RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1597-16T3
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF
CHILD PROTECTION AND
PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
N.J.,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
D.T.,
Defendant.
________________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE
GUARDIANSHIP OF D.U.O., a minor.
________________________________________________________________
Submitted September 20, 2017 – Decided October 10, 2017
Before Judges Haas and Rothstadt.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden County,
Docket No. FG-04-0168-16.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (James D. O'Kelly, Designated
Counsel, on the brief).
Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
attorney for respondent (Melissa H. Raksa,
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Joshua
Bohn, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law
Guardian for minor (Karen Ann Lodeserto,
Designated Counsel, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant, N.J. appeals from the Family Part's November 30,
2016 judgment of guardianship and order terminating her parental
rights to her daughter, D.U.O.1 The Division of Child Protection
and Permanency (Division) and the Law Guardian contend that the
order should be affirmed. After reviewing the record in light of
the applicable legal standards, we affirm substantially for the
reasons stated by Judge Francine I. Axelrad in her thorough oral
decision placed on the record on November 30, 2016.
The pertinent evidence was set forth in Judge Axelrad's
decision and need not be repeated at length here in detail.
Suffice it to say, defendant and her six children have been the
1
The child's putative father, D.T. was never involved in D.U.O.'s
life and did not appear in this matter. He also has not appealed
from the guardianship judgment and order terminating his parental
rights.
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subject of numerous referrals dating back to 2005 that were based
upon serious allegations of child abuse and neglect.
D.U.O. was born on October 30, 2008, while defendant was
incarcerated. In 2014, the Division removed D.U.O. from
defendant's custody based on its determination that defendant
failed to supervise and neglected D.U.O. The child has been in
placement since then, where she is being well cared for by resource
parents who are willing to adopt her and with whom D.U.O. wishes
to remain.
At the conclusion of the guardianship trial, Judge Axelrad
found that the Division had satisfied all four prongs of the best
interests test as set forth in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). This appeal
followed.
On appeal, defendant only challenges Judge Axelrad's findings
as to the third prong of the best interest test. Specifically,
she argues:
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
IT HAD CONSIDERED ALTERNATIVES TO
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS WHEN
IT ADOPTED THE DCPP'S SPECULATIVE
AND UNSUPPORTED ARGUMENTS
CONCERNING N.J.'S COUSIN, J.P.,
WITHOUT A RULE-OUT LETTER, RELEVANT
EXPERT TESTIMONY OR CASEWORKER
TESTIMONY THAT COULD BE RECONCILED
WITH THE TRIAL RECORD.
3 A-1597-16T3
Based on our review of the record, we find that Judge
Axelrod's decision as to the third prong is supported by
substantial credible evidence. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family
Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448-49 (2012). We also conclude
that defendant's appellate argument is without sufficient merit
to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Judge Axlerad made specific findings about the Division's efforts
to place the child with N.J.'s cousin, including the fact that
N.J.'s cousin was not willing to have D.U.O permanently placed
with her and that D.U.O preferred to remain with her resource
family. Moreover, the child could not safely live in the cousin's
home because defendant and her other children resided with the
cousin, and D.U.O. being in the same house with her mother and
certain siblings jeopardized her safety.
Also, the Division's admitted failure to issue a "rule out
letter," see N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12.1(b), does not warrant jeopardizing
the safety of the child or her entitlement to permanency without
further delay. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. K.L.W.,
419 N.J. Super. 568, 581 (App. Div. 2011) ("Delay of permanency
or reversal of termination based on the Division's noncompliance
with its statutory obligations is warranted only when it is in the
best interests of the child").
Affirmed.
4 A-1597-16T3