NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted September 20, 2017*
Decided October 5, 2017
Before
MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
No. 17‐1968
ARLIN T. CALVIN, Appeal from the United States District
Plaintiff‐Appellant, Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin.
v.
No. 16‐CV‐552
SUB‐ZERO FREEZER, CO.,
Defendant‐Appellee. James D. Peterson,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
Arlin Calvin appeals the entry of summary judgment for his former employer,
Sub‐Zero Freezer Co., in this discrimination suit under the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101. The district court concluded that Calvin’s claims were barred by
the statute of limitations because he did not file an administrative charge within 300 days
of his discharge in 2002. We agree and affirm the judgment.
* We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately
present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. See Fed.
R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
No. 17‐1968 Page 2
Calvin, who had worked at Sub‐Zero for nearly a decade, suffered an unspecified
work‐related injury in August 2001 and no longer could perform his job on the
production line. He was assigned a new job that ended in July 2002. Calvin says that at
that time he “was walked out of the back door of Sub‐Zero” and was told by Sub‐Zero’s
Director of Human Resources that his “employment with Sub‐Zero was done.” A year
and a half later, Calvin received a letter from Sub‐Zero. It stated that he had exhausted
his unpaid leave under the collective bargaining agreement and confirmed that his job
had been terminated.
In 2004 Calvin filed an administrative complaint with the Wisconsin Department
of Workforce Development Equal Rights Division. His case languished for years (the
record contains conflicting accounts of the reasons for the delay), and in 2010 he filed
another administrative complaint. In late 2015 an administrative law judge determined
that there was not probable cause to believe that Sub‐Zero discriminated against him
based on his race, color, or disability.
Calvin then filed this suit under the ADA in 2016. The district judge initially
questioned whether Calvin’s case could be timely, given the dated nature of the events.
But the judge allowed the case to proceed because of uncertain details about the precise
date that Calvin’s job was terminated and whether he had ever received a right‐to‐sue
letter from the Equal Rights Division. The judge eventually entered summary judgment
for Sub‐Zero, concluding that Calvin’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations.
As the judge explained, Calvin knew in July 2002 that his employment was terminated
and yet did not file his administrative complaint until November 2004, long after the
applicable 300‐day limit. See Barrett v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 803 F.3d 893, 898 (7th Cir. 2015);
Roney v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 474 F.3d 455, 459–60 (7th Cir. 2007). The judge then denied
Calvin’s motion for reconsideration in which he argued—for the first time—that his
discharge did not become official until 2004, when he received the letter from Sub‐Zero
about his terminated job.
Before a plaintiff files a suit for employment discrimination under the ADA, he
must file a timely administrative complaint. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (adopting exhaustion
procedures set forth in Title VII for ADA claims); Kersting v. Wal‐Mart Stores, Inc., 250 F.3d
1109, 1118 (7th Cir. 2001); Fairchild v. Forma Scientific, Inc., 147 F.3d 567, 574 (7th Cir. 1998).
In Wisconsin, a plaintiff has 300 days from the alleged discriminatory act to file a
complaint with the EEOC or the state Equal Rights Division. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e‐5(e);
Johnson v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 280 F.3d 1125, 1128–29 (7th Cir. 2002). A plaintiff’s failure
to file a timely administrative complaint bars his suit. See Salas v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr.,
493 F.3d 913, 921 (7th Cir. 2007) (Title VII).
No. 17‐1968 Page 3
On appeal Calvin asserts that his administrative complaint to the Equal Rights
Division in 2004 was timely. He argues that he filed his administrative complaint within
the 300‐day deadline because his employment was terminated in February 2004, not
July 2002. We disagree. Calvin knew in July 2002 that Sub‐Zero ended his employment
when Sub‐Zero walked him out of the facility, told him that his job was “done,” and
stopped paying him. Those actions, presented to him at that time, were adverse
employment actions that started the limitations period. See de la Rama v. Ill. Dep’t of Human
Servs., 541 F.3d 681, 685–86 (7th Cir. 2008). The February 2004 letter, by contrast, did not
start (or restart) the limitations period. It merely reflected the consequence of Sub‐Zero’s
earlier decision in 2002, of which Calvin was aware in 2002, to end his employment.
See Barrett v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 803 F.3d 893, 898 (7th Cir. 2015). Because Calvin knew in
July 2002 that Sub‐Zero had taken these adverse employment actions against him, Calvin
had 300 days from that time to file a timely administrative complaint. See Del. State Coll.
v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980); Barrett, 803 F.3d at 898; Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
920 F.2d 446, 453 (7th Cir. 1990). His failure, then, to file an administrative complaint until
November 2004, over two years later, dooms his suit.
AFFIRMED.