NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 6 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOSE MANUEL LOPEZ, No. 16-55216
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 8:14-cv-01369-SVW-
RAO
v.
CITY OF SANTA ANA, a Municipal MEMORANDUM*
Corporation; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 26, 2017**
Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Jose Manuel Lopez appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 action alleging federal and state law
claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). United States v. Teng Jiao Zhou, 815 F.3d
639, 642 (9th Cir. 2016). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Lopez’s §§ 1983 and 1985 claims for
false arrest and false imprisonment on the basis of the applicable statute of
limitations because Lopez’s claims accrued more than two years before he filed
this action. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 397, 389 (2007) (§ 1983 claim
arising from false arrest “begins to run at the time the claimant becomes detained
pursuant to legal process,” and a false imprisonment claim begins to run when the
alleged false imprisonment ends); see also Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1 (two-year
statute of limitations for personal injury claims); Lukovsky v. City & County of San
Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2008) (California’s statute of limitations
for personal injury torts applies to §§ 1983 and 1985 claims).
The district court properly dismissed Lopez’s claims under the Eighth
Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and conspiracy claim under § 1985 because
Lopez failed to allege facts sufficient to state plausible claims for relief. See
Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings
are to be liberally construed, plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to
state a plausible claim for relief).
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The district court properly dismissed Lopez’s claim for violations of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), because
governmental entities cannot form the necessary criminal intent to commit a RICO
violation. See Pedrina v. Chun, 97 F.3d 1296, 1300 (9th Cir. 1996).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lopez’s motion for
summary judgment without prejudice in order to first resolve a pending motion for
judgment on the pleadings. See S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Lynch, 307 F.3d 794, 807
(9th Cir. 2002) (“District courts have ‘inherent power’ to control their dockets.”
(citation omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Lopez’s state law claims. See Ove v. Gwinn, 264
F.3d 817, 821, 826 (9th Cir. 2001) (setting forth standard of review and explaining
that “[a] court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state-
law claims once it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). We treat the dismissal of the state
law claims as a dismissal without prejudice. See Gini v. Las Vegas Metro. Police
Dep’t, 40 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994) (“When . . . the court dismisses the
federal claim leaving only state claims for resolution, the court should decline
3 16-55216
jurisdiction over the state claims and dismiss them without prejudice.” (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).
We reject as without merit Lopez’s contentions regarding the continuing
violation doctrine and that the district court improperly considered matters outside
the pleadings.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
All pending motions and requests are denied.
AFFIRMED.
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