State v. Barnes

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IN CLERKS OFFICE
This opinion was filed for record
SUPEBE COURT,STOE OF WASHMGTQN
9
DATE_ OCT
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CHIEFjusnce
SUSAN L. CARLSON
SUPREME COURT CLERK

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Petitioner, No. 93829-6

V. En Banc

JOSHUA M.BARNES,
Filed OCT 1 2 20:
Respondent.

OWENS,J. — In 2015, after attempting to steal a riding lawn mower,Joshua

Barnes was arrested and charged with theft of a motor vehicle. He filed a motion to

dismiss, claiming that a riding lawn mower is not a "motor vehicle" under ROW

9A.56.065, Washington's theft of a motor vehicle statute.

ROW 9A.56.065 prohibits theft of a motor vehicle. However,neither the statute

nor the criminal code explicitly defines the term "motor vehicle." Though a plain

reading ofthe term could conceivably include a riding lawn mower,the legislature

intended otherwise. Because the act itself denotes a restrained definition, we find that as
State V. Barnes
No. 93829-6

a matter oflaw, a riding lawn mower is not a"motor vehicle" for purposes ofthe theft of

a motor vehicle statute.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2015, Barnes and his girlfriend allegedly tried to steal a riding lawn mower

from a property outside Leavenworth, Washington. After seeing a pickup truck drive

past her home,the property owner heard her riding lawn mower starting up. Looking

out a window, she saw Barnes attempting to ride her lawn mower up a ramp and onto

the bed of his pickup truck. The owner confronted Barnes, who returned the lawn

mower. As he and his girlfriend drove away, the owner wrote down the license plate

number and called the police, providing a description of both individuals. Barnes was

arrested two days later and charged with second degree theft and second degree

criminal trespass. The State later added the charge oftheft of a motor vehicle under

RCW 9A.56.065 and 9A.56.020.

Barnes objected to the motor vehicle charge under State v. Knapstad, 107

Wn.2d 346,729 P.2d 48(1986). He argued that the definition of"motor vehicle"

does not include riding lawn mowers. He pointed to RCW 46.04.320 and RCW

46.04.670, the definitions of"motor vehicle" and "vehicle" in our vehicle and traffic

statutes, noting that a riding lawn mower is similar to a golf cart under those statutes.

Because golf carts are explicitly excluded from either definition, Barnes contended

that the legislature similarly intended to exclude riding lawn mowers. Because lawn
State V. Barnes
No. 93829-6

mowers are designed for pruning grass rather than for transporting people or cargo on

a public roadway, he argued they are not included in the theft of a motor vehicle

statute.

The State countered that the statute is clear on its face. It noted that the lawn

mower is "self-propelled," as required by RCW 46.04.320. Further, it is "capable of

being moved upon a public highway" while carrying people or cargo as required by

RCW 46.04.670. Because a lawn mower fits into the definitions provided in our

vehicle and traffic laws, and because the legislature did not include an explicit

exception for lawn mowers,the State argued a riding lawn mower qualifies as a

"motor vehicle."

The superior court agreed with Barnes. It explained that if a statute is plain on

its face, the court must give effect to that plain meaning. However, it noted the court

is also required to take into account the statute's context and to effectuate the

legislature's intent. Accordingly, the trial court found the legislature had not intended

that riding lawn mowers be included under the theft of a motor vehicle statute and

dismissed the charge.

The State delayed prosecution of Barnes's remaining charges and moved the

Court of Appeals for review. The Court of Appeals affumed. State v. Barnes, 196

Wn. App. 261, 382 P.3d 729(2016). It noted that if a statute is clear, the plain

language should be taken on its face. However,the court's fundamental task is to
State V. Barnes
No. 93829-6

"ascertain and carry out the intent ofthe legislature." Id. at 266. It opined that the

statute is elear on its faee, but questioned "whether we should always follow the plain

meaning prineiple." Id. at 269. It reasoned that "[a] thing within the letter ofthe law,

but not within its spirit, may be held inoperative when it would otherwise lead to an

absurd conclusion." Id. at 271 (citing Murphy v. CampbellInv. Co., 79 Wn.2d 417,

421,486 P.2d 1080 (1971)). Because ofthis, the Court of Appeals agreed with the

trial court that a riding lawn mower is not a "motor vehicle" for purposes ofthe

statute. Id. at 276.

