the absence of a
complete record, this Court is obligated to presume regularity in the proceedings below.” King v.
Carleton, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 13CA010374, 2013-Ohio-5781, ¶ 30. Upon consideration of Mr.
Lane’s arguments and review of the record, we conclude that Mr. Lane has failed to establish
that the trial court exercised improper discretion when it allowed the detective to testify about
sexual conduct Mr. Lane admitted committing with another girl. Mr. Lane’s first assignment of
error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
APPELLANT’S CONVICTION WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT
OF THE EVIDENCE.
{¶9} Mr. Lane next argues that his conviction was against the manifest weight of the
evidence. If a defendant asserts that a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence,
an appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all
reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine
whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way
and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be
reversed and a new trial ordered.
5
State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (9th Dist.1986). Weight of the evidence pertains to the
greater amount of credible evidence produced in a trial to support one side over the other side.
State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997). An appellate court should only exercise its
power to reverse a judgment as against the manifest weight of the evidence in exceptional cases.
State v. Carson, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26900, 2013-Ohio-5785, ¶ 32, citing Otten at 340.
{¶10} Mr. Lane notes that, although B.M.A. testified that he sent her a certain love
letter, which was admitted, she was the only witness to identify his handwriting. He notes that
B.M.A. was also the only one to testify that the “BML” tattoo on his hand stood for the initials
she would have after they got married. Mr. Lane notes that there was no forensic analysis done
on the love letter to determine whether his fingerprints or DNA was on it or in the bedroom
where the alleged sexual conduct occurred. He also notes that, although B.M.A. testified that she
told a friend about having sex with him, the friend did not testify. He further notes that his
grandmother testified that B.M.A. only lived with them for a two week period, which preceded
the date of the alleged sexual conduct by two months. His grandmother also testified that there
were approximately 18 people living in the house, making it implausible that sexual conduct
occurred without anyone else being aware of it. Finally, Mr. Lane asserts that the detective put
undue and coercive pressure on B.M.A. when he interviewed her at the police station by falsely
telling her that he already knew what had happened, making the story she came up with less
plausible.
{¶11} “[T]he weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are
primarily for the trier of the facts.” State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230 (1967), paragraph one of
the syllabus. In reaching its verdict, the jury was in the best position to evaluate the credibility of
the witnesses and it was entitled to believe all, part, or none of the testimony of each witness.
6
Prince v. Jordan, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 04CA008423, 2004-Ohio-7184, ¶ 35, citing State v.
Jackson, 86 Ohio App.3d 29, 33 (4th Dist.1993). “A conviction is not against the manifest
weight because the jury chose to credit the State’s version of events.” State v. Peasley, 9th Dist.
Summit No. 25062, 2010-Ohio-4333, ¶ 18.
{¶12} Mr. Lane has not identified any discrepancies between B.M.A.’s testimony and
what she initially told the detective about what happened, what she told a social worker two
weeks later, or what she told a therapist two months after that. On the other hand, the State
impeached Mr. Lane’s grandmother’s testimony with evidence that, despite claiming Mr. Lane
never lived at her house, she had consulted with a police officer about how to evict Mr. Lane and
his mother from it. Upon review of the record, we cannot say that the jury clearly lost its way
when it chose to believe B.M.A.’s testimony that she and Mr. Lane engaged in sexual conduct.
Mr. Lane’s second assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶13} Mr. Lane’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Summit
County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
7
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
JENNIFER HENSAL
FOR THE COURT
TEODOSIO, J.
CALLAHAN, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
JEFFREY N. JAMES, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and HEAVEN DIMARTINO, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.