NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 4 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AARON RAISER, No. 15-55048
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:13-cv-05312-RGK-RZ
v.
MEMORANDUM*
LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 21, 2017**
Before: SCHROEDER, HAWKINS, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Aaron Raiser appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in
his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging, among other claims, a claim under Monell v.
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Doe v. Abbott Labs., 571 F.3d 930, 933
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes these cases are suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
(9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Raiser failed
to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether any constitutional
deprivation resulted from an official policy, practice, or custom. See Ellins v. City
of Sierra Madre, 710 F.3d 1049, 1066 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[M]unicipalities are
subject to damages under § 1983 in three situations: when the plaintiff was injured
pursuant to an expressly adopted official policy, a long-standing practice or
custom, or the decision of a ‘final policymaker.’”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing without prejudice
Raiser’s claims against the Doe defendants because Raiser failed properly to
identify and serve a summons and complaint on these defendants after being given
notice that his failure to do so would result in dismissal of his claims. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 4(m) (district court may dismiss a claim for failure to effect timely service
after providing notice, and absent a showing of good cause for failure to serve); see
also Thompson v. Maldonado, 309 F.3d 107, 110 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth
standard of review).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Raiser’s discovery
motions before ruling on summary judgment because Raiser failed to carry his
burden to “proffer sufficient facts to show that the evidence sought exists, and that
it would prevent summary judgment.” Chance v. Pac-Tel Teletrac Inc., 242 F.3d
2 15-55048
1151, 1161 n.6 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Tatum v. City & County of San Francisco,
441 F.3d 1090, 1100 (9th Cir. 2006) (setting forth standard of review and
explaining that movant must show specific facts he hopes to discover and how
these facts would preclude summary judgment).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Raiser’s motion to
recuse the magistrate judge because Raiser did not establish that the magistrate
judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. See Jorgensen v. Cassiday,
320 F.3d 906, 911 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth standard of review); United States
v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 1453-34 (9th Cir. 1997) (substantive standard for
evaluating recusal motions).
We reject as without merit Raiser’s contentions that the district court erred
by failing to hold a scheduling conference and that the local rules are
unconstitutional.
AFFIRMED.
3 15-55048