J-S56040-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
CHARLES HILLER,
Appellant No. 3274 EDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order September 22, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-51-CR-0904821-1990
BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED OCTOBER 12, 2017
Appellant, Charles Hiller, appeals pro se from the order dismissing his
third serial petition brought pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act
(PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541–9546. The PCRA court denied Appellant’s
petition, filed seventeen years after his judgment of sentence became final,
as facially untimely with no statutory exception to the time bar pleaded and
proven. Appellant claims the benefit of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460
(2012) through Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, as revised (Jan.
27, 2016). We affirm.
Appellant, born September 22, 1971, does not dispute that on July 13,
1990, when he was eighteen years of age (two months before his nineteenth
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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birthday), he fatally shot the victim, Joseph Gibson. At the same time,
Appellant also shot at a second person, Blaylan Freeman. A jury convicted
him of murder of the first degree, aggravated assault, possession of an
instrument of crime, and recklessly endangering another person. The trial
court sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a consecutive term of not less
than seven and one-half nor more than fifteen years of incarceration. This
Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on February 3, 1994. Our
Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal on December 27, 1994.
Appellant filed two previous PCRA petitions which did not result in relief.
On August 21, 2012, over seventeen years later, Appellant filed the
instant third PCRA petition, pro se. In response to the PCRA court’s notice of
intent to dismiss, as untimely, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, Appellant filed
two amended petitions. The court dismissed the petition (as amended) on
September 22, 2016. This timely appeal followed, on October 18, 2016.1
Appellant raises one question for our review:
[1.] Did the PCRA court commit an error of law where it
failed to conduct the proper analysis in determining the
substantive nature of [Appellant’s] claim of cruel & unusual
punishment under the 8th amendment, where Miller v.
Alabama and Montgomery v. [Louisiana], bars the imposition
of a [mandatory] life without parole sentence for juveniles and
adolescents without first considering the mitigating factors of
youth?
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1 The court did not order a statement of errors. The court filed its opinion on
January 24, 2017. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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(Appellant’s Brief, at 1) (unnecessary capitalization omitted).2
Our standard and scope of review are well-settled.
On appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard and scope
of review is limited to determining whether the PCRA court’s
findings are supported by the record and without legal error.
[Our] scope of review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court
and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable to
the prevailing party at the PCRA court level. The PCRA court’s
credibility determinations, when supported by the record, are
binding on this Court. However, this Court applies a de novo
standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal conclusions.
* * *
We note the timeliness of a PCRA petition implicates the
jurisdiction of this Court and the PCRA court. Pennsylvania law
makes clear no court has jurisdiction to hear an untimely PCRA
petition. The PCRA confers no authority upon this Court to
fashion ad hoc equitable exceptions to the PCRA time-bar[.]
This is to accord finality to the collateral review process. A
petition for relief under the PCRA, including a second or
subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date
the judgment becomes final unless the petition alleges, and the
petitioner proves, that an exception to the time for filing the
petition, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii),
is met. The [A]ct provides, in relevant part, as follows.
§ 9545. Jurisdiction and proceedings
* * *
(b) Time for filing petition.—
(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a
second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year
of the date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition
alleges and the petitioner proves that:
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2 Appellant numbers eight sequential pages as “1.” The question appears on
the sixth of the eight “1” pages.
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(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the
result of interference by government officials with the
presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution
or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws
of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated
were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that
was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United
States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the
time period provided in this section and has been held by
that court to apply retroactively.
(2) Any petition invoking an exception provided in
paragraph (1) shall be filed within 60 days of the date the
claim could have been presented.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b).
Commonwealth v. Medina, 92 A.3d 1210, 1214–15 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en
banc) (case citations, internal quotation marks and other incidental
punctuation omitted).
Here, Appellant filed the instant petition over seventeen years after his
judgment was final. Therefore, it is untimely on its face unless Appellant
can plead and prove a statutory exception to the time-bar. However,
Appellant does not attempt to prove an explicit exception to the PCRA time-
bar.
Instead he argues, in somewhat meandering fashion, that scientific
studies of human brain development as a gradual process extending into the
mid-twenties entitle him to a remand. He wants an evidentiary hearing to
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show that at eighteen, when he committed the murder, his brain was still
immature. He maintains that because his brain was still immature when he
committed the murder, he is entitled to the benefit of Miller, supra.3
Notably, Miller expressly applies only to those defendants who were “under
the age of 18 at the time of their crimes[.]” Miller, supra at 465 (emphasis
added).4
Thus, Appellant’s argument asks for an extension of Miller. It does
not plead and prove an exception to the time-bar. See Commonwealth v.
Cintora, 69 A.3d 759, 764 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied, 81 A.3d 75
(Pa. 2013) (contention that newly-recognized constitutional right in Miller
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3 In pertinent part, the Miller Court held that mandatory-sentencing
schemes requiring that all children convicted of homicide receive lifetime
incarceration without possibility of parole, violate the Eighth Amendment’s
ban on cruel and unusual punishment. See Miller, supra at 489.
4 Moreover, Appellant’s “where do you draw the line” argument, even if
timely and otherwise reviewable, would not merit relief. The claim has
already been raised and rejected for the issue of capital punishment. See
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005):
Drawing the line at 18 years of age is subject, of course, to
the objections always raised against categorical rules. The
qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear
when an individual turns 18. . . . For the reasons we have
discussed, however, a line must be drawn. . . . The age of 18 is
the point where society draws the line for many purposes
between childhood and adulthood. It is, we conclude, the age at
which the line for death eligibility ought to rest.
Id. at 574.
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should be extended to others eighteen or over does not render petition
timely pursuant to section 9545(b)(1)(iii)); accord, Commonwealth v.
Furgess, 149 A.3d 90, 94 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citing Cintora, supra).
Appellant fails to plead and prove a statutory exception to the PCRA
time-bar. The PCRA court properly dismissed his petition as untimely.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/29/17
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