United States, 973 F.2d 1548, 1550–51 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (quoting Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 241 cmt. A (1981)). Making this determination “depends on the nature and effect of
the violation in light of how the particular contract was viewed, bargained for, entered into, and
performed by the parties.” Id. at 1551.
Although DynCorp’s pleading is far from convincing, its failure to cite other “cases
where a prior material breach of contract was found to be a defense to claims under the FCA”
(Reply Mot. at 10), does not mean that the Court should strike this defense at this early stage.
Thus, the Court denies the government’s motion to strike the prior breach of contract defense, but
it grants the motion to strike the inequitable conduct or unclean hands defense.
CONCLUSION
The government’s motion to strike is granted in part and denied in part. The motion is
granted as to the fifth and sixth defenses, and granted in part as to the seventh and ninth defenses
and it is denied as to laches if asserted as to prejudgment interest (seventh defense) and the
breach of contract defense (ninth defense).
/s/ Ellen Segal Huvelle
ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE
United States District Judge
Date: October 4, 2017
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