The State sought diseretionary review, whieh we granted. State v. Barnes, 187

Wn.2d 1017, 390 P.3d 348(2017).

ISSUE

Is a riding lawn mower a "motor vehicle" for purposes ofRCW 9A.56.065?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Knapstad,the trial eourt should dismiss a eriminal charge ifthere are

"no disputed material faets and the undisputed faets do not raise a prima faeie ease of

guilt as a matter of law." State v. Bauer, 180 Wn.2d 929, 935, 329 P.3d 67(2014)

(citing Knapstad, 107 Wn.2d at 356-57). We review Knapstad findings de novo.

State V. Montana, 169 Wn.2d 872, 876,239 P.3d 360(2010).
State V. Barnes
No. 93829-6

ANALYSIS

Our "paramount duty in statutory interpretation is to give effect to the

Legislature's intent." State v. Elgin, 118 Wn.2d 551, 555, 825 P.2d 314(1992)(citing

Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 113 Wn.2d 288,292,778 P.2d 1047

(1989)). When a statute does not define a term, we give the term '"its plain and

ordinary meaning unless a contrary legislative intent is indicated.'" State v. Jones, 172

Wn.2d 236, 242,257 P.3d 616(quoting Ravenscroft v. Wash. Water Power Co., 136

Wn.2d 911, 920-21,969 P.2d 75 (1998)). We generally derive this plain meaning

from the "context ofthe entire act" as well as other related statutes. Jametsky v.

Olsen, 179 Wn.2d 756, 762, 317 P.3d 1003(2014)(citing Dep't ofEcology v.

Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 11,43 P.3d 4(2002)). We may also

determine the plain meaning of an undefined term from a standard English dictionary.

State V. Fuentes, 183 Wn.2d 149, 160, 352 P.3d 152(citing State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d

739, 754, 193 P.3d 678 (2008)).

Here, RCW 9A.56.065 does not explicitly define "motor vehicle." Both parties

suggest we use the term "vehicle" as defined in RCW 9A.04.110(29), using by

reference the definition of"motor vehicle" in our vehicle and transport laws, RCW

46.04.320,.670. However, we decline to do so. The legislature chose not to define

"motor vehicle" in our theft statutes. Because the term is undefmed, we give it its
State V. Barnes
No. 93829-6

plain and ordinary meaning as ascertained from a standard English dictionary.

Fuentes, 183 Wn.2d at 160.^

A "motor vehicle" is defined as "an automotive vehicle not operated on rails;

esp[ecially]: one with rubber tires for use on highways." WEBSTER'S THIRD New

International Dictionary 1476 (2002). "Automotive" is defined as "containing

within itself the means of propulsion ... of, relating to, or concerned with vehicles or

machines that propel themselves (as automobiles, trucks, airplanes, motorboats)." Id.

at 148. In the context of this statute, these definitions contemplate cars and other

automobiles designed for transport of people or cargo, but not machines designed for

other purposes yet capable oftransporting people or cargo. Yet these definitions

could conceivably uiclude riding lawn mowers. Though designed for pruning grass,

riding lawn mowers are nonetheless self-propelled means of transport. However,the

legislature has explicitly indicated a contrary legislative intent.

^ The dissent argues that we should apply the definition of"vehicle" from ROW 9A.04.110(29)
because a "motor vehicle" is always also a "vehicle." Dissent at 3-4. But even identical terms
can have different meanings in different parts of a single statute. Yates v. United States, U.S.
, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1082, 191 L. Ed. 2d 64 (2015). Here, we are confronted with two slightly
different terms:"motor vehicle" in RCW 9A.56.065, the theft statute under which Barnes was
prosecuted, and "vehicle" in RCW 9A.04.110(29), the catchall definitional statute. The
legislature enacted the catchall definition over 30 years before it enacted the theft statute. Laws
OF 2007, ch. 199, § 29 (enacting RCW 9A.56.065); Laws OF 1975, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 260,
§ 9A.04.110(enacting definition of"vehicle" now codified at RCW 9A.04.110(29)). And when
it enacted the theft statute, in 2007, it simultaneously codified a statement offindings and intent
that equates "motor vehicles" with cars. See discussion infra. Given this context, we decline to
equate "motor vehicle" in RCW 9A.56.065 with "vehicle" in the catchall definitional statute.
State V. Barnes
No. 93829-6

The act itself indicates that the legislature contemplated automobiles, rather

than riding lawn mowers, when it used the term "motor vehicle" in the theft of a

motor vehicle statute. The 2007 act's short title is "the Elizabeth Nowak-Washington

auto theft prevention act." LAWS OF 2007, ch. 199, § 29.^ In its findings, the
legislature used the term "motor vehicle" or "vehicle" 10 times. Id. % I. Yet, it used

the terms "car," "auto," or "auto theft" 14 times. Id. It ftirther noted that "[t]he

family car is a priority of most individuals and families." Id. § l(l)(a). While other

crime had decreased over time,"auto theft ha[d] increased over fifty-five percent"

since 1994; over 50,000 thefts occurred in 2005 alone. Id. § l(l)(b). The legislature

also noted that "auto theft ... is linked more and more to offenders engaged in other

crimes." Id. § l(l)(c). Indeed,"[m]any stolen vehicles are used by criminals

involved in such crimes as robbery, burglary, and assault." Id. The legislature passed

this bill with the explicit purpose of curbing the rising rate of auto thefts.

While not necessary to our holding, the statute's legislative history also

supports the conclusion that the legislature never intended riding lawn mowers to be

included under the theft of a motor vehicle statute. Before passage, advocates ofthe

bill noted the high rate of auto theft and the comparatively low penalty for repeat

offenders under the then-current theft scheme. H.B. Rep. ON ENGROSSED THIRD

^ Elizabeth Nowak was a Seattle police officer who was killed in a collision involving a stolen
car. Verbatim Report of Proceedings at 4-5.

7
State V. Barnes
No. 93829-6

Substitute Bill 1001, at 9-10, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess.(Wash. 2007). They explained

auto theft's connection to other crimes, including identity theft, methamphetamine

possession, and gang activity. Id. It is clear that auto theft, not lawn mower theft, was

the primary concern when the bill was drafted. Where that is the ease, courts will,

consistent with other relevant statutory language, construe a general term so as to

further that specific purpose. See Yates v. United States, U.S. , 135 S. Ct.

1074, 1080, 191 L. Ed. 2d. 64(2015)(construing the term "tangible object," in

destruction-of-evidence statute passed to combat corporate fraud, to incorporate only

those objects that can store information, and thus exclude fish).

Here, Barnes did not attempt to steal a "family car," nor is the riding lawn

mower he attempted to take a comparable investment to a family car. He did not

attempt to steal anything that could reasonably be used for a later robbery, burglary, or

assault. There is nothing to indicate a connection between the theft oflawn mowers

and drug possession or gang activity.

The plain meaning of"motor vehicle" is clear. The legislature has explicitly

indicated it intended to focus this statute on cars and other automobiles. It was

responding to increased auto theft, not increased riding lawn mower theft. Though the

definition of"motor vehicle" could be more expansive in other statutes, the only

statute at issue here is the theft of a motor vehicle statute. Because of this, we hold

that a riding lawn mower is not a "motor vehicle" under RCW 9A.56.065.
State V. Barnes
No. 93829-6

CONCLUSION

We hold that a riding lawn mower is not a "motor vehicle" under ROW

9A.56.065. The statute does not define "motor vehicle" for purposes oftheft.

However,the legislature has made its intent clear. The session law indicates it was

designed to combat auto theft and associated crime, not the theft oflawn mowers.

Barnes cannot be charged with theft of a motor vehicle for stealing a riding lawn

mower. Therefore, we affirm the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court for

further proceedings.
State V. Barnes
No. 93829-6

WE CONCUR:

